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Abstract 
 
Britain’s railways were essential for the development of the British economy throughout 
the nineteenth century; however, by 1919 their seemingly unassailable position as goods 
carriers was about to be eroded by the lorry.  The railway strike of September 1919 had 
presented traders with an opportunity to observe the capabilities of road haulage, but there 
is no study which focuses on the process of modal shift in goods distribution from the 
trader’s perspective.  This thesis therefore marks an important departure from the existing 
literature by placing goods transport into its working context.   
 
The importance of food as an everyday essential commodity adds a further dimension to 
the status of goods transport within Britain’s supply chain, particularly when the fragility 
of food products means that minimising the impact of distance, time and spoilage before 
consumption is vital in ensuring effective and practical logistical solutions.  These are 
considered in a series of four case studies on specific food commodities and retail 
distribution, which also hypothesise that the modal shift from rail to road reflected the 
changing character of transport demand between 1919 and 1975.  Consequently, this thesis 
explores the notion that the centre of governance over the supply chain transferred between 
food producers, manufacturers, government and chain retailer, thereby driving changes in 
transport technology and practice. 
  
This thesis uses archival material to provide a qualitative study into the food industry’s 
relationship with transport where the case studies incorporate supply chain analyses to 
permit an exploration of how changes in structure might have influenced the modal shift 
from rail to road distribution.  It subsequently discusses how and when the emergence of 
mass-consumerism, as well as the intensification of the chain retailer’s quest for 
competitive advantage, effected a permanent change in the balance of food logistics in 
Britain before 1975.   
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Introduction 
 
This thesis explores the role of the transport user in the development of food transport by 
rail and road in Britain between 1919 and 1975.  Existing accounts of transport history 
have focused upon political and demand-side issues; furthermore, the process of moving 
goods from supplier to consumer has taken second preference to passenger mobility.  The 
mobility of things is therefore largely nebulous, only emerging to underpin debates 
regarding rail and road competition.  Similarly, food history is characterised by the culture 
of consumption, experiences of consumerism, the acquisition of luxury products and the 
development of in-store processes.1 Consequently, this thesis offers an alternative 
perspective that not only describes the process of reducing space and time, but also places 
it within the context of the control of dynamic distribution chains and its impact upon 
demand-side transport requirements.  Furthermore, it provides a significant advance 
beyond a simple history of goods transport in modern Britain by incorporating and 
contributing to histories of consumption, manufacturing and retail. 
 The rationale behind choosing food as a focus for studying freight is its human 
connection; the need to feed the population has justified the existence of trade and 
government agencies to administer and facilitate its supply.  With the existing transport 
research agenda reflecting upon the why and wherefore of passenger experiences and 
cultural interactions, little has been written about the interrelationship between transport 
and the changing consumer environment.  The perishable nature of some foods also raises 
practical challenges for transport organisations, thus permitting an exploration of how 
modes of transport adapted to convey specific commodities.   
 Part of the problem with researching the relationship between food and transport 
is that its presence is frequently obscured by the prominence and prestige of the user.  
Freight transport is a key case in point, as the structure of Britain’s railways, as well as the 
allure of the locomotives and rolling stock, have garnered a plethora of column inches over 
the actual process of shifting commodities from A to B.  Even this directly contrasts with 
road goods transport, which has yet to attract the academic and public interest it deserves.  
Yet the latter’s role as successor to the railways in an array of freight flows poses the 
question- why was there a transition?  More importantly, where does logistics fit within the 
narrative of Britain’s consumer society during the mid-twentieth century?  This thesis 
therefore considers how regulatory and market forces affected transport development. 
                                                 
1
 S. W. Mintz, ‘The Changing Roles of Food in the Study of Consumption’ in Consumption and the World of 
Goods, ed. J. Brewer and R. Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 261. 
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 The author has already indicated that an examination of the literature, exemplified 
by accounts by Colin Divall, Peter Scott and, going further back, Gilbert Walker, reveals a 
predominant focus upon passenger mobility, management structures and purely legislative 
influences.2 However, it has also provided inspiration for selecting a case-based approach 
to the thesis which provides insight into the operation of goods transport networks through 
specific traffic flows and assist the author in addressing the following research questions: 
 
1. How was food traffic moved at a time of profound social and economic change, 
and did a transfer of control within Britain’s food supply chain to the retailer 
influence the modal shift from rail to road between 1919 and 1975? 
2. What impact did a trader’s perceptions of service quality and government 
legislative intervention have upon food distribution throughout the period, and how 
did this affect he relationship between rail and road transport?  
 
In answering these questions, this thesis will make a unique contribution to British 
transport historiography by considering the development of road transport within each case 
to establish the motivation for change from a demand, rather than supply-side perspective.  
Furthermore, case studies of specific traffic flows have been overlooked as a tool for 
determining the relationship between traders and transport, and this approach presents an 
opportunity to tie both technological and transport management strands together.  In the 
case of the United States, Shane Hamilton has suggested that the emergence of 
independent road haulage was crucial in the development of a mass-consumerist market.3 
Consequently, the author agrees with Mark Casson and Mary B. Rose that business 
innovation is path-dependant; this assessment places emphasis upon ‘...the impact of firm-
specific routines on the choice of technology and as such is invaluable in the explanation 
of divergent, as opposed to converging business developments’, and appears to contradict 
any suggestion that market integration was a predictable economic process.4  
                                                 
2
 P. Scott, “British Railways and the Challenge from Road Haulage, 1919-1939,” Twentieth Century British 
History, 13 (2002), pp. 101-120; C. Divall, “Conceiving Distribution in the United Kingdom: The (London 
and) North Eastern Railway’s Discursive Response to Road Haulage, 1921–1939” in From Rails to Roads 
and Back Again? A Century of Transport Competition and Interdependency, ed. R. Roth and C. Divall 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015), pp. 91-108.  
3
 S. Hamilton, Trucking Country: The Road to America’s Wal-Mart Economy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), pp. 4-5. 
4
 M. Casson and Mary B. Rose, “Institutions and the Evolution of Modern Business: Introduction” in 
Institutions and the Evolution of Modern Business, ed. M. Casson and Mary B. Rose (London: Frank Cass, 
1998), p. 2; also: G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, “The Governance of Global Value Chains,” 
Review of International Political Economy, 12 (2005), p. 80. 
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The thesis therefore argues that whilst the existence of a national transport network 
- the railways - was essential to the development of long-distance, national food 
distribution chains in the nineteenth century, its use was periodically marked by trader 
input as business developments diverged away from what the railways could provide.  This 
raises the question of the extent to which the railway companies were receptive to the 
market pressures faced by their users, and whether this had any bearing upon the industry’s 
longer-term relationship with the trading community.  Consequently, the thesis aims to 
investigate the reasons for the modal shift from rail to road that took place after the Second 
World War from a demand-side perspective, and the extent to which this coincided with 
the emergence of the retail chain as a governing enterprise within Britain’s food supply 
chain since decontrol of food rationing in the mid-1950s.5 
 
Methodology: supply chain analysis, perspective, chronology 
and structure 
 
The case study approach has been informed by the food and transport literature consulted, 
and presents an opportunity to explore the relationship between the control exercised by 
market stakeholders over the supply chain and the process of distribution.  The author 
proposes that distribution is taken for granted in histories of consumption and 
consumerism; indeed, Victoria de Grazia notes that ‘the evolution of modern systems of 
distribution is astonishingly under-studied’. Each case study thus begins with a supply 
chain analysis which provides an analytical tool for charting the structural changes taking 
place within food distribution to explain how and why modal shift from rail to road 
haulage took place between 1919 and 1975. 
 Supply, or value chain analysis provides an analytical framework for considering 
the linkage between globalisation and the unequal sharing of gains when participating in an 
economic activity.7 It examines how and where value is added to a commodity throughout 
the chain before consumer purchase.  However, the approach requires full access to 
financial data and close contact with the organisations involved; access constraints posed 
by the quality and quantity of surviving data means that a historic analysis of British food 
                                                 
5
 J. Burnett, Plenty and Want: A Social History of Diet in England from 1815 to the Present Day, 2nd Edition 
(London: Scolar Press, 1979), pp. 337-338. 
6
 V. de Grazia, “Changing Consumption regimes in Europe, 1930-70: Comparative perspectives on the 
distribution problem” in S. Strasser, C. McGovern, M. Judt (eds.), Getting and Spending: European and 
American Consumer Societies in the 20th Century (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 59. 
7
 R. Kaplinsky, “Globalisation and Unequalisation: What can be Learned from Value Chain Analysis?,” The 
Journal of Development Studies, 37 (2000), p. 118; Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, “The Governance of 
Global Value Chains,” pp. 78-104. 
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supply chains will demand a considerable modification in scope.  The issue was 
encountered during the preparation of J. B. Jeffreys’ The Distribution of Consumer Goods, 
which details the process in 1938.8 No prior means of collecting figures existed, whilst the 
first Census of Distribution published that year focused upon the direct relationships 
between each of the key stages in a supply chain; indeed, a full survey of the costs of items 
such as transport and items such as wastage to determine the motives behind transport 
choices, to quote Jeffreys, is an impossibility until the entire ‘universe was known’.9 
Whilst Jeffreys proceeded to provide estimates of the cost of distribution for a 
variety of consumer goods, the lack of a cost breakdown has rendered the isolation of costs 
directly attributable to transport impossible to discern.10 Indeed, the difficulty in obtaining 
data is current in 2016, as traditional accounting methods focus upon product costs rather 
than customer costs; the cost of transport to a food manufacturer is aggregated with the 
figures for onward distribution.11 This thesis therefore repurposes the framework to 
describe the changes taking place within specific cases of food distribution through the 
concept of supply chain governance.  The author defines supply chain governance as the 
ability of organisations and systems to manage commodity distribution processes.12 The 
former may be termed ‘executive governance’, which details how firms can use their 
market position to drive change, whilst the latter concerns ‘legislative governance’, defined 
as the regulation of the terms of market participation by government and firms.13 
 By charting shifts in supply chain governance within the case studies, the author 
examines food transport from the user’s perspective, thus giving a ‘history from below’ 
that compensates for the fragmentary quantitative data on the subject.  The aim is to 
highlight that whilst it is possible to argue that Britain’s railways and road hauliers faced 
financial, organisational and regulatory challenges throughout the period, the trader’s 
demand for reliable, flexible and affordable transport remained constant.  As will be seen, 
the steady growth of road haulage in the late 1950s continued despite the low level, as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product, of British government investment in road 
infrastructure in comparison to other European nations cited by Scott, with 151,900 
additional private lorries operating in 1959 compared to 1956.14  
                                                 
8
 J. B. Jefferys, M. Maccoll and G. L. Levett, The Distribution of Consumer Goods: A Factual Study of 
Methods and Costs in the United Kingdom in 1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. vii. 
9
 Jefferys et al., The Distribution of Consumer Goods, p. 5. 
10
 Jefferys et al., The Distribution of Consumer Goods, p. 88. 
11
 M. Christopher, Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Fifth Edition (Harlow: Pearson, 2016), p. 69. 
12
 Christopher, Logistics and Supply Chain Management, p. 3. 
13
 Kaplinsky, “Globalisation and Unequalisation,” p. 124.   
14
 P. Scott, “Public Sector Investment and Britain’s Post-war Economic Performance: A Case Study of Roads 
Policy,” Journal of European Economic History, 34 (2005), pp. 412-413; figure calculated from data in 
Appendix 2.5. 
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The thesis also marks a departure from earlier histories of transport as the author 
considers that the reason for the decline of goods transport by rail is more complex than the 
‘what the traffic will bear’ argument about price competition; indeed, the ascendancy of 
road haulage was in part the result of large enterprises making commercial decisions to 
vertically integrate transport in the interests of establishing competitive advantage against 
their rivals, and was not just a result of ‘cherry picking’ on the part of the private road 
haulier.15 Indeed, as discussed in chapter 2, the railways possessed tools to compete with 
road haulage in the guise of ‘exceptional’ and ‘agreed’ charges. 
 The scope and chronology of the thesis also deserves comment.  Although a more 
in-depth comparison and discussion of transport investment and operations relative to other 
European nations would be useful in placing Britain’s transition from rail to road transport 
within an international context, the author believes that the potential scale of the task 
makes it suitable for a future collaborative research project.  Equally, the global links of 
Britain’s food supply chain have been confined to the port where imported foods are 
received by the nation’s inland transport networks.  Only passing reference will be made to 
canals, as their role in food conveyance was much-diminished during the twentieth 
century.16 Whilst the regulations governing the provision of freight transport has received 
previous analysis, rail is favoured over road.17 This has been partially dictated by 
difficulties in obtaining records pertaining to the transport of goods by road, and a 
predilection towards the social and economic implications of personal and public 
transport.18 The chronology of the thesis has been selected to reflect the expansion of road 
distribution since the First World War, and permits an account of rail transport that 
encompasses the ‘grouping’ of Britain’s railways in 1921 and the cessation of their post-
Beeching contraction in 1975.   
A key pitfall is the variable quality and quantity of evidence for each case study 
across the period; whilst there is rich archival material for the inter-war and immediate 
post-war years, statistical evidence is comparatively thin as commercial sensitivities are 
                                                 
15
 Divall, “Conceiving Distribution in the United Kingdom,” pp. 102-103; P. Scott, “British Railways and the 
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more likely to affect access to post-1960 material.  However, whilst the period 1930-1950 
represents an era of development, the late 1950s and 1960s encompassed the transition to, 
and subsequent normalisation of, post-war concepts such as self-service and the resurgence 
of road haulage in the debate on the best mode of transport for long-distance food 
distribution in Britain.19 A case study approach therefore ensures that each chapter is 
themed by commodity, whilst the use of a broadly chronological structure within each 
permits the overlaying of these elements to identify the timing of demand-side changes and 
how they influenced the transport of specific food products. 
 The thesis begins with a contextual chapter providing an overview of our 
understanding of freight transport in Britain that focuses upon the effect of government 
regulation.  Consequently, the notion of transport coordination is encountered; the author 
defines the first as the voluntary combination of more than one mode of transport in a 
transport mission regardless of ownership, with each mode employed in the task to which 
they are most suited.20 Following the contextual chapter are three commodity-based case 
studies.  Their selection stems from the fact that the National Railway Museum (NRM), 
which has part-sponsored this thesis, has a strong collection of goods vehicles on display 
relating to milk, livestock and meat, and confectionery distribution.  A fourth case study 
will analyse the role of transport within the food retail sector.  This approach has been 
adopted to provide an effective means of concentrating research within a well-defined 
framework.  Furthermore, the approach lends itself to the synthesis of commodity 
biographies that trace the progress of goods through the supply chain, thereby ascertaining 
how different food trades interacted with transport.   
 Each case study presents an opportunity to appraise the overall performance of 
rail and road in conveying these traffics between 1919 and 1975.  The first case study 
focuses upon milk; a commodity sold to the consumer in its ‘fresh’ state, notwithstanding 
pasteurisation and other treatments, and occupies a prominent place within the national diet 
as an essential, everyday food staple that was prone to spoilage.  The study of milk 
distribution presents an opportunity for determining how rail and road transport providers 
responded to the challenge of conveying a perishable product over long distances, whilst 
analysis into the shifting supply chain governance between producer and wholesaler will 
reveal how the agenda for rail and road competition was being set throughout the period. 
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 The second tackles the complex supply networks associated with the distribution 
of fresh meat, and considers how the interplay between domestic and import markets 
determined approaches to transport.  The case study thus identifies three distinct flows 
associated with the fresh meat trade; namely the supply of cattle for fattening prior to 
slaughter and the transport of home-killed and imported meat.  The question of governance 
over the supply chain is raised through an analysis of the actions of a fragmentary domestic 
livestock industry, government intervention in the market throughout the 1930s and 1940s, 
and rising retailer influence within the trade from the mid-1950s.  These factors provide 
the context for the state of distribution in the industry, underpinning the developments in 
rail and road transport technology associated with the conveyance of this commodity. 
 The third case study considers the food manufacturer’s relationship with transport 
through an examination of confectionery distribution.  The reasons for choosing 
confectionery as a case study are two-fold; it encompasses luxury products with growing 
mass consumer appeal, and it represents an industry which had established close control 
over its marketing and branding activities by 1919, the importance of which provides a 
basis for examining management attitudes towards transport as a means of effecting 
nationwide distribution.  Consequently, the chapter analyses a supply chain that was 
initially governed by the manufacturer, and explores how this affected rail and road 
transport before the retail sector grew in influence during the post-war period.  Finally, the 
study focuses upon the transport arrangements of Rowntree of York, which has seen little 
previous research despite its status as a nationally-recognised brand.     
 The final case study considers how the transformation of retail from counter to 
self-service in the mid-twentieth century influenced the sector’s transport requirements and 
its wider supply chain.  The retailer’s position at the end of a complex supply chain meant 
that transport was initially used as a means of service-based competition as manufacturer-
imposed Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) on branded goods had limited scope for price 
competition.  However, the thesis hypothesises that the post-war shift to self-service 
caused a shift in the status-quo, and by studying the transport arrangements of retail 
organisations including the Co-operative movement and Marks & Spencer, the chapter 
hypothesises that a combination of the retailer’s interface with the consumer and wider 
improvements in distribution technology and infrastructure empowered large regional and 
national retail chains to determine the nature of transport throughout the supply chain. 
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Chapter 1 - Historiography, sources and themes  
 
1.1 Food overview 
 
The research agenda set by this thesis has emerged from the fact that the relationship 
between food and transport is under-represented within the existing historiography of 
twentieth century Britain.  Furthermore, the supply chain as a device for engineering a 
holistic approach towards food distribution has itself seen little use, despite historical 
geographers such as Elaine Hartwick and food historians such as Hans Teuteberg extolling 
the virtues of adopting such an approach in the past two decades.21 Hartwick implies that 
whilst research undertaken by sociologists examines broad material-cultural implications, 
the existing literature ‘overemphasizes the cultural mechanisms of buying’.22 
Consequently, the literature on consumption represented by John Benson and Laura 
Ugolini reflect upon themes such as status, gender and the satisfaction of ambitions in 
explaining changes in demand.23   
The sociological approach to distribution history thus risks overlooking basic 
factors such as technology, geography and economy; concepts which are referenced by 
Peter Atkins and Ian Bowler.24 This is equally true of business histories about specific food 
firms, as Charles Wilson’s history of Unilever and Smith, Child and Rowlinson’s 
examination of Cadbury’s lack a full appreciation of the importance of moving 
commodities between producer and consumer.25 The omission of a supply-chain approach 
to the history of food distribution in Britain belies the interrelationship between different 
stages of the food-chain such as food processing, manufacturing, retail and transport.26 
Furthermore, whilst the extremes of food supply such as agriculture and retail have 
enjoyed much academic attention in accounts by Edith Whetham, John Martin and Kim 
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Humphery, they generally provide an overview of the structures of the industries in 
question, and are therefore considered in isolation from broader contexts.27 However, the 
study of specific economic activities in the context of supply and demand permits the 
exploration of long-term changes within participating organisations, and how these 
influenced the character of food transport in Britain. 
 
Food literature: From agriculture to retailing 
 
Paul Brassley asserts that the historiography of British agriculture before and during the 
period covered by this thesis suffers from chronological discontinuity, making an 
assessment of the long-term issues facing the industry difficult.28 This discontinuity can be 
attributed to the fact that the literature records the organisation and operation of British 
agriculture during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whilst post-Second World 
War agriculture is poorly represented.29 Furthermore, agrarian historians largely fail to 
consider the impact of agriculture ‘beyond the farm gate’, leaving the task of exploring 
wider market connections to economic historians such as Derek Aldcroft.30  
Although an analysis of the producer offers useful socio-economic insights into 
agricultural aptitude and the health and wealth of nations, the technological and 
organisational processes developed in response to changing downstream demands remain 
unexplained.  Subsequent stages such as the manufacturing and processing sectors drove 
and responded to demand through investment in advertising, technology and product 
innovation; all are characteristic of endogenous growth, whereby economic growth is 
generated through structural changes within organisations.31 Whilst this is useful for 
explaining the mechanism for the development of markets, the coverage of food 
manufacturing and processing within the historiography is perfunctory, despite the 
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consensus established amongst food academics including Hans Teuteberg and Gabriella 
Petrick about the need to examine the intermediate stages of food supply and distribution 
between producer and consumer.32 In this regard, several factors can be identified which 
provide an explanation for the current state of the field. 
Firstly, Brassley suggests that food is a complex commodity because of the 
multiple paths it takes between production and consumption, and the intermediate stages of 
the supply chain, as detailed above, are not always clearly defined within the literature.33 
However, food processing is defined by Atkins and Bowler as ‘the manipulation of 
agricultural raw materials into food products which retain many of the characteristics of 
the original materials’, whilst food manufacturing is ‘the transformation of agricultural raw 
materials into food products that have lost many of [their original] characteristics’.34 
Previous practice has been to bundle both together; Bertie Mandelblatt implies that the 
rising prominence of Britain’s retail sector since 1954 has ensured that the activities of 
businesses engaged in upstream, or non-consumer-facing activities within the supply chain, 
are hidden.35 Put differently, the retail sector’s engagement with the needs of the consumer 
means that it is easy to assume that it is the sole agent within the food chain.  The notion of 
the supply chain again highlights that the retailer is part of a wider system that 
encompasses technological and distributive innovations undertaken by food processors and 
wholesalers at different points in time.    
However, interest in the food habits of the pre-industrial age means the researcher 
relies upon the output of business historians to obtain any sense of the development of food 
manufacturing during the mid-twentieth century.36 An analysis of the ‘intermediate’ food 
industry in its broadest sense is complicated by the fact that existing research is fragmented 
across a vast array of academic disciplines and time periods.37 The literature promoting the 
concept of value, or supply chain analysis by Raphael Kaplinsky, Gary Gereffi, Martin 
Christopher and others provides a useful means of identifying the value added to a 
commodity during production and sale as well as the variety of inputs, and has hitherto 
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been used as a tool to describe the inequalities caused by globalisation in developing 
economies.38 However, in the case of developed economies, supply chain analysis is 
better-suited to continuous analysis; indeed, the requirement for long-term quantitative 
data renders it incompatible for the study of historical supply chains in unmodified form.39  
Consequently, there is a need to adapt supply chain analysis to suit the available 
material, specifically to chart the principal stimuli provided by competition and changes in 
how the chain was managed, which in turn spawned marketing and product innovation that 
added value for consumers and obtained advantage over rival firms.40 However, James 
Johnston’s history of food canning in interwar Britain is indicative of the tendency to lean 
towards an inevitable pattern of progression, in which the evolution of industrial and 
technological processes were merely sidelights to the overall development of business 
administration.41 In contrast, historians of consumption including Leslie Gofton and Shane 
Hamilton have considered advances in processing and manufacturing as primarily a 
reflection of changes in consumer demand, which included the extension of shelf-life and 
the deskilling of staple food preparation, as the adoption of canning, refrigeration and 
freezing technology exemplified.42 However, none of these examples consider the 
ramifications for the manufacturer’s demand for transport.   
The final stage observed within the literature on Britain’s food supply chain relates 
to the means of distributing the products to the consumer.  The retail sector has been the 
focus of much research in the past two decades, as evidenced by accounts by Roger Scola, 
Gareth Shaw and Kim Humphery, which has demonstrated that the period 1850-1960 
encompasses a profound change as a result of developments in the industrial economy, 
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social strata and urban expansion.43 Suburbanisation and rising consumer income 
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries precipitated a gradual 
proliferation of fixed-location co-operatives, independent and multiple retailers, latterly 
supplemented by mobile shops, which combined to displace specialist producer-retailers 
and central markets as the principal customer interfaces.44  
In the latter respect, several factors influenced the character of food retailing which 
included the variety of products demanded by consumers and the affordability of food in 
relation to consumer income, with both potentially increasing the complexity of transport 
operations.  Equally, food stocked by retailers reflected changing social norms, with 
Atkins, Bowler and Peter Scott noting the increasing number of women entering the 
workplace.45 Rising female employment after the Second World War reduced the time 
available to prepare food for the family, fostering demand for greater convenience, both 
intrinsically within the food product itself and in reducing the frequency of acquisition.46 
Furthermore, John Burnett notes that post-war developments in food retail such as self-
service required the pre-packaging of products, whilst the consumer’s demand for 
convenience necessitated pre-preparation, all of which had implications for product range, 
hygiene, availability and transport.47 
The proliferation and diversification of regional ‘multiple’ stores during the 1930s 
were a response to shifts in the macro-economy, and also coincided with an increasing 
interest in achieving financial and organisational economies in distribution, a process 
which was accelerated during the Second World War.48 However, whilst the inter-war 
years might be construed as preparation for ‘Americanised’ mass retailing as suggested by 
Victoria de Grazia, Shaw and Curth imply that the process was more nuanced as rationing 
and resale price maintenance (RPM) administered by manufacturers restricted the ability of 
retail chains to pass cost reductions on to the customer, thus retarding the sector’s 
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modernisation before the mid-1950s.49 These developments neatly exemplify the 
interdependence of the food supply chain in satisfying consumer demand, yet also raises 
the issue of the importance of shifting supply chain governance in driving change within a 
given commodity market.   
In this respect, the rising influence of the retailer as supply chain innovator and 
agenda-setter in Britain after the decontrol of food rationing in 1954 is noted by Humphery 
and John Pickering, and both assert that the undermining of RPM was a key factor in 
shifting governance towards the retail sector.50 Roy Church highlights the increasing 
negotiating power of the retailer, which laid the groundwork for food range expansion 
through centralised bulk-buying and aggressive marketing strategies to expand market 
share, culminating with the emergence of the supermarket concept in Britain during the 
1950s and 1960s.51 However, whilst the literature has suggested that the retail sector 
anticipated and drove consumer demand, little reference has been given to the role of 
transport in supporting the transition from counter to self-service, whilst the retailer’s role 
in the development of food logistics remains unclear.52 
 
1.2 Transport overview 
 
The historiography relating to freight transport in Britain, though less fragmentary than 
that concerning food, appears to have reached a peak in academic interest at the 
millennium.  The transport genre is currently dominated by the ‘mobility turn’ championed 
by Transport, Traffic and Mobility (T2M), which set a new agenda for broadening the 
historiography of passenger and public transport to encompass, amongst other things, 
histories of experiences, the motivations behind consuming transport, and its cultural 
significance.53 Where there has been research into goods transport, it has displayed a 
tendency to focus upon the effect of legislative process and rail-road competition from a 
top-down, supply-side perspective.  Consequently, accounts concerning the practice and 
development of commodity-specific transport operations are notable by their absence. 
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 The potential for research into transport’s role in Britain’s food supply has already 
been described, as it intertwines between the various stages of the supply chain, making it 
sensitive to wider economic changes.  The subject of rail and road competition for freight 
in Britain between 1919 and 1975 is a prime example of the dynamic nature of transport’s 
response to the needs of users, yet comparatively little research has been directed towards 
goods transport as a whole, which in the case of Britain’s railways accounted for 53 and 67 
per cent of gross traffic receipts in 1919 and 1959 respectively.54 This is not necessarily a 
symptom of historiographical neglect; it can be assumed that the aforementioned 
preference for passenger transport demonstrated within both popular and academic 
histories by Tanya Jackson, Simon Bradley, Terence Gourvish and others is partly due to 
the enduring popularity of the subject matter as being directly relevant to the current 
travelling public.55 
 The focus upon the passenger thus leaves the way open for renewed research into 
goods transport; this thesis will therefore combine the historiography of food with that of 
freight transport to develop a picture of the evolution and practice of food distribution in 
Britain throughout the period.  It will not only present an opportunity to demonstrate how 
food commodities can provide insights into the common issues of distribution in terms of 
transport cost, speed, technology and flexibility, but also places the transport provider’s 
supply of freight services within a fundamentally important working context.  The 
following brief review of the literature establishes the general state of the field before 
establishing the reason why a commodity-based case-study approach that analyses the link 
between transport supply and demand in the movement of goods has been adopted. 
 
Transport literature: Finding an approach 
 
Rail and road transport have been the main foci for study over successive decades, 
although in the case of Britain, the latter has experienced comparatively little study.  
Academic research into road transport history includes overviews of the sector such as 
Theo Barker and Dorian Gerhold’s The Rise and Rise of Road Transport, and popular 
histories include Barker’s account of haulier John Jempson & Son, which again 
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predominantly focuses upon the development of the transport enterprise.56 A more recent 
account which addresses the modernisation of the British road network is Peter Merriman’s 
Driving Spaces, which establishes the relationship between road construction, the regions 
served and the culture of the motorway.57 Furthermore, Peter Scott has explored the effect 
of the government’s post-war macro-economic policy upon new road construction between 
1920 and 1960, and highlights a disparity between investment levels in Britain and in 
Europe.58 However, the treatment of this mode of transport remains patchy, a situation that 
might be partly attributed to the surviving archival material, although a more likely reason 
is the enduring popularity of railway history, which has traditionally been the preserve of 
the dedicated enthusiast examining, in sometimes minute detail, the mode’s nuances.59  
 Scott’s influential article on road and rail competition bridges the gap between 
both modes of transport, arguing that the regulatory framework in which Britain’s railways 
operated restricted their ability to compete with road haulage.60 Studies of Britain’s 
railways include Terence Gourvish’s British Railways, 1948-73, which reveals the 
relationship between a nationalised enterprise and government whilst John Quail’s analysis 
of business accounting within British Railways.61 The common theme is the political and 
executive management of the railway network, with a particular emphasis upon ‘what went 
wrong’ after nationalisation in 1948.  Whilst Mark Casson’s analysis of Britain’s Victorian 
railway network has considered the broader economic factors in its development, accounts 
of the twentieth century railway industry focus heavily upon passenger transport, 
technology, politics and management.62 Ralf Roth and Colin Divall’s edited volume From 
Rail to Road and Back Again? demonstrates that there have been few advances into the 
field of freight transport beyond an analysis of the effects of competition and regulation.63 
A plethora of popular histories have focused upon the railways.  Whilst they may 
cover a broad range of topics including the conveyance of goods, such as Simon Bradley’s 
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The Railways: Nation, Network and People, which considers the socio-economic and 
technological development of Britain’s railways, they incorporate much of the when and 
how, but tend to skim over the why.64 The need to establish a context for transport 
organisation and operation in Britain thus presents a historiographical problem for this 
thesis to address.  Put simply, there is room within the existing historiography for an 
account that considers the purpose of transport within the economy, and acknowledges that 
the business of logistics cannot, and does not, operate in a vacuum.  Furthermore, this 
approach to the goods transport problem has been made elsewhere in Europe, having been 
inspired by the work of Richard Vahrenkamp in his account of Germany’s inland freight 
networks, The Logistics Revolution.65 
Vahrenkamp considers the complex linkage between transport and the growth of 
mass consumption between 1880 and 2012 by using the German retail sector to combine 
the evolution of supply chain management with rising consumer affluence and demand for 
a variety of consumer goods.66 Vahrenkamp argues that mass consumerism was an 
effective stimulus for change within the transport industry, which made a transition from 
an internalised ‘auxiliary function …to an independent [external] factor of production’ 
during the mid-twentieth century as business enterprises gradually outsourced their 
logistical requirements and concentrated on core operations.67 The example of Germany 
illustrates that cost, flexibility and the management of distribution drove supply chain 
innovation, which in turn relied upon stability in external factors including politics and 
wider society.68 Vaherenkamp’s approach also raises the broader issue of shifting supply 
chain governance over time, which presents a convenient method for explaining the 
changes in distribution.   
 
1.3 Sources 
 
Initial scoping exercises indicated that the available primary source material is diverse in 
quality and quantity, and ranges from administrative records and government legislation to 
statistics.  However, the quality of available goods transport records has hindered scrutiny, 
as unsystematic data collection has meant that individual commodities were only 
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selectively recorded.69 The railways are an important case in point, as mineral and 
livestock traffic are clear, yet sundry items such as food was aggregated as ‘merchandise’ 
to frustrate detailed analysis.70 Road transport has fared worse, as there was no statutory 
requirement for individual goods haulage firms to retain records of loadings and distances 
travelled for more than six months until 1939.71 Road data thus depends upon the survival 
of records kept by individual businesses, thus hindering comparisons between road or rail 
at national level.72 
 This thesis is therefore concerned with providing an empirical analysis of 
surviving written archival material.  Records held at the NRM include railway company 
magazines, which provide an important source of information about food or any other 
aspect of rail transport.73 Championed by Michael Heller, company magazines are an 
essential resource for acquiring a managerial perspective of the economic, political and 
social issues affecting the company.74 Railway company magazines therefore illustrate a 
top-down management perspective of the services rendered to traders, justifications for the 
approaches adopted, and how the various railway companies imagined their role within the 
supply chain. 
Other publications such as The Railway Magazine and Modern Transport provide 
commentary upon the transport successes and failures to improve services and adopt new 
technologies to attract and retain customers.75 Similarly, material held at The National 
Archives (TNA) include railway company memoranda and marketing ephemera, and 
provides a strategic perspective of freight transport that highlights where food fitted within 
the overall business.  Similarly, technological developments undertaken by the railways 
before and after nationalisation in 1948 can provide a crude indicator of where the traffic 
generated by Britain’s food industries fitted within its priorities.  Finally, these documents 
provide an invaluable resource for ascertaining the effort expended in meeting road 
competition for existing traffic flows.   
The Commercial Motor provides a broad, if sometimes bellicose account of rail and 
road competition, and its analysis of the effects of government legislation upon the road 
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haulage sector provides a counterpoint to the narrative portrayed within railway company 
magazines.76 The publication’s comprehensive coverage of the environment in which road 
haulage operated permits reflection upon the role of the user in driving technological 
development and organisational innovation in road haulage.  Therefore, accounts of road 
haulage used by specific food traders and suppliers makes The Commercial Motor a 
valuable resource for ascertaining the circumstances surrounding any modal shift to the 
lorry.        
Supplementing the exploration of the transport sector’s role in food distribution are 
publications and archival material produced by the food industries themselves.  This thesis 
uses the archives of firms such as United Dairies, Rowntree and retailers such as Marks & 
Spencer and the Co-operative to review their use of transport and how it was developed 
over time according to the needs of each firm.  However, this material provides only a 
small sample of a potentially richer archive, as board reports have sometimes remained out 
of reach of the author because of ongoing commercial sensitivities.  Corporate archives are 
therefore augmented by pamphlets, company magazines and trade press, which all provide 
insight into the priorities of the firm when organising rail and road transport.77   
 Archival material pertaining to producers of raw food products is limited because 
of the fragmentation of the domestic agricultural industry.  However, the relationship 
between farmer and transport is ascertained through material held at the Museum of 
English Rural Life (MERL), Reading, which includes the National Farmers’ Union’s 
(NFU) minutes and reports.78 Documents held at TNA on behalf of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Fisheries and the now-defunct agricultural marketing boards provide 
a further source of information for specific commodities.79 The Milk Marketing Board’s 
(MMB) transport files can be readily accessed, although are ‘not on public record’ and 
hence subject to strict copyright restrictions.  Restrictions notwithstanding, they highlight 
the impact of geography, politics and transport cost, thus indicating both practical and 
administrative reasons for a producing industry’s modal shift to road haulage.   
 Transport and food-specific material is supplemented by documents produced by 
the government about the status of Britain’s food supply throughout the period.  Various 
Parliamentary inquiries into aspects of food distribution have considered the effect of 
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transport upon the cost of living, a factor prevalent in reports analysing the forces 
influencing the retail price of domestic food products.80 These reports demonstrate the 
government’s general interest in Britain’s food supply, and describe moves to regulate 
distribution and achieve cost-efficiency through economies of scale during the inter-war 
period.  Equally, consideration of government policy in relation to foreign trade provides 
another perspective in terms of the role of transport in competition between the domestic 
producer and importers. 
 
1.4 Themes 
 
Whilst the period 1919 to 1975 witnessed the widespread transition from rail and horse-
based goods distribution to road haulage, an exploration of the reasons behind this change 
is essential.  The themes emerging from the literature provide important anchor points for 
analysing the changing relationship between food distribution and transport, which include 
the geography of supply and demand, transport competition, cost in relation to service and 
the governance of Britain’s food supply chain.  Similarly, they will reveal how a post-war 
shift from goods supply to supply chain management produced a seismic shift in the 
character of distribution through a fundamental restructuring of logistics based upon cost, 
economy of scale and speed that was in part underpinned by road network development.81 
 
Geography 
 
The food trade is influenced by the geography of supply and demand, which determines 
the mode of transport used and governs the complexity of the distribution operation.  
Although the cases examined within this thesis are varied, they all display an urban focus.  
The London market is particularly prominent in the milk and meat trades, with firms 
established in the regions to specifically meet the capital’s demand for these products.  The 
location of supply has also proved to be an important determinant for transport, with long-
distance, bulk flows of food from port or country milk depot initially favouring rail, whilst 
the crowded urban environment provided a more complex logistical challenge that 
favoured a more flexible form of transport.   In contrast, Rowntree’s distribution operation 
explores the challenge of dispatching goods nationwide from a specific location, and the 
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extent to which rail and road transport suppliers attempted to meet the manufacturer’s 
requirements.  The geographical spread of the retail sector throughout Britain meant that 
route inflexibility and high rates at shorter distances had placed the railways at a 
disadvantage, ensuring that a close relationship with road-based transport was established 
at an early stage.82 Consequently, the concept of local, service-based competition between 
retailers is also explored, as home delivery encompassed goods conveyance over shorter 
distances.  Finally, the thesis will consider the extent to which the long-term use of road 
transport had provided foundations for the widespread adoption of lorry-based distribution 
after the Second World War.     
 
Competition and regulation 
 
The theme of competition combines transport regulation and operation, which provides a 
background to the individual cases under review.  An influential article focusing upon the 
inter-war competition between rail and road for high-value merchandise traffic is provided 
by Scott, who asserts that regulatory forces retarded Britain’s railway industry when 
competing with road haulage.83 The consequence was railway ‘innovation’ through 
lobbying for the regulation of road transport and the improvement of services through the 
introduction of containerisation.84 The potential race to the bottom posed by the rail and 
road competition for traffic gave rise to demands for greater transport coordination, already 
defined as the allocation of traffic to the mode best suited to the characteristics and 
circumstances of a particular commodity, to provide stability whilst achieving the daily 
supply and distribution of goods efficiently and cheaply.85  
 The result was the statutory amalgamation of over 100 railway companies in 1923 
and the passing of the Road and Rail Transport Act in 1933 to regulate road transport as a 
prelude to encouraging greater collaboration with rail.  Government control during the 
Second World War facilitated transport rationalisation, as R. J. Hammond’s multi-volume 
account of the administration of Britain’s wartime food supply highlights.86 The 
nationalisation of the railways and long-distance road haulage from 1948, succinctly 
covered by Michael Bonavia in The Nationalisation of British Transport, permits an 
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analysis of the extent to which government policy might have affected the speed at which 
the modal shift from rail to road took place.87 
 The traders using transport were also subject to regulation, which often reflected 
the state of competition, supply and demand for the product under review.  This is 
exemplified by the issue of free trade, a key concern for successive British governments 
between 1919 and 1939 whilst pursuing consumer benefit and markets for domestically 
manufactured goods, yet falling world food prices and a depressed domestic agricultural 
industry prompted a series of debates on whether tariffs should be applied to imported 
produce.88 A corollary of the debate was whether transport helped or hindered traders 
throughout the 1920s; this intensified as subsequent measures to improve the resilience of 
British agriculture included the establishment of produce marketing boards to protect the 
domestic industry.  The issue of supply chain governance and its effect upon commodity 
transport is raised again; this thesis therefore hypothesises that the producer’s ability to 
drive change depended upon the ability to negotiate as a unified collective.89  
The thesis also touches upon food hygiene regulation, which has been the subject of 
research by Michael French and Jim Phillips, and its effect upon the development of 
technology for the carriage of food products.90 The theme of regulation is also associated 
with the process of industrial concentration into fewer and larger oligopolies capable of 
governing the entire supply chain, with the government intervening to control the market in 
wartime or to remove hindrances to effective competition as a result of trader pressure.  
Consequently, trader competition and regulation combined with demand for lower cost and 
better service to produce a hypothesis that shifting governance within Britain’s food supply 
chain was a key influence in the trader’s choice of transport and its organisation. 
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Cost and service 
 
The themes of transport cost and service from the perspective of the provider have been 
considered in detail by Scott, Divall and others.91 The difficulty in obtaining specific data 
regarding actual costs means that the empirical evidence used within this thesis 
predominantly features trader correspondence rather than specific price data.  However, the 
debates surrounding transport cost, speed, service and flexibility from a demand-side 
perspective would permit an assessment of the strength, complexity and success of the 
relationships forged between trader and transport.  Consequently, it is necessary to assume 
that cost control was a crucial factor for traders maintaining market position against 
competitors, and the pursuit of ‘value for money’ was reflected in their approaches to 
transport organisation.   
 The railway strikes that took place in 1919, 1926 and 1955, as well as the Second 
World War are therefore important cases for analysis, as they reveal trader perceptions of 
service provision under exceptional circumstances.  It is possible to view subsequent 
experimentation and adoption of road transport through the lens of reliability and 
convenience, the latter incorporating operational aspects such as the cost to individual 
concerns for purchasing the expensive and heavy packaging normally associated with rail 
transit.  The user’s perception of the quality of service received for the charges paid is 
particularly obvious in the rail distribution of agricultural commodities, becoming regular 
points of dispute for the National Farmers’ Union and the Milk Marketing Board (MMB).   
 Similarly, the risk and inconvenience of product spoilage during rail transit gave 
traders cause for concern, although this problem was also inherent in road distribution.  
This aspect of service quality paves the way for considering how rail and road transport 
addressed their shortcomings, particularly when investment available for the construction 
of specialist vehicles depended upon prevailing market conditions within the food sector.  
Therefore, an analysis of the services provided by Britain’s railways and road hauliers will 
determine how both responded to shifts in supply chain governance between 1919 and 
1975.  However, before placing these cornerstones of distribution within specific cases, the 
next chapter will contextualise food logistics through a supply-side account of the 
development of goods transport throughout the period.  
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Chapter 2 - Goods by rail and road, 1919-1975 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The introduction has indicated that the historiography of inland goods transport can be 
developed further.  The ‘mobility turn’ has produced a nuanced historiography for 
passenger transport and public engagement with transport, yet the mobility of things, rather 
than people, has been overlooked.92 Whilst there are notable exceptions, such as Richard 
Vahrenkamp’s case study of Germany in The Logistics Revolution, the historiography of 
goods transport in Britain has deviated little from the themes of regulation, technology and 
competition.93 A similar situation is found in the history of road haulage; the weight of 
research has favoured rail transport, which benefits from a well-defined body of archival 
material held at Kew, York and elsewhere.94 In contrast, the treatment of road haulage is 
constrained by the fragmentary nature of the material; as chapter 1 suggests, the lack of 
official requirement for published documentation before 1933, coupled with the 
commercial sensitivities of a competitive business has meant that evidence detailing the 
growth and administration of private hauliers is sparse.95 
 Despite these shortcomings, it is necessary to contextualise the ongoing 
relationship between goods transport and its users through a narrative account that focuses 
upon transport supply and provides an overview of the systems and structures available to 
the food trade throughout the period.  This chapter begins by establishing the character of 
inland goods transport in 1919, and uses Gilbert Walker’s account of rail and road 
transport to explain how regulation implemented during the nineteenth century influenced 
the course of competition.96 It will also explain that as the First World War and subsequent 
railway strikes accelerated the growth of road transport, the railway industry initially failed 
to foresee the extent to which road transport would compete for traffic.  The chapter also 
explores the railway industry’s technological and political responses to road competition 
and the challenges faced in meeting the expectations of the trading community. 
 
                                                 
92
 C. Horner and J. Greaves, “Mobility Spotting: Running Off the Rails in the Transport Historiography of 
the United Kingdom” in Mobility in History: Themes in Transport ed. G. Mom, P. Norton, G. Clarsen and G. 
Pirie (Neuchâtel: Éditions Alphil-Presses universitaires suisses, 2010), p. 154.   
93
 R. Vahrenkamp, The Logistics Revolution: The Rise of Logistics in the Mass Consumption Society 
(Cologne: Josef Eul Verlag, 2012). 
94
 Horner and Greaves, “Mobility Spotting,” pp. 151-152. 
95
 Horner and J. Greaves, “Mobility Spotting,” p. 154, p. 156. 
96
 G. Walker, Road and Rail: An Enquiry into the Economics of Competition and State Control (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1942). 
  
 
45 
Table 1 
Ten-yearly freight train receipts 1913, 1925-1975  
 1913 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 
Freight 
receipts at 
current 
prices 
(£ thousands) 
64,255 103,676 86,237 165,700 274,244 225,513 
Freight 
receipts at 
1975 prices 
(£ thousands) 
883,834 751,372 731,116 852,532 857,728 520,533 
244,824 
 
Sources: British Railways Board, Report and Accounts (London: HMSO); D. L. Munby and 
A. H. Watson, Inland Transport Statistics: Great Britain, 1900-1970, Volume 1 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1978); J. O’ Donoghue, L. Goulding and G. Allen, “Consumer Price 
Inflation Since 1750” in Economic Trends No. 604 (London: HMSO, 2004), pp. 38-46. 
 
Note: The table presents a crude indication of equivalent values set at 1975 prices for 
charting the performance of rail freight receipts in real terms.  These have been adjusted 
using Office of National Statistics retail price index (RPI) data.  However, it should be noted 
that inaccuracies stem from the range of goods and services used in its compilation changing 
over time, whilst transport reflects that purchased by the consumer.  Despite this issue, RPI 
covers a longer continuous period than alternatives including Charles Feinstein’s price index 
for public authorities goods and services in Britain, or CPI.97   
 
The chapter will also explore the subsequent development of transport regulation, 
including railway reorganisation under the Railways Act (1921) and the debates 
surrounding the Road and Rail Traffic Act (1933).98  Both attempted to address the 
challenges facing rail and road transport; the former in terms of duplication of effort and 
the latter inefficient, unregulated competition.  Throughout the period covered by this 
thesis, the railways experienced a gradual 46 per cent decline in total goods traffic from 
367 million tons in 1913, a key year for statistical comparisons, to 205 million tons in 
1970.99 Although a crude measure, Table 1 shows that an adjustment of the revenue 
received in 1913 to 1975 prices using retail price index data suggests a real-terms decline 
of 72 per cent in the value of railway receipts over the period.  Whilst peaks are observed 
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in 1945 and 1955, the former stemmed from heavy wartime traffic and was eroded by a 
government levy, whilst the latter occurred as British Railways (BR) was building an 
operating deficit.100  
 The service-based reasons behind this decline will form the basis of the individual 
case study chapters; instead, this chapter focuses upon the railway industry’s attempts to 
address arrest decline, beginning with the 1938 ‘Square Deal’ campaign to remove 
restrictive regulations and simplify rates-setting.  The role of the Second World War in 
pausing competition and facilitating post-war planning is also considered, whilst the 
problems raised by transport nationalisation and rail-road coordination are discussed.101 
Finally, the post-nationalisation relationship between the railways and road haulage will be 
considered through the 1955 ‘Modernisation Plan’; Britain’s motorway construction 
programme, the Reshaping of the Railways reports and the implications of subsequent 
Transport Acts in 1953, 1962 and 1968. 
  
2.2 Monopoly prevention and industrial action: railway rates 
regulation and the expansion of road haulage 
 
Before 1914, road transport in Britain was a localised concern that complemented the 
rivers, canals, coastal shipping and the railways, with poor road conditions and horse-
drawn transport restricting its use for distribution over long distances.  The railway 
industry’s ability to convey goods in bulk nationwide had secured its position as principal 
inland transport network by the mid-nineteenth century, creating a virtual monopoly over 
inland transport and hence conditions for exploitation.102 In consequence, a series of Acts 
were passed between 1854 and 1894 to regulate the industry’s relationship with traffic 
consigners.  Although Britain’s railways were considered ‘common carriers’ of most 
goods, this was subject to restrictive terms and conditions of carriage that placed risk upon 
the consigner.  Limiting the potential for abuse in this regard was the aim of the Railway 
and Canal Traffic Act (1854), which also imposed obligations to accept and provide 
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facilities for the conveyance of any traffic offered and to publish all rates for public 
scrutiny.103 Furthermore, railway companies could display no ‘undue preference’ towards 
one trader over another to enforce the fair and impartial treatment of all users.104 
 The Railway and Canal Traffic Act (1888) empowered Railway and Canal 
Commissioners at the Board of Trade to devise maximum goods rates for banding within a 
published ‘Standard Classification of Rates’.105 This comprised eight classes, with low 
rates maxima for easily-bulked commodities including minerals and higher for 
manufactured goods and part or wagon-load traffic, with each established through 
consultation with traders and the railway companies.  Aside from the maxima, railway 
companies were also free to charge cheaper ‘exceptional’ rates for traffic forwarded at a 
trader’s own risk, whilst a further safeguard was provided by successive post-1900 
Conservative and Liberal governments barring railway company mergers which created 
regional monopolies.106 Although the majority of goods traffic was concentrated amongst 
larger companies such as the London & North Western and North Eastern Railways 
(LNWR and NER), Philippe Thalmann’s survey of goods transport notes that government 
policy relied upon company rivalries to drive improvements which benefited the user.107 
 Companies including the Great Western (GWR) and London & South Western 
Railways could vie for a finite quantity of traffic within their respective areas of operation, 
resulting in exceptional rates being offered for any traffic experiencing competition from 
rival companies.108 These discounts were expected to encourage competition between 
Britain’s railway companies, thus compensating for the fact that the railways experienced 
minimal external competition for traffic because of the lack of a viable transport 
alternative.  However, the railway company’s obligation to observe ‘no undue preference’ 
meant that reduced rates were granted to all traders engaged in similar business within a 
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locality.109 Indiscriminate use of this concession therefore harboured the risk that traders 
would expect an offer of discounted rates as a matter of course.110 
 Despite being introduced in Britain in the 1890s, the development of the lorry was 
gradual; Barker and Gerhold indicate that trials to break the railway monopoly over goods 
transport between Liverpool and Manchester between 1898 and 1900  demonstrated that 
the internal combustion engine was not yet capable of supplying the necessary power to 
move heavy goods.111 Indeed, the need for further development ensured that the horse 
remained the predominant means of general road haulage as late as 1913.112 Although 
urban road improvements and decreasing manufacturing costs prompted some use by 
traders in the distribution of light and perishable goods, the widespread adoption of the 
motor lorry was delayed by the outbreak of the First World War, which also precipitated a 
decline in coastal shipping to maintain the position of the railways as principal mode of 
distribution.113 However, the prospect of war in 1914 also raised fears that the number of 
railway companies would compromise efficiency.114  
 To ensure network cohesion during the wartime emergency, the railways were 
brought under government control through the establishment of the Railway Executive 
Committee (REC).115 By steering Britain’s railway network through the considerable 
operational challenges posed by the First World War, including port congestion and wagon 
shortages, the Committee had proved that a railway network managed by a single 
executive organisation was efficient.  Consequently, the year 1919 proved pivotal for 
British transport for two reasons.  Firstly, the Liberal coalition government maintained its 
strategic control over Britain’s railways before establishing a new, permanent transport 
ministry, the lack of which had prevented the government from establishing precisely what 
‘...great changes [there] should be in order to procure the best possible system of private 
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transport in this country’.116 The Ministry of Transport was created in May, with its first 
Minister, Eric Geddes, appointed to embark  upon a reorganisation of the railways.117  
 Although the government had briefly considered nationalising the railways on the 
grounds that Britain’s smaller railway companies had been weakened by competition, 
which had also compromised ease of use before the war, Geddes asserted that network 
cohesion in peacetime could be achieved through a substantial reduction in the number of 
companies.118 Secondly, and of more immediate concern, was the commencement of 
industrial action by the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen 
(ASLEF) and the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) over government-sanctioned pay 
cuts on 26 September 1919; the ensuing disruption would damage the reputation of the 
railways at a critical point in the development of road goods transport in Britain.119      
 The Railway Gazette expressed the scale of the disruption experienced during the 
strike through the number of rail services run.  On the first day, 27 September, only 40 
trains ran throughout Britain, whilst none ran on the second day.120 Although the total 
number of trains rose to 3,480 by 3 October as employees began to return to work, the 
disruption was such that the REC, which continued to run Britain’s railways on the 
government’s behalf, requested that businesses ‘restrict their deliveries for a few days’ 
whilst the goods backlog was cleared.121 Consequently, the Gazette noted that ‘the evil 
effects of the [strike] will be felt for many weeks to come’, and estimated that it would take 
over four months before normal service was resumed.122  
 Although evidence of the strike’s impact focuses upon the inconvenience to 
traders and the railway industry’s difficulties, the organisation of an emergency road 
haulage operation prompted The Railway Gazette to comment that ‘the strikers left the 
motor lorry out of their calculations’.123 This was because the First World War had 
accelerated the development of the lorry; operational range was extended to 60 miles.124 
Purchases by the army during the First World War had stimulated technological 
development, and the sale of ex-military lorries after the 1918 Armistice facilitated a rapid 
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expansion of the road haulage sector as demobilising trained personnel purchased vehicles 
and offered their services to traders for ‘hire or reward’.125 Peter Scott notes that demand 
for lorries had been fuelled by a post-war economic boom and a desire amongst traders to 
reduce the impact of inflation upon costs; consequently, over 60,000 vehicles were 
available for purchase and participation in the substitution of rail with road haulage.126 
 Although the strike achieved its goal of maintaining railway wages at wartime 
levels, contemporary newspaper reportage suggested that it proved the inability of the 
railways to provide a consistently reliable service.  The Gazette itself summarised the 
mood by suggesting that the nation ‘cannot ...allow itself to be suddenly “held up” by half 
a million or more of its members’, whilst traders now ‘considered [road transport] as equal 
competition’ with the railways.127 Their reputation was further eroded by the poor 
condition of railway infrastructure after four years of war; indeed, a wagon shortage 
coinciding with a glut of peacetime goods traffic prompted the imposition of embargoes as 
the backlog at goods depots was reduced.128 Whilst the small size and limited range of 
existing lorries made it ‘inconceivable that the road motor can ever deal with the heavier 
classes of traffic as an effective equivalent of the railway’ in the short term, the emergency 
demonstrated that the mode possessed flexibility and convenience in requiring less 
planning to operate an effective door-to-door service.129 As Scott indicates, the 
combination of the strike, the difficulties facing the railways and the onset of a post-war 
depression in 1921 all provide reasons for the foothold gained by road haulage in short to 
medium-distance traffic distributed within a 30-mile radius of a haulage depot.130 
 
2.3 Railway challenges 
 
The latter points stem from the fact that Britain’s railways experienced a growing financial 
crisis caused by subsequent wage increases and the continuing post-war maintenance 
deficit whilst under government control between 1918 and 1922.131 In an attempt to avert 
the crisis, an interim Rates Advisory Committee was established to continue the work of 
                                                 
125
 Gibson, Road Haulage by Motor in Britain, p. 119. 
126
 Scott, “British Railways and the Challenge from Road Haulage, 1919-1939,” p. 103; Gibson, Road 
Haulage by Motor in Britain, p. 138.    
127
 The Railway Gazette, XXXI (10 October 1919), p. 437 and “Road Transport and Railway Traffic,” p. 440. 
128
 Bagwell, The Transport Revolution, p. 227. 
129
 “Road Transport and Railway Traffic,” p. 440.  In their concise history on the development of road 
transport, Theo Barker and Dorian Gerhold suggest that the number of registered goods vehicles increased 
from 41,000 in 1918 to 100,000 by 1920.  See Barker and Gerhold, The Rise and Rise of Road Transport, p. 
62. 
130
 Gibson, Road Haulage by Motor in Britain, p. 119; Scott, “British Railways and the Challenge from Road 
Haulage, 1919-1939,” p. 103. 
131
 Gibson, Road Haulage by Motor in Britain, p. 143. 
  
 
51 
the Railway and Canal Commission on behalf of the Ministry of Transport, which 
recommended a series of general increases before the reorganisation, or ‘grouping’ of 
Britain’s railways.132 Thomas Gibson cites that general merchandise traffic by rail 
experienced an average rate rise of 60 per cent in 1920.133 Although implemented at a time 
of relative economic growth, the intended effect proved elusive for two reasons.   
 Firstly, wages remained high when a collapse in demand for British-manufactured 
exports brought economic recession in 1921.134 Britain’s railways were thus saddled with 
an inflated wages bill and higher goods charges whilst traffic was declining, prompting 
cost-conscious traders to complain of being ‘unable to meet competition [because of] high 
railway rates’.135 Scott indicates that the government-endorsed rate increases ‘led traders to 
re-evaluate [their transport arrangements] and, in many cases, make a longer term switch to 
road transport’.136 Secondly, the government’s preoccupation with the reorganisation of 
Britain’s railways suppressed any attempt to address the issue of rail and road competition.  
Furthermore, the railway industry’s attitude towards road transport was initially 
ambivalent, as pre-war experience had suggested that road transport was more amenable to 
a ‘“retail” method of trading’ by carrying small quantities of goods, promoting a persistent 
belief within railway management that both modes of transport had clearly-defined roles 
within the sphere of inland transport.137 
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Map 1 
Britain’s ‘Big Four’ railway companies, 1923 
 
 
 
Simplified map illustrating the regional monopolies held by the ‘Big Four’ railway 
companies.  However, all four companies competed on long-distance routes, with the LMS 
(maroon) and LNER (blue) vying for the Scotland traffic whilst the GWR (brown) and 
Southern Railway (green) competed for traffic to the West Country.   
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A White Paper tabled by the Ministry of Transport in 1920 proposed the reorganisation of 
Britain’s railway industry through voluntary amalgamation schemes; 120 of Britain’s 
private railway companies would be divided between four large groups with regional 
monopolies to obtain administrative efficiencies, effect economies of scale and compete in 
long-distance services.138 The Railways Bill of 1920 passed into the statute books as the 
Railways Act (1921), which determined that amalgamation schemes should be completed 
by January 1 1923.139 The reorganisation produced the ‘Big Four’ railway companies, 
namely the GWR; London, Midland and Scottish Railway (LMS), London and North 
Eastern Railway (LNER) and the Southern Railway; their areas of operation are indicated 
in Map 1, above.140 
 By restricting competition to the long-distance services, the Act had created local 
transport monopolies ripe for exploitation by competing forms of transport capable of 
offering a cheaper service; indeed, Roy Edwards and Scott indicate that few measures were 
in place to prepare the industry for road competition.141 The scale of the administrative task 
also placed the railways on the back foot, as two opportunities to address the threat of road 
competition came to nought.  Edwards suggests that the first was the failure to incorporate 
railway road powers into the 1921 Act.142 This stemmed from a concern amongst private 
hauliers that the government had inadvertently enabled the railways to engage in general 
haulage by loaning lorries for war use.  The principle of the railway companies operating 
general haulage in parallel to its core business was deemed a separate matter to that being 
addressed by the 1921 Act, and would be the subject of legal analysis and clarification in a 
separate Parliamentary Bill.143  
 The second opportunity was a Bill tabled jointly by the London and North 
Western (LNWR) and Midland Railway (MR) companies in 1922, which requested powers 
to operate door-to-door road haulage as an adjunct to the railway business and to reduce 
the expense of station handling.144 Hitherto, the railway industry’s road operations were 
broadly restricted to collection and delivery which fed into the freight operation.  The Bill 
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attempted to overcome the restrictions posed by the railway network’s layout by conveying 
short-distance freight direct by road, thereby saving mileage, wagon-shunting and 
transhipment whilst providing the trader with an economical service administered by the 
railway companies.145 Although the Bill obtained broad Parliamentary support in the face 
of objections from at least 65 road firms, Edwards cites that the evidence submitted by the 
Ministry of Transport on a point of detail prompted the railway companies to withdraw.146  
 The evidence provided by Sir George Beharrell indicated a concern that the 
companies had failed to provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that savings accrued from 
the charging of railway rates for the road operation would be passed to the trader, and not 
to the railway shareholder.147 The editor of Modern Transport, a weekly publication 
documenting transport developments, consequently expressed surprise that the railways 
gave up on the Bill ‘when a fair sailing might well have been anticipated’.148 The railway 
industry did not resume its campaign to obtain road haulage powers until 1928, prompting 
Edwards to conclude that the government’s decision not to grant them in 1921 was an 
‘error of omission’.149 Timely opportunities to expand rail-owned road haulage beyond 
collection and delivery were therefore lost, raising the hypothesis that the government had 
failed to grasp the importance of preparing the railways for road competition. 
 Government intervention in the business of goods transport was also manifest in 
another aspect of the 1921 Act, namely the overhaul of the railway industry’s rate-setting 
mechanism and its impact upon trader and industry.  The Act stipulated that each of the 
‘Big Four’ should achieve an annual ‘Standard Revenue’ based upon the aggregate net 
revenue obtained by their constituents in 1913 to cover operating costs.150 Although the 
companies were not compelled to reach their aggregate Standard Revenue of £51 million, 
the Act attempted to restrict the indiscriminate charging of exceptional rates by modifying 
the rate-setting mechanism to include 21 goods classifications based upon value, with 
standard charges set according to the principle of ‘what the traffic will bear’ in each 
                                                 
145
 A Southern Railway Magazine article published in 1926 asserted that ‘for every mile we had a freight 
train we perform a mile of freight shunting’.  See Sir H. Walker, “Statistics,” Southern Railway Magazine, IV 
(1926), p. 36.     
146
 Edwards, “Shaping British Freight Transport in the Interwar Period,” pp. 84-86; “Railways and the 
Roads,” Modern Transport, VII (25 February 1922), p. 12. 
147
 Edwards, “Shaping British Freight Transport in the Interwar Period,” p. 86; “Transferring the Rail Load to 
the Road,” Modern Transport, VII (June 17, 1922), p. 1.  Sir John George Beharrell (1873 - 1959) was 
Assistant Goods Manager under Eric Geddes with the NER.  He was appointed to the Ministry of Munitions 
in 1915 before being appointed director-general of finance and statistics at the Ministry of Transport in 1921.  
See “Obituary: Sir John Gorge Beharrell,” The Engineer, 209 (February 27, 1959), p. 342. 
148
 “Transferring the Rail Load to the Road,” p. 1; Thalmann, The Dynamics of Freight Transport 
Development, p. 8. 
149
 Edwards, “Shaping British Freight Transport in the Interwar Period,” p. 78. 
150
 Railways Act, 1921, 11 & 12 Geo. 5, c. 55, s. 58; Walker, Road and Rail, p. 50. 
  
 
55 
class.151 However, exceptional rates not less than ‘five per cent. or more than forty per 
cent. below the standard rate chargeable’ were permitted, and could be issued by railway 
companies without consulting regulatory bodies.152  
 To ensure that due consideration was given to an exceptional rate’s impact upon 
the prospects of achieving the Standard Revenue, the Minister of Transport was to be 
informed of rate reductions issued within these percentiles, and any further reduction or 
rise would be assessed by a Railway Rates Tribunal.  The Tribunal was a permanent ‘Court 
of Record’ employed to scrutinise rate changes with regard to the ‘Standard Revenue’ and 
against existing anti-monopolistic legislative criteria such as ‘undue preference’, which 
presented traders with opportunities to object against charges published by the railways in 
the event that their businesses would be adversely affected.153 However, the re-
classification of thousands of commodities proved time consuming, and the ‘appointed 
day’ for implementation was delayed until January 1, 1928.   
 The revised classification was bureaucratic, rather than inflexible, as any 
negotiation on exceptional rates followed a due process that prevented the railways from 
quoting rates expeditiously in the face of road competition.154 This was because the 
continuation of the ‘undue preference’ criteria meant that each class of good would 
experience blanket rate increases or decreases, whilst the publication of all rates presented 
competitors with a means to undercut the railways.  Whilst reorganisation under the 1921 
Act presented an opportunity for the railways to accrue savings from economies of scale, 
the combination of higher charges, expenditure and the continuation of a cumbersome rates 
structure designed to prevent a rail transport monopoly contrasted starkly with the 
comparative freedom of road hauliers to set their own rates.155 This placed pressure upon 
the railway companies to quote exceptional rates to retain traffic; indeed, by 1930, these 
would account for 76.52 per cent of the rates charged, thereby undermining the already 
precarious financial position of the railway industry by creating conditions in which the 
‘Big Four’ companies would consistently fail to reach the Standard Revenue.156 
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2.4 Perceptions of declining railway service quality: 
compensation, the 1926 General Strike and road propaganda 
 
Image 1 
 
Private-owner coal wagons being sorted at Toton yard, 6 July 1927.  Note the different grades 
of coal in each wagon, highlighting the predominantly wagonload nature of freight hauled on 
Britain’s railways.  Source: National Railway Museum DY11430. 
 
Firms forwarding bulk mineral and merchandise traffic on a regular basis could save 
money by negotiating for a private siding.157 In contrast, ancillary services such as terminal 
usage, warehousing and provision for smaller consignments, these were provided at extra 
cost to the trader.158 This was because smaller consignments constituted an operational and 
financial burden for the railways.  Single wagons were marshalled into freight trains at 
locations such as Toton yard illustrated in Image 1; an inefficient and time-consuming 
process that accumulated unremunerative mileage whilst increasing the risk of damage or 
delay.159 Local shunting also nullified the railway industry’s advantage of speedy long-
distance bulk haulage whilst railway managers demanded expeditious handling, thereby 
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increasing the potential risk of claims for damage, delay or pilferage.160 An exploration of 
the compensation paid to traders thus provides an indicator of the circumstances in which 
claims rose as well as a basis for understanding how the user’s concerns about service 
quality were exploited by road hauliers.  
 The GWR in 1920 and the Southern Railway in 1926 noted rising claims for lost 
and damaged goods, with Graph 1 below demonstrating that claims were highest in the 
immediate post-war war period when wagon shortages and maintenance arrears reduced 
upon railway efficiency.  Claims made between 1920 and 1921 also coincided with rates 
increases sanctioned by the Ministry of Transport, raising the hypothesis that higher rates 
prompted increased vigilance over railway transgressions by cost-conscious organisations 
such as Cadbury’s.161 A small rise in claims expenditure in 1937 and sustained in 1938 
appears consistent with this point, as it coincided with a 5 per cent general rates increase 
that prompted users to make savings by eliminating some of their long-distance traffic due 
on the pretext of ‘poor service’.162 Although claims expenditure fell sharply after 1921, 
later assisted by the introduction of fully enclosed demountable containers, Sir Herbert 
Walker, the Southern Railway’s General Manager continued to condemn the ‘needless’ 
expenditure, which rose by £1,000 on the Southern between 1925 and 1926.163 
 Rising expenditure on compensation was more than simply a product of increased 
trader vigilance; it was also linked to the relationship between railway company and 
employee.  Firstly, LNWR and NER magazine articles published in 1920 suggest that the 
commencement of the statutory eight hour day meant that staff with little freight handling 
experience were employed, prompting a spike in claims.164 Secondly, a concurrent article 
published by the GWR on the subject of goods handling attributed the problem to a wave 
of employee ‘indifference’ towards their jobs, with ‘...rough handling [detracting] from the 
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reputation of everyone concerned’.165 By 1924, the GWR argued that the increased cost of 
living and attempts to increase productivity had strained managerial relations with low-
grade employees, fuelling apathy towards the company.166 Growing tension between 
railway staff and management may have been a factor in railwaymen joining the General 
Strike of 1926, an act which further demonstrated that reliance upon a single mode of 
goods transport for distribution increased trader risk.167 
 
Graph 1 
Compensation paid per 1000 tons of goods traffic carried on Britain's 
railways, 1920-1938
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 1 (p. 297). 
 
The effect of the General Strike is discerned in Graph 1, as it shows a higher payment per 
1,000 tons of goods carried for 1926, which may be attributed to the disruption caused by 
the stoppage as it accompanied a 31 per cent drop in goods tonnage forwarded by rail from 
340 million tons in 1925 to 233 million tons in 1926.168 The financial consequences of the 
strike for Britain’s railways are clearly seen in Table 2.  Using weekly merchandise and 
livestock revenue data published by The Railway Gazette, the table shows that whilst 
receipts in week 17 of 1926 were an improvement over the corresponding period in 1925, 
the strike drastically cut receipts by 91 per cent in week 18 and a further 61 per cent in 
week 19 respectively.  Indeed, it also indicates a gradual recovery; the four weeks 
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following the strike produced considerably lower returns than the same period in 1925.  
This can be explained by the potential revenue lost and the time and resources the railways 
needed to process the existing goods backlog, although the potential dampening effect 
caused by trader reticence, whilst difficult to quantify, cannot be discounted. 
 
Table 2  
Railway merchandise and livestock returns during the General Strike: a comparison 
of 1925 and 1926 (£ thousands) 
 
Week 
17 
Week 
18 
Week 
19 
Week 
20 
Week 
21 
Week 
22 
Week 
23 
1925 2,063 1,313 1,338 1,956 1,913 1,404 1,853 
1926 2,171 199 77 1,230 1,084 1,242 1,223 
Source: The Railway Gazette. 
 
Whilst it is possible to speculate that strike action combined with the mishandling of goods 
eroded the trading community’s trust in the railways, these problems occurred whilst the 
railway industry was criticising the user for creating the conditions for damage and delay.  
In 1920, the GWR suggested that senders of goods are ‘...not generally as free from 
responsibility as they used to be’, highlighting that the standard terms and conditions of 
rail carriage advised users about correct labelling and packaging to minimise the 
inconvenience of damage, theft and delay.169 The implication was that traders were failing 
to assist the railways in their endeavour to deliver goods expeditiously, and that claims 
stemmed from ignorance or the wilful exploitation of railway weaknesses for financial 
gain.  However, accusations of trader impropriety risked alienating customers and supports 
a hypothesis that Britain’s railways were out of step with the needs of a trading community 
desirous of economical, flexible and convenient transport.   
 The road haulage lobby could therefore assert that the lorry would ‘emancipate’ 
industry from a railway industry in which the quality of service and reliability did not 
justify the charges levied by the ‘Big Four’.170 As a campaigning advocate of the haulage 
sector, The Commercial Motor pressed its readership to draw the attention of potential 
customers towards the resilience of road haulage and the trade unionism that had 
encumbered the railways in 1919 and 1926.171 The sector comprised a substantial number 
of independent operators capable of operating at short notice, whilst their flexibility in 
short to medium-distance logistics at ‘cost plus profit’ rates made a switch to road haulage 
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an attractive proposition for Britain’s trading community during the economic crises 
between 1921 and 1939.172   
 The trader’s reality was that seemingly insignificant items such as packaging 
represented a substantial additional outlay for small businesses and agricultural concerns 
seeking to control costs.  Economic expediency determined whether businesses purchased 
new packaging or reduced costs by re-using old or sub-standard alternatives to perpetuate a 
cycle of claim and counter-claim.173 With the railways a third-party in the supply chain, 
full accountability for the condition of a commodity in transit was ambiguous when the 
onus was upon the consigner to prove the negligence of the railway companies involved; in 
contrast, road haulage was the product of a clear bilateral agreement between two 
parties.174 As traders lost control of their consignments after dispatch by rail, road haulage 
permitted minimal transhipment and tighter control during lorry-loading, which reduced 
the risk of damage as well as the bulk and cost of packaging.175  
 
2.5 Road haulage: competition without regulation 
 
Looking beyond the simplicity of road haulage, an analysis of the sector during the 1920s 
also indicates that it sometimes bore little advantage over rail haulage because of several 
issues that affected service quality.  The road haulier’s challenges were three-fold, namely 
market saturation, lack of regulation and the indifferent quality of Britain’s existing road 
infrastructure.  Firstly, Scott and Reid have noted that market saturation stemmed from the 
ease with which individuals could enter the road haulage business, which had proved 
attractive for demobilising soldiers trained in vehicle operation with little prospect of other 
employment in a post-war recession.176 This resulted in a rapid rise in owner-drivers, with 
Scott noting an increase from 62,000 to 128,000 lorries between 1919 and 1920.177 
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 Although established firms competed by offering premium service inducements 
such as ‘next-day delivery’, the situation was exacerbated by a lack of effective regulation 
beyond vehicle taxation, as the government appeared content to pursue a laissez-faire 
approach to road haulage legislation.178 Road hauliers were not obliged to publish rates, 
which Gibson suggests encouraged a culture of rate-cutting to guarantee the job which 
ultimately created a transport buyer’s market.179 The principal outcome was competition 
which drove rate-cutting to uneconomic levels, resulting in owner-drivers going out of 
business because of their inability to earn a living.180 This also posed a problem for more 
established firms, as carefully-researched rates were being undercut by ‘irresponsible’ 
newcomers displaying a complete lack of regard for business economics.181  
 Competition also emerged from the need to obtain a ‘back-load’, which boosted 
income through the conveyance of goods on the return journey at low rates.182 Although 
financially advantageous when the railways charged to return empty rolling stock to the 
point of demand, back-loading posed a challenge for road hauliers.  Established firms 
possessed the advantages of goodwill and multiple depots for acquiring loads and 
minimising operating costs; in contrast, the owner-driver relied upon third-party clearing 
houses to obtain back-loads for a surcharge.183 The system was therefore open to 
opportunism; Scott and Reid describe how the position of the clearing house as ‘price 
takers’ could be manipulated to extract a profit from transactions with sub-contractors by 
withholding information about the rate paid by the consigner.184 Traders such as 
Sainsbury’s choose to remove the ‘middle-man’ altogether by integrating road haulage into 
their organisations, thus reducing the traffic available to the independent haulier.185   
 The situation was exacerbated by a lack of regulation that defined the specific 
roles of road haulage, as own-account operators could freely engage in back-loading to 
supplement driver wages or improve the return on vehicle investment.186 The problem 
stemmed from the fact that the regular work already undertaken for the owning firm 
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permitted the quotation of lower rates for the back-haul, thus placing further pressure upon 
the small independent haulier to cut rates.  Therefore, the road haulage sector was 
acquiring a reputation for its lack of sound business practice and ‘superfluous’ competition 
which fostered an expectation amongst traders that haulage rates could be driven 
downwards with impunity.187 
 The third reason for road haulage’s inability to establish complete superiority over 
the railways during the 1920s was the condition of the road infrastructure.  Although a 
comprehensive national railway network had developed since the 1830s, the road network 
was not in a condition to facilitate a wholesale transfer of freight traffic from rail.  
Although the Roads Act (1920) ring-fenced vehicle taxes to produce a Road Fund for 
network maintenance, a significant contribution had to be made through local authority 
rates, resulting in patchy development.188 Consequently, decades of underinvestment and a 
failure to centralise decision-making had resulted in a poorly-maintained and inefficient 
trunk road network.  Opportunities to improve the situation were not pursued, as evidenced 
by the failure of an early London-Birmingham motorway scheme in Parliament in 1924.189 
 
2.6 The railways respond to road competition 
  
Although the condition of the trunk roads and the stillborn motorway scheme maintained 
the railway industry’s status as principal provider of long-distance transport, the part-
funding of road maintenance through the local rates system became a subject of bitter 
dispute.190 Since 1923, the ‘Big Four’ railway companies collectively argued that as 
substantial rate payers to local councils, they were subsidising road maintenance and hence 
their primary competition.191 Furthermore, the companies suggested that the heavy vehicles 
used by haulage firms were responsible for a significant proportion of road surface 
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deterioration, and asserted that vehicle taxation failed to account for their share of the 
damage.  The ‘Big Four’ companies also asserted that their networks were developed and 
maintained through their own resources, prompting claims of unequal treatment as the 
failure to secure road powers in 1922 had removed any benefit from their contribution to 
local rates.192   
 Similarly, the cost and service propaganda disseminated by the road lobby elicited 
a response from the railway industry in the guise of two pamphlets published by the 
Railway Clearing House (RCH) in 1923 and 1927, which attempted to demonstrate the 
negligible impact of railway rates upon food costs.193 The railways also responded through 
technological means; whilst The Commercial Motor lauded the haulier’s offer of door-to-
door services organised according to the user’s needs, the railway industry’s responded 
with the demountable container, introduced by the LMS in 1926 and illustrated in Image 2 
below.194 The concept provided a solution to the problems of handling, pilferage and small 
loads and removed the requirement for expensive packaging to create a flexible service 
when combined with railway-operated collection and delivery.195 
 The container proved successful, as the LMS reported that usage rose from 25,000 
tons in 1927 to 129,000 tons in 1930.196 However, the means for their introduction had 
existed before the First World War, raising the hypothesis that their appearance in 1926 
was a knee-jerk reaction to the threat from road competition, and a response to the labour 
issues raised by the General Strike.197 Furthermore, the gradual emergence of new 
container variants throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s suggest that the concept was 
not fully realised when introduced; Gourvish highlights that the capital sunk into existing 
railway vehicle types meant that the substitution of the fixed railway van with containers 
was delayed for several decades.198 
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Image 2 
 
 
 
An LMS container being transhipped in 1936.  The photograph illustrates the degree of 
coordination between rail and road achieved by the railway companies following the 
container’s introduction in 1926; the mechanical horse on the left is evidence of the LMS’ 
ability to offer a complete door-to-door service to traders.  One drawback to the scheme was 
the requirement for a mobile crane at every yard.  Source: National Railway Museum 1997-
7409_LMS_7933.  
 
Although the demountable container encapsulated the railway industry’s effort to improve 
its relationship with traders, the lack of road haulage regulation and the local rates issue 
emboldened the ‘Big Four’ to make individual applications for road powers in 1928 in the 
interests of equality of treatment.  The Commercial Motor warned that the basic railway 
cartage operation had produced a loss of £3 million, and suggested that the ‘Big Four’ 
would cross-subsidise the new operation from revenue to undercut existing hauliers and 
eliminate competition.199 Despite the concern, the four Railway (Road Transport) Acts 
were passed, permitting the development of rural road services.  The GWR unveiled its 
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Country Lorry Services operation in 1928 followed by the LMS, LNER and the Southern 
respectively for the distribution of perishable goods and agricultural commodities such as 
milk, feed, fruit and sugar beet, thereby extending the railway presence into areas with 
previously sparse coverage.200   
 
2.7 Establishing goods transport regulation 
   
An important benefit of railway-owned rural and urban road feeder services was a 
diversification in traffic when the economic recession between 1929 and 1932 severely 
curtailed coal and mineral receipts.201 The LNER, which suffered heavy revenue losses 
because of a decline in steel production in the North East, implemented a rural service in 
Eastern England and Southern Scotland to reduce the overheads associated with short-
distance rail haulage.  The provision of a door-to-door road service was combined with a 
reduction in terminal charges to increase trader demand; the goods tonnage conveyed by 
road in the Southern Area consequently rose by 67 per cent from 1,607,312 tons in 1932 
and 2,687,507 tons in 1935.202 Graph 2 provides a snapshot of the expansion of the LNER 
lorry fleet from 1,569 to 3,033 vehicles, which took place alongside a reduction of 761 
cartage horses between 1933 and 1935. 
 
Graph 2 
LNER cartage service motorisation, 1932-1935
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Sources: See Appendix 2, Table 2 (p. 298). 
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The warning published by The Commercial Motor in 1928 that rail-operated road haulage 
would fail to stem the overall decline in net revenue, which reached its nadir in 1932 and 
failed to break £40 million in subsequent years, is demonstrated in Table 3.203 As 
oversupply within the road haulage sector threatened the viability of both modes of 
transport, the railway companies made several approaches to the Minister of Transport 
between January and March 1932.  A Railway Companies Association (RCA) campaign 
memorandum entitled ‘Fair Play for the Railways’ pressed the case for the quantitative 
regulation of road haulage through licensing on the basis that £16 million in merchandise 
receipts had been lost because of road competition between 1924 and 1930.204 Traders’ 
organisations such as the Mansion House Association on Transport (MHA) attacked the 
publication on the grounds that the RCA overstated the deficiency in receipts, which were 
alleged to produce a deficit of only £4.3 million.205 
 
Table 3 
Total net revenue for Britain’s railway companies, 1929-1938 
 
Total net revenue 
(£ thousands) 
1929 49,322 
1930 42,007 
1931 37,562 
1932 27,194 
1933 29,589 
1934 32,255 
1935 33,695 
1936 36,527 
1937 38,624 
1938 29,758 
 
Source: D. L. Munby and A. H. Watson, Inland Transport Statistics: Great Britain, 1900-1970, 
Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
 
The MHA also accused the railways of tardiness in recognising that there was demand for 
improvements in reliability, and attributed the exodus to road haulage to ‘...shortcomings 
in this direction [as] repeated labour disputes hastened the development of traders’ own 
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road delivery fleets’, a process which forms the basis of subsequent chapters.206 The MHA 
argued ‘...that it is neither progressive, nor reasonable to favour a less efficient mode of 
transport by imposing penalties upon other and more suitable forms of transport’.207 The 
object of the debate was to increase government awareness of the problems facing inland 
goods transport, and prompted the Ministry of Transport to appoint a panel of transport 
experts chaired by Sir Arthur Salter to establish terms for ‘a fair basis of competition and 
division of function between rail and road transport of goods’ in 1932.208 
  The objective was to devise a method of regulating road haulage that safeguarded 
the future of goods transport and protected the interests of trade and industry.209 Although 
The Commercial Motor accused Salter of producing ‘drastic proposals’ that restricted a 
trader’s choice, the resultant report concluded that road haulage was a free-for-all where a 
prospective haulier had ‘...an unlimited right to enter the industry ...and is often tempted to 
force his way in by offering rates which are completely unremunerative’.210 The Salter 
Report thus recommended the introduction of quantity licensing linked to the extent of 
transport facilities available within geographical regions, with goods transport coordinated 
between long and short-distance traffic; the former being allocated to rail and the latter to 
road haulage.211 
 The railway companies were by no means idle whilst Salter was compiling his 
report, as they began to probe the legal boundaries of rate-setting to improve their 
competitive position.  Gilbert Walker describes how the ‘Big Four’ experimented with 
existing regulations in 1931 when Robinson’s, a Bristol oil-cake firm, offered the 
proportion of its traffic conveyed by road to the GWR on the proviso that a flat rate per ton 
to any station within a specified area was charged.212 Walker notes that the scheme showed 
potential in arresting decline by guaranteeing traffic for a year, whilst Robinson’s would 
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enjoy the convenience of negotiating with a single transport provider.213 However, when 
the GWR referred the ‘agreed charge’ to the Railway Rates Tribunal for ratification in 
1932, consent was withheld on grounds of ‘undue preference’ and scant evidence that the 
scheme would assist the company in achieving its Standard Revenue.214  
 From the railway industry’s perspective, the ruling was emblematic of the 
inflexibility of existing regulations.  However, the Road and Rail Traffic Act (1933), which 
used the Salter Report as its basis, overturned the decision with the addition of a clause 
legalising the quotation of agreed charges subject to approval from the Tribunal, with the 
question of ‘undue preference’ addressed by granting traders the right of objection.215 The 
agreed charge was therefore an example of railway innovation in rate-setting; when 
combined with the ability to continue charging exceptional rates, the ‘Big Four’ were in 
possession of important rate-setting tools for acquiring and retaining traffic in the short 
term.216 However, the Act’s sanctioning of quantitative licensing in the interests of 
regulating road transport prompted complaints of unequal treatment from the road haulage 
sector.217   
 Three licence types were devised for road haulage, and were categorised as ‘A’ 
for vehicles engaged in general haulage for ‘hire and reward’; ‘B’ for mixed private and 
general haulage, and ‘C’ for vehicles employed by traders solely as ancillary transport for 
their business; the latter being prohibited from carrying return loads for hire and reward.  
Although trade and industry retained flexibility in their transport options, the introduction 
of quantitative licensing was accompanied by the right of objection, thus allowing the ‘Big 
Four’ railways to influence the amount of competition they faced.218 However, the system 
was weakened by a lack of quantitative licensing for ‘C’ licensees; The Commercial Motor 
considered this a fundamental issue for the independent haulage sector as the freedom for 
firms to expand own-account transport risked exacerbating the oversupply problem.219  
 The government’s reticence to fully regulate own-account transport presents a 
counterpoint to the perception that the railways were the recipients of preferential 
treatment as the transition of goods from rail to road continued unchecked, whilst growth 
in the number of ‘C’ licensees threatened to squeeze the traffic available to the independent 
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haulier.220 The situation was also complicated by the ‘Big Four’, which were permitted to 
jointly acquire shares in Hay’s Wharf Limited, a firm which possessed a national network 
of warehouses and road haulage depots, in December 1933.221 The terms of the 1933 Act 
thus provided a catalyst for a broader debate on the fairness of rail and road transport 
regulation for the remainder of the 1930s.  In doing so, the combination of railway rate 
regulation and quantitative haulage licensing suggested that neither mode gained from 
government policy. 
 
2.8 Searching for a ‘Square Deal’ in goods transport,  
1934-1939 
 
In tandem with the acquisition of shares in national haulage firms, the railways attempted 
to improve their competitive position through other means, including a speeding-up of 
freight timetables to meet the trader’s desire for expeditious transport.  The scale of 
improvement is revealed in LMS Magazine, which boasted 300 train accelerations between 
London, Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield and Leeds, whilst 93 per cent of 
goods arrived at the receiving station within 24 hours of dispatch.222 Increased speed 
mitigated terminal delays, and pamphlets such as the LNER example in Image 3 below 
provided canvassers with the means to sell the ‘Big Four’ railways to the trading 
community.223 The railway advantage in long-distance goods transport was also guaranteed 
by the continuation of the 20mph speed limit for lorries, the observance of which restricted 
a haulier’s economical radius of operation.224 
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Image 3 
 
 ‘How the LNER “Expresses” Freight’ was published in October 1932, the year the Salter 
Conference published its report on road and rail transport.  The pamphlet is typical of the 
type published by each of the ‘Big Four’ railway companies in that it stresses the importance 
of the railway company to the trading community.  It asserts that ‘Efficient freight transport 
is vital to the community.  Express Freight Services are vital to efficient freight transport’, 
and contains details of ten high-speed routes covered by the LNER. 
 
Despite advances in speed and salesmanship on the railways, the goods marshalling yard, 
where goods trains were assembled for onward dispatch, remained a key bottleneck.  The 
assembly of goods trains relied heavily upon manual labour to check, shunt and couple 
individual wagons, whilst attempts to improve efficiency in such matters required 
substantial investment, as exemplified by the LNER’s introduction of automatic gravity, or 
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‘hump’ shunting at its Wath and Whitemoor yards in 1935.225 This entailed the installation 
of electrically-operated equipment that controlled the descent of the wagon into a siding 
with a view to reducing manpower.  However, when compared with a small road haulier’s 
ability to provide door-to-door transport, the marshalling yard represented a high-cost 
answer to the intrinsic inflexibility of railway infrastructure as manual labour was still 
required to couple the wagons, as the plan of the LNER’s Whitemoor yard in Image 4 
clearly illustrates. 
 
Image 4 
 
 
 
Cyanotype plan of LNER Whitemoor Yard, 1930.  Trains arrived in the reception sidings on 
the right, wagons uncoupled and shunted over a hump.  The wagons enter the sorting sidings 
by gravity, with speed regulated by the retarders.  New trains are formed in the sorting 
sidings, where wagons are re-coupled prior to being shunted to the departure roads.  
Although several of these processes were automated, the process retained dependent upon 
manual labour.  Source: National Railway Museum: Stratford Works Archive SX531. 
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The difference between the railway industry’s need to self-fund its infrastructure and the 
road industry’s unregulated cost plus approach to rate-setting became the subject of a 1937 
Transport Advisory Council report.226 The report recommended that all independent road 
hauliers should operate under a regulated, standardised rates regime comparable to the 
railway industry’s existing rates classification system.227 However, whilst there was some 
support from hauliers hit by indiscriminate rate cutting, the proposal threatened to restrict 
trader flexibility whenever rates were increased; Table 3 (p. 66) raises the hypothesis that 
a five per cent general increase in railway rates had prompted a transfer to road haulage as 
the railways experienced a £8,219 decline in net receipts between 1937 and 1938.228 The 
loss thus provided the context for a second campaign to raise public and political 
awareness of the difficulties facing the ‘Big Four’. 
The ‘Square Deal’ campaign commenced in November 1938 and marked a 
change in approach to the previous ‘Fair Play for the Railways’ campaign; instead of 
lobbying for an increase in the regulation of road haulage, the railways campaigned for the 
deregulation of the railway rate mechanism.  Commenting upon the campaign, Brigadier-
General Sir Osborne Mance of the International Chamber of Commerce records that it 
attempted to highlight the importance of the railways to Britain’s economic wellbeing in 
peace and war, thereby justifying an overhaul of existing regulation to obtain a similar 
level of flexibility to that enjoyed by the road haulier when setting rates.229 The campaign 
thus labelled restrictions such as the statutory ‘undue preference, ‘common carrier’ and 
rate-publishing obligations as barriers to effective transport co-ordination, defined as ‘the 
correct economic distribution of traffic between road and rail’.230   
 The railways proposed the dissolution of the 1928 rates classification on grounds 
that its inflexibility and bureaucracy had prevented ‘snap quotations’ based upon a trader’s 
immediate requirements and encouraged road encroachment upon railway business.  
Instead, the railway companies suggested that they should be free to adjust charges 
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according to prevailing economic conditions.  New rates would be quoted on a basis of 
‘reasonableness’ and not with reference to a fixed Standard Revenue; any disputes would 
be settled by a reconfigured Railway Rates Tribunal.231 Whilst the Conservative Minister 
of Transport, Euan Wallace agreed that there was a ‘prima-facie’ case for some reform in 
the light of railway losses, the ‘Big Four’s proposals demonstrate an ignorance of their 
longer-term implications.232   
 Though cumbersome, the existing legislative structure provided checks and 
balances which encouraged careful consideration of rate alterations, raising the hypothesis 
that the risk associated with their removal was that more freight would be carried for less 
income.  This is evidenced by the fact that larger trading firms had successfully watered-
down the ‘Square Deal’ proposals by demanding a month’s notice for rate increases, thus 
providing an opportunity to switch to own-account or contract road haulage.233 The 
scheme’s successful implementation thus depended upon the establishment of goodwill 
between all parties; furthermore, Mance’s contemporary critique of the campaign suggests 
that any agreement depended upon the formation of a transport oligopoly in the road 
haulage sector to achieve closer alignment with rail transport.234 
 However, the campaign revealed some common ground; the traffic carried by ‘C’ 
transport was an area of mutual interest between ‘A’ licensees and the ‘Big Four’ railway 
companies.  This produced a conditional agreement for voluntary cooperation in setting 
merchandise rates for ratification within an Act of Parliament that pegged road and rail 
tariffs together to prevent undercutting.235 Whilst ‘...delighted to see that road and rail 
interests are getting together and are [voluntarily] progressing with the groundwork of co-
ordination’, Wallace delayed drafting the Bill and suggested that ‘...the spirit [of 
cooperation] is of more importance than the letter’.236 This lack of commitment stemmed 
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from the government’s preoccupation with national defence, and the ‘Square Deal’ was 
quietly shelved after the declaration of war against Germany in September 1939.237 
 
2.9 Planning for war, 1938-1939 
 
Government preparations for possible conflict with Germany began in 1936, although 
specific plans for transport were predicated upon the belief that rail and road had the 
capacity to make substantial contributions to the war effort.238 In the case of the railways, 
preparations began in earnest after the Munich Crisis in September 1938, when the 
government appointed a new Railway Executive Committee (REC) as an advisory body 
charged with developing strategies to ‘...[maintain] supplies and services essential to the 
life of the community’.239 Chaired by Sir Ralph Wedgwood of the LNER, the Committee 
comprised senior managers from the ‘Big Four’ railways to address a series of 
organisational and operational challenges such as traffic prioritisation; the prevention of 
congestion at key railway junctions and docks, and the evacuation of children.240 
 From the government’s perspective, the focus was to achieve an orderly transition 
to wartime operation, and a Ministry of War Transport Railway Control Officer was tasked 
with establishing control.  By August 1939, an Order of Defence Regulations had been 
prepared which empowered the Minister of War Transport to assume control of transport 
assets in the national interest.241 Various railway assets including docks, road transport 
operations and warehousing would enter the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War Transport 
through the REC, which became the principal means of railway management once the 
Order was enacted.  However, after establishing a chain of command, the government 
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assumed that excess line capacity resulting from traffic volatility during the latter 1930s 
was sufficient for the railways to absorb wartime traffic increases.242 
 In contrast to the railways, the sheer number of independent hauliers and the lack 
of a unifying representative body made pre-war preparations for road haulage difficult.243 
This was made clear in a government booklet issued to all goods licensees in 1939, as the 
foreword indicated the need for a strategy that would ‘...work smoothly from the very 
beginning of a war, but at the same time will be elastic enough to meet changing 
conditions’.244 The principal purpose of the booklet was to communicate the necessity to 
save fuel in the event of war, when priority would be given to military and civil defence 
organisations.  However, the existence of 500,000 vehicles and 200,000 commercial 
operators posed the problem of ‘thousands of individuals ...going his own way’.245    
 The plan proposed by the Minister was based upon the advice of the Road 
Transport (Defence) Advisory Committee, which consisted of ‘leading men in the road 
transport industry’.246 The plan entailed the formation of voluntary groups of 25 to 100 
licence holders to assist the government in securing the best use of road transport and the 
best use of fuel.247 This was to be achieved by directing the majority of goods traffic to the 
railways, which used an indigenous fuel that was less vulnerable to shortage and 
disruption.  Consequently, Britain’s road haulage sector was organised into 9,500 haulier 
groups administered by a regional Road Transport Defence Organisation, which in turn 
was based upon the existing structure of the road Licensing Authority.248   
 Other important aspects of the scheme included the pooling of lorries engaged in 
similar work into groups, whilst vehicles also remained in the area in which they were 
registered for the duration of the conflict to ease the administration of fuel rationing and 
prevent wasteful cross-haulage.249 However, the organisation lacked statutory compulsion 
and relied upon industry goodwill; indeed, the government’s expectation that the railways 
would provide the bulk of wartime haulage capacity suggests that it had ‘insufficient 
appreciation of the crucial part that road transport must inevitably play in wartime’.250 
Government control over the railways was established when the Minister passed an 
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Emergency (Railway Control) Order on 1 September 1939 to facilitate the evacuation of 
children.  Although initially expected to continue with ‘business as usual’ where possible, 
the ‘Big Four’ gradually issued notices that services were liable to disruption, with goods 
accepted on the proviso that the railway companies would not accept responsibility for loss 
or delay.251 
 
2.10 Goods transport in wartime and planning for peace,  
1940-1945 
 
The railway companies had gained the status of contractors to the government, which 
exercised greater control over finances when the Treasury implemented a revenue-pooling 
scheme as an anti-inflation measure in February 1940.  This guaranteed the railways a flat 
annual payment of nearly £40 million for services rendered, with any excess divided 
between each company and the government up to a total of £56 million.252 Government 
traffic was granted a 33 per cent reduction on peacetime rates, and the railways requested, 
and obtained, permission for a 17 per cent general increase in non-government 
merchandise traffic rates.253 With inflationary pressures continuing to threaten Britain’s 
price-controlled economy in 1941, a revised ‘Railway Control Agreement’ was issued to 
fix the annual payment at £43 million, with the balance going to the Exchequer.254  
 Despite protecting the wider economy, a profound increase in traffic between 
1941 and 1944 produced a potential £350 million in revenue; instead, the Treasury 
received £178 million in ‘excess profits’, leaving the railways with £172 million to fund 
running repairs, meet rising operating costs and plan for peacetime.255 The impact of this 
arrangement, namely a lack of compensation for wear and tear, was to be long-term; the 
short-term problem concerned the operation of Britain’s railways in wartime when attrition 
in materials, manpower and equipment precipitated the accumulation of maintenance 
arrears.  Therefore, the outbreak of war had imposed a moratorium upon road and rail 
competition, yet also marked the beginning of an erosion of service reliability. 
 Wartime adjustment was initially characterised by the deceleration of railway 
passenger and goods services to reduce locomotive wear and coal consumption.  Robert 
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Bell’s post-war analysis of Britain’s railways at war cites the disbandment of ‘next-day’ 
goods services, including the LNER’s ‘Green Arrow’ express freight service, as a 
symptom of the attrition facing the industry, with goods trains lengthened to achieve more 
with fewer resources.256 Although general merchandise continued to be carried, it was 
secondary in priority to war materials and food, and therefore prone to heavy delays.  The 
REC also conceded that congestion was partially self-inflicted due to inadequate wagon 
clearance procedures; the later than anticipated commencement of aerial bombardment in 
September 1940 thus provided a brief breathing space for addressing these matters.257 
 
Image 5 
 
 
War damage at Derby station after an air raid on 15 January, 1941, and indicative of the 
disruption experienced at various locations across Britain’s railway network during the 
conflict.  Source: National Railway Museum DS091161-82597. 
 
Thereafter, stations, marshalling yards and railway junctions became prime targets, and the 
destruction depicted in Image 5 or the dislocation of rolling stock impacted upon the 
railway industry’s capacity to serve strategic assets such as the ports.  Consequently, shore 
warehousing overflowed and caused a rise in shipping demurrage, a key point of concern 
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in the official and subsequent histories of wartime distribution.258 R. J. Hammond and 
Lizzie Collingham suggest that the port situation was complicated by the government’s 
pre-war supply strategy, which determined that essential commodities normally entering 
the country via the east coast, such as grain, would be diverted to west coast ports at 
Liverpool, Glasgow and elsewhere to counteract the anticipated U-Boat threat.259 In the 
case of Liverpool, the railways were expected to ferry grain traffic to the mills of eastern 
England across the Pennines over lines with restricted capacity, such as the Diggle and 
Woodhead routes from Manchester to Leeds and Sheffield respectively.260 
By October 1940, an all-railway working party had been established to analyse 
port congestion and propose solutions.  Summarising the report, Christopher Savage’s 
official history of wartime transport suggests that the haphazard organisation of the 
government’s own rail traffic had a negative impact upon the operational capacity of the 
railways, as three separate Ministries used network as a matter of priority.261 Inter-
departmental competition for finite transport resources meant that wagons were hoarded by 
the Ministry of Supply and the War Department at the expense of the Ministry of Food’s 
distribution operations.  The working party thus emphasised the need for more systematic 
planning according to anticipated traffic requirements through closer cooperation between 
railways, ports, traders and government departments.262 
 Such planning required the pooling of the wagon fleet, thus ensuring that 
specialist vehicles were allocated to locations with greatest need; new construction was 
constrained by the manufacture of war material at railway works.263 To assist, wagon 
demurrage charges were altered to increase availability and speed up unloading.  In 1937, 
the demurrage charge for an ordinary wagon was 17p per day on the Southern railway after 
a free initial 24-hour period for unloading; from December 1940, the charge was doubled 
to 34p per day by the Minister of War Transport.264 This supplemented a ‘nominated 
loading’ system, which entailed the holding-back of part-loads for dispatch on specified 
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days, thus ensuring more economical wagon use, a reduction in journey times and the 
ability to forward plan.265   
 The conflict had also presented the Ministry of War Transport with an opportunity 
to consider the future needs of inland transport in Britain, with two important points of 
discussion being the maintenance of efficient transport and road network development.  In 
the first instance, a report prepared by Sir Cyril Hurcomb at the Ministry of War Transport 
in July 1943 recorded that railway finances were key to post-war stability.266 In this 
respect, Hurcomb referred to what Gourvish describes as a ‘radical’ report compiled by Dr 
W. H. Coates and Sir Alfred Robinson on behalf of the then-Minister of Transport, Lord 
John Reith in 1940, which proposed the creation of a single, monopolist transport 
organisation.267 Although shelved by Reith’s successor, J. T. C. Moore-Brabazon, the 
report, entitled ‘The Transport Problem in Great Britain’, also speculated upon the 
outcome of the ‘Square Deal’ campaign had it not been interrupted by the war.268 
 The authors dismissed the scheme on the grounds that it ignored the ‘...underlying 
differences of the differing rates structures of the two sides of the [transport] Industry’; 
although the proposals appeared to ‘...free the railways from their legislative shackles, they 
will not effectively do so in practice’.269 Hurcomb considered that a ‘Square Deal Bill’ 
would be a palliative at best, as the railways would require ‘more radical treatment at an 
early date’.270 Other schemes considered included the creation of a ‘national clearing 
house’ that would allocate traffic to the most appropriate mode of transport.271 
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Furthermore, a plan submitted by Sir Osborne Mance advocated the ‘separation of 
responsibility for the respective permanent ways of road and rail from the responsibility for 
the operation of transport’ in a manner which presaged the relationship between Railtrack, 
Network Rail and Britain’s Train Operating Companies after privatisation in 1994.272  
 Hurcomb emphasised that there was an urgent requirement for ‘...a definite view 
of the manner in which we mean to prevent the condition of Inland Transport slipping back 
into one of competitive chaos immediately the war is over’.273 Dr Coates’ shelved proposal 
for a transport monopoly which united canal, rail and long-distance road haulage under a 
central management structure gained renewed interest, as it solved the ‘problem of co-
ordination in a complete and drastic fashion’.274 Whilst Hurcomb suggested that such a 
monopoly would provide ‘financial and administrative difficulties’ that would give rise to 
‘much controversy’, the importance of inland transport provided ample justification for 
directing thoughts towards creating a ‘national transport authority’, presaging the policy of 
nationalisation that was eventually adopted.275  
 The second aspect of post-war inland transport considered by the Ministry of War 
Transport was the development of Britain’s road network, a debate summarised in Peter 
Merriman’s Driving Spaces.276 Merriman refers to a memorandum prepared by Frederick 
Cook, Chief Engineer of the Ministry of War Transport in mid-1942, which set the agenda 
for the government’s peacetime road policy, which had previously been ‘determined by the 
principles laid down by a former Minister (Mr. Hore-Belisha)’ in 1936, which was merely 
to incrementally ‘...improve the system we now have’.277 Although a fact-finding tour of 
Germany in 1937 had softened the Ministry’s stance towards the construction of a new 
national road network, Merriman records that inter-war policy was stifled by slowing 
economic growth and rising defence expenditure, which prevented the construction of a 
Carnforth-Warrington motorway and planning for a toll-free version of the 1923 London-
Birmingham scheme.278   
 Cook acknowledged that the circumstances prevailing in 1936 could not apply to 
the post-war period, and recommended that a decision should be made as to whether ‘...it is 
in the national interest that the construction of a system of motorways shall form part of the 
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post-war programme’.279 The memorandum’s comparative analysis of the Italian and 
German motorway programmes suggest that despite high initial cost, their construction 
provided a means of reducing traffic congestion and increasing road capacity in a Britain 
that was ‘...under-vehicled in relation to population and over-vehicled in relation to road 
mileage’, indicating that a new road network would complement existing trunk routes.280   
 Cook thus suggested that improved roads would encourage long-distance door-to-
door transport, whilst motorways built to serve densely-populated areas were also 
envisaged to give rural businesses direct access to lucrative urban markets, thus permitting 
direct competition with the railways in merchandise traffic.281 The issue was also being 
pressed by a vocal road lobby, which extolled the benefits a new, potentially faster road 
network would have for the economy.  Whilst a sympathetic Labour government was 
elected in 1945, economic headwinds continued to delay motorway construction.  
Furthermore, the Labour government’s election campaign had focused upon the 
implementation of sweeping reforms to place industry ‘...[into] the service of the nation’ 
and a commitment to nationalise inland transport.282 
 
2.11 From nationalisation to reorganisation: goods transport 
1945-1955 
 
The Labour government’s pursuit of nationalisation in 1945 was the culmination of 
political debate and frustration at the lack of economic planning directed towards 
protecting the ailing ‘commanding heights’ of British industry.283 In the case of transport, 
this entailed imposing control over private interest.284 The implication was that the arms-
length approach to regulation prevailing before 1939 had failed to secure an effective 
settlement of the competition between rail and road through private enterprise, which had 
instead created a prolonged ‘struggle with sectional interests’.285 The Labour government 
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thus advocated intervention through the Ministry of Transport, which maintained its 
control over the ‘Big Four’ railways throughout the nationalisation process.       
 From the railway industry’s perspective, the threat of imminent public ownership 
meant distraction and uncertainty, which prevented the implementation of post-war 
investment plans, as the government’s continuing control over railway finances 
immediately prior to nationalisation extended to the development fund created from 
wartime operating profits.286 The consequence was an inability to address wartime 
maintenance arrears; the period 1945-1947 was instead characterised by disinvestment and 
service deterioration which outwardly confirmed the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh 
Dalton’s exclamation that the ‘Big Four’ companies were ‘a very poor bag of physical 
assets’.287 The deterioration in service quality was evidenced by a severe locomotive 
shortage that adversely impacted upon the freight business during the winter of 1947. 
 The adverse impact emerged from the railway industry’s decision to tackle the 
situation by imposing freight embargoes, a strategy that risked hastening the contraction of 
traffic since 1945.288 However, the Southern Railway’s Chairman, Colonel Eric Gore-
Browne condemned the Labour government’s lack of assistance in 1947.289 Gore-Browne 
argued to shareholders that nationalisation was driven by ideology rather than a real 
concern for the state of transport, and was the latest ‘ham-fisted’ scheme to emerge from a 
chronic lack of continuity in transport policy since the creation of the Ministry of Transport 
in 1919.290 In short, railway managers argued that the combination of government control 
of investment and the uncertainty of nationalisation had rendered them impotent in 
delivering the renewal and re-equipment demanded by the trading community.   
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 Gore-Browne’s critique also chimed with sentiments expressed within the 
independent long-distance road haulage sector.  This was because the Labour government 
was also intent on nationalising long-distance road haulage in a bid to limit competition for 
traffic which could be conveyed by rail.  The plan attracted fierce criticism from the 
haulage lobby’s newly-formed Road Haulage Association and was a basis for cooperation 
with the ‘Big Four’ railways; however, the ‘ill-conceived, ill-drafted [and] tyrannical’ 
Transport Act gained Parliamentary approval on 15 August 1947.291 The Act determined 
that inland waterways and the ‘Big Four’ railways would be vested into a British Transport 
Commission (BTC) on January 1, 1948, which would provide strategic management for 
British transport and was answerable to the Minister of Transport.  The day-to-day 
management of inland transport was to be delegated to several Executive bodies including 
the Railway Executive (RE), which managed the newly-formed British Railways (BR), and 
the Road Haulage Executive (RHE). 
Michael Bonavia’s history of the BTC argues that the relationship between the 
BTC and Executives was determined by the individual circumstances of their creation.292 
The RE possessed managerial continuity as its personnel was selected from existing 
employees to ease the transition from a private to nationalised entity, whilst it oversaw 
regions that roughly corresponded with the ‘Big Four’.  However, Bonavia and Gourvish 
suggest that the retention of management personnel with close association with the ‘Big 
Four’ was risky, as ‘personalities and nostalgia’ threatened to create a rift between 
operational and strategic management.293 Furthermore, hopes of a post-nationalisation 
investment programme to address the ongoing maintenance arrears were dashed when 
declining economic fortunes forced the government to impose a moratorium on capital 
spending.294 With the BTC queuing in an order of national priorities that included health 
and education, tension with the RE increased. 
 In contrast, the development of the RHE was initially complex as it required the 
legal ratification of purchase agreements made between the BTC and thousands of 
individual haulage firms.  However, their settlement secured substantial lorry fleets and a 
transfer of experienced personnel, whilst the haulage industry’s fragmentation ultimately 
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worked in the RHE’s favour because of the smaller-scale of company loyalties.295 
Therefore, the main organisational challenge facing the RHE was acquisition, and whilst 
the Transport Act had anticipated this by setting a deadline of October 1948, it would take 
until 1951 before British Road Services (BRS), the trading name of the RHE, was 
operational, having absorbed 3,766 long-distance haulage firms and 41,265 lorries.296   
 The creation of BRS ensured that freight traffic could be allocated between the 
nationalised concerns efficiently, with small loads conveyed by road, and bulkier loads by 
rail.  A 25-mile operating restriction was imposed upon remaining independent hauliers to 
give BRS a monopoly over remaining long-distance road transport operations.297 This 
posed two problems, the first being a reduction in choice available to traders, as 
highlighted in later chapters, whilst the implementation of fixed tariffs was followed by 
rates increases to improve the relationship between costs and income.298 This was because 
‘a number of rates were uneconomic and required upward revision’, whilst the proceeds 
from general rates increases ranging from two to ten per cent would finance an overhaul 
programme, the scale of which resulted in a -£1 million deficit in net receipts in 1950.299 
Whilst this was a visible attempt to improve the quality of service provided by BRS, the 
concentration of transport provision within a single organisation increased the risk of 
disruption during trade union disputes, as exemplified by a failed attempt to amalgamate 
all of the BTC’s road collection and delivery services within a single organisation.300 
 The BTC attempted to transfer control of the RE’s road collection and delivery 
services to the RHE, which generated administrative difficulties and trade union pressure 
over redundancies caused by the amalgamation, causing a stoppage at St. Pancras goods 
depot.301 The tension between the BTC and the Executives was compounded by a period of 
drift within the Labour party before a new Conservative government committed to the 
denationalisation of long-distance road haulage was elected in October 1951.302 The plan 
was formalised under the Transport Act (1953), although a lack of safeguards meant that 
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BR faced competition from the rump of BRS, private hauliers and ‘C’ licensees.303 Despite 
demonstrating recognition of the importance of road haulage to the national economy, the 
Act contained little consideration for BR’s ability to exist alongside a reinvigorated road 
haulage sector.  Instead, the government commenced another reorganisation by abolishing 
the RE and dividing its responsibilities between the BTC and regional management.304 
Although the Act anticipated renewed transport competition by removing all railway rate 
restrictions except maximum charges, success would ultimately hinge upon the outcome of 
investment funding released to the railways in 1955.305  
 
2.12 The ‘Modernisation Plan’, 1955-1959 
 
In 1955, BR’s freight business was characterised by a labour-intensive steam-hauled 
wagon-load service and rising staff wages, as highlighted below in Graph 3.306 In 
proportion to annual revenue earned, estimated total annual male adult wages calculated 
from BR’s average weekly wage bill represented 60 per cent of £336 million earned in 
1949, eventually rising to 67 per cent of £472 million earned in 1958.307 In 1954, BR 
attempted to capitalise upon political goodwill and address the issue by compiling a report 
entitled ‘Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways’, which described, in 
general terms, how an anticipated £1,240 million in funding would be spent upon 
revitalising the network, a new motive power construction programme and the adoption of 
new technology to streamline existing methods of freight handling.308 Despite the BTC 
receiving government support and permission to acquire funding through the issue of Loan 
Stock on the market following publication in January 1955, circumstances conspired to 
ensure that the plan would fail to stem the flow of freight traffic turning to road transport. 
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Graph 3 
Estimated British Railways male adults annual wage bill, 1949-1958
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 3 (p. 298). 
 
Firstly, former BR employee Stewart Joy argues that there was a lack of strategic vision 
amongst the upper echelons of management, leading to a failure to recognise the changing 
character of trade and industry in Britain.309 Whilst the country was moving towards a 
more competitive, consumer-based economy, the choice between road and rail transport 
became starker as producers, manufacturers and retailers increasingly desired a 
standardised form of logistics that gave ‘primary consideration ...to the interests of people 
using transport’.310 This included the integration of storage and final distribution into a 
seamless operation which minimised costly handling, with the retail sector using third-
party hauliers to provide most of their distribution requirements.311 BR’s response was to 
improve its existing wagon-load and container operations, which ostensibly offered the 
trader the flexibility they desired by expanding services that catered for the dispatch of 
small loads over long distances, thereby justifying investment in a new generation of 
automated marshalling yards.312 
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Although BR management had correctly identified the need for a reduction in the 
labour-intensity of goods operations, the decision to invest £50 million in marshalling 
yards raises the hypothesis that it was working towards a ‘modernised’ rather than 
‘modern’ railway network to address 16 years of disinvestment.313 Schemes initiated under 
the plan included dieselisation and the acceleration of vacuum-braked goods wagon 
construction; both attempted to improve the industry’s competitive position against longer-
distance road haulage by increasing speed of transit and reducing the number of staff 
required to safely operate goods trains.314 However, an ‘inadequate response to 
productivity from railwaymen’ was accompanied by the degeneration of a pilot scheme to 
test new diesels into a morass of panic-ordering.315 
 
Graph 4 
Non-nationalised lorries in Britain, 1945-1959
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 4 (p. 299). 
 
The acceleration of vacuum-braked wagon construction also proved an expensive white 
elephant on two counts.  Although BR policy envisaged a gradual transition from steam to 
diesel motive power that necessitated the retention of vacuum brakes, both Joy and 
subsequently Gourvish indicate that more efficient air-braking was widely used by various 
European railways and could be adapted for use with diesel motive power.316 Secondly, the 
practical benefit of fitting vacuum brakes to all wagons was nullified by the need to 
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manually couple individual wagons at marshalling yards.  Taken together, these 
demonstrate BR’s failure to construct its Modernisation Plan according to the demands of 
its customers, resulting in money being wasted on infrastructure being rendered redundant 
by the growth of road haulage highlighted above in Graph 4.317 
The unveiling of the Modernisation Plan was followed by industrial action over a 
long-standing engineman’s wages dispute.  An ASLEF strike between May and June 1955 
caused severe disruption, and indicated that a modernising BR had yet to overcome the 
problem of employee relations, which continued to impact upon service reliability.318 The 
fragmentary nature of the road haulage industry meant that it was less susceptible to trade 
union interference, and it is possible to hypothesise that this, and subsequent rate 
adjustments made by BR in 1957 contributed to the decline in the tonnage of merchandise 
conveyed in 1958, as indicated by Graph 5; the lack of a substantial recovery in 1959 
permits an assumption that a permanent transfer to road haulage had taken place in the 
traffic concerned.319   
 
Graph 5 
British Railways total merchandise freight traffic, 1948-1959
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 5 (p. 299). 
 
The loss of traffic thus suggests that Britain’s railways were no longer an automatic 
proposition for goods conveyance and therefore needed a more proactive approach to 
marketing that ‘sold’ services to the trader.   This is exemplified by BR’s introduction of 
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the ‘liner train’ in 1959, which entailed running fast, regular, fixed-formation trains over 
long-distance trunk routes such as London-Glasgow.320 The service used rail-mounted 
containers to eradicate shunting and reduce the need for specialist wagons, whilst traders 
could trunk loose or palletised traffic to a selection of locations for transhipment.  The 
concept thus showcased BR’s ability to offer a full door-to-door service; collection, trunk-
haulage and delivery was conveniently arranged by one organisation, whilst the reduction 
in handling afforded by the container preserved condition during transit.321 However, a 
combination of the Modernisation Plan’s inability to reverse the decline in traffic and 
income hindered any meaningful expansion of the liner train concept before 1963. 
 
2.13 Railways in retreat, road haulage under pressure: goods 
transport, 1959-1975      
 
If the six years between 1953 and 1958 witnessed the balance tip in favour of road haulage, 
the period to 1975 sealed BR’s fate in the conveyance of merchandise; the decline in the 
overall tonnage of freight carried by Britain’s railways throughout the period has already 
been shown in the introduction of this chapter.  The decline coincided with a change in the 
politics of inland transport with the appointment of Ernest Marples as Minister of 
Transport.322 This marked the Conservative government’s adoption of a more pragmatic 
stance which accounted for the advance of private motor transport and rising demand for 
the lorry as the principal means of goods conveyance by trade and industry.  The opening 
of the M1 in 1959 and the subsequent motorway construction programme provided new 
arterial routes for long-distance transport that relieved urban traffic congestion and 
permitted competition between rail and road for long-distance traffic.323  
 Marples’ response to the decline in BR’s fortunes was to establish a Parliamentary 
Select Committee on BTC finances and a Special Advisory Group to review the 
Modernisation Plan.  Gourvish records that BR had little immediate chance of ‘breaking 
even’, whilst the Advisory Group, led by Sir Ivan Stedeford and featuring Dr. Richard 
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Beeching of Imperial Chemical Industries, recommended the cessation of the 
Modernisation Plan.324 The Group concluded that BR’s declining financial performance 
between 1951 and 1960, highlighted in Table 1 (p. 45), stemmed from ineffective 
management accounting, a factor considered in detail by John Quail.325 Quail’s analysis 
suggests that the ‘Big Four’ failed to fully cost services before the Second World War; 
indeed, success was measured by the tonnage carried rather than profit derived thereof, and 
institutional path-dependency in day-to-day management meant that any attempt to 
implement cost-budget accounting took place within a business culture unaccustomed to 
pegging revenue with cost.326 
 Derek Aldcroft attributes the inability to implement management accounting to 
the sheer burden of demand upon revenue, the need to offer competitive rates in the face of 
road competition and excessive cross-subsidisation between profitable and unprofitable 
services exacerbated by the sunk costs in existing infrastructure.327 Furthermore, he records 
that whilst the 1953 Act had given the BTC the freedom to adjust charges within a 
published maxima, the risk of failing to cover indirect costs such as track maintenance and 
administration remained.328 The situation demanded strict budgetary restraint, yet the 
challenge of covering total costs meant that the growth of BR’s financial deficit continued 
unchecked, as highlighted in Table 1, prompting questions about the optimum size of the 
network.329 The debate gained traction as traffic forwarded by BR’s traditional major 
customers, the coal and steel industries, shrank in the face of global competition.330 This 
was the context in which Beeching was appointed BTC Chairman in 1961, which presaged 
another reorganisation under the Transport Act (1962).331 
 Whilst the BTC was dissolved to permit the creation of an autonomous British 
Railways Board (BRB), the Act also removed the last of the Victorian legislative 
handicaps affecting the freight business.  The statutory duty to offer ‘reasonable facilities’ 
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to all traders requiring rail transport was repealed, which furnished the BRB with the 
commercial freedom to withdraw services and refuse unremunerative traffic.  The 1962 
Act also made it easier for the BRB to adjust to the demands of trade and industry by 
‘reshaping’ the railway network, thereby divesting itself of unremunerative 
infrastructure.332 Equally, the Act spawned Beeching’s 1965 plan for developing the 
remaining railway services, which proposed a drastic reduction in inefficient wagon-load 
services in favour of train-load and long-distance inter-modal liner trains.333  
 The growth of road haulage in the early 1960s might also be consistent with the 
expansion of motorways, which made long-distance competition with the railways 
possible.  Although Scott has shown that the share of Gross Domestic Fixed Capital 
Formation granted to road infrastructure was 2.1 per cent was lower than the 4.3 per cent 
granted to the BRB in 1959-1960, the situation was reversed by 1963 when the share had 
risen to 2.9 per cent as opposed to the 1.9 percent granted to the railways; indeed, this 
increased to 3.1 per cent in 1965 with the commencement of extensions to the M1 and the 
construction of the M6 providing a publically-funded fillip for the long-distance road 
haulage sector.334 The ubiquity of road haulage meant that the BRB was reduced to a 
supplemental role, although proposals for high-speed liner trains operating between 55 
‘Freightliner’ terminals emerged in 1963.335 Whilst a step towards competing with long-
distance road haulage, attempts to grant non-BRB hauliers access to the rail terminals were 
met with opposition from the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) on grounds that the 
BRB’s road feeder services were threatened; the first Freightliner train finally ran in 
November 1965 after two years of negotiation.336 However, the schemes emerging from 
the Beeching reports provided the BRB with a response to the evolving demands of trade 
by streamlining the railway operation to minimise handling and the potential for delay, and 
hence improve door-to-door distribution capability.337 
 The election of a Labour government in 1964 marked another change in direction.  
The appointment of Barbara Castle as Minister of Transport and the enforced departure of 
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Beeching in 1965 presaged what Dennis Munby describes as another ‘revolution’ in 
nationalised transport policy that paid lip-service to transport coordination through the 
creation of a ‘model’ of road and rail organisation.338 The scheme was outlined in the 
Transport Act (1968), which Gourvish suggests reflected a shift in emphasis ‘...from 
“efficiency” and “competition” towards “service” and “modal integration”’ for the benefit 
of the trading community.339 The Act legislated for the amalgamation of Freightliner and 
the BRB’s unprofitable and labour-intensive small goods services with what remained of 
BRS to create a National Freight Corporation (NFC) in January 1969.340 The development 
of the NFC scheme ran parallel to the BRB’s policy to cease unremunerative services and 
invest in the profitable core of its operations, namely bulk or trainload goods regularly 
conveyed between fixed points; criteria that the Freightliner concept sought to address.  
Consequently, the proposal attracted opposition from the BRB, as it entailed removing the 
‘brightest jewel in British Rail’s crown’.341 
 The Act also raised concerns amongst independent and own-account hauliers, as it 
contained clauses for tightening-up road safety legislation.  On the one hand, developments 
in road safety legislation were purely administrative in nature and included the compulsory 
logging of routes and times, whilst vehicles were to be ‘plated’ with details of tare and 
loaded weights in the interests of improving loading and construction standards.342 
Concern principally stemmed from the Act’s replacement of quantitative licensing with 
qualitative licensing based upon driver competency, thus restricting entry into the industry 
by increasing start-up costs and establishing minimum pricing.343 As the government faced 
increased pressure to accelerate motorway expansion, the author speculates that the 
restriction of new-entrants into the sector was a means to govern traffic growth when 
Britain’s struggling economy had forced the imposition of wage freezes and financial 
stringency in infrastructure investment.344  
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 The Conservative government’s election in 1970 precipitated another change in 
focus from rail and road coordination to reducing the BRB’s stubborn financial deficit.  To 
this end, the Railways Act (1974) implemented a system of grants for retaining profitable 
traffics.345 However, aside from the emergence of Freightliner in 1965, the closure of 
railway facilities since 1963 meant that many traders no longer enjoyed a viable alternative 
to road transport.346 The strategic implication of this was revealed by the Oil Crisis in 
December 1973, which caused a temporary interruption in the development of Britain’s 
motorway network.  Although the crisis demonstrated the sensitivity of Britain’s road 
haulage sector to global events, the overall flexibility of the lorry in meeting a wide range 
of distribution needs, as well as government support in contrast to the infrastructure-
dependent railways, would guarantee growth and development well beyond 1975. 
 
2.14 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has indicated that a top-down approach to freight transport only partially 
explains Britain’s transition from rail to road during the mid-twentieth century.  Whilst the 
basic elements of industrial relations, service quality and technological innovation are key 
factors, the question of the extent to which external agencies influenced transport remains.  
Crucially, this raises the hypothesis that the course taken by inland transport between 1919 
and 1975 may have been shaped by the needs of the trading community in facilitating the 
supply of goods.  The governance of the supply chain thus provides a working context for 
the themes of transport cost, convenience, service and efficiency, thus corroborating their 
importance as prerequisites for effective logistics. 
 This review of freight transport has highlighted the differences between rail and 
road; the former was relatively free to pursue investment projects such as containers and 
infrastructure improvements.  However, the inflexibility of railways as a mode of guided 
transport and through anti-monopolist rate regulation posed challenges; furthermore, their 
inability to charge rates that reflected direct and indirect operating costs rendered the mode 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of rate undercutting within a competitive transport 
market.  Britain’s railways were also hamstrung by crises of reliability, which included 
traffic embargoes and recurring industrial disputes.  The strikes of 1919, 1926 and 1955 
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and the freight embargoes of 1919 and 1946-47 were clearly injurious; how this emerged 
in practice requires an exploration of the attitudes of individual traders.  
 In contrast, road haulage, despite initial load and range limitations, enjoyed a 
comparatively free hand to compete for traffic and quote low rates whilst the fragmented 
and competitive nature of participants provided a bulwark against industrial action.  In the 
1920s, individuals seeking self-employment found the industry simple to enter; before the 
Road and Rail Traffic Act (1933) imposed a basic regulatory structure, the sector was 
characterised by a ‘race to the bottom’ in which inexperienced newcomers undercut 
established firms to obtain traffic at any cost.  Whilst Britain’s transition to road can be 
partially attributed to the independent haulier’s opportunism, the existing literature may be 
enhanced by case studies explaining why specific traders began to adopt the mode.347   
 Aside from restructuring many aspects of the industry between 1919 and 1945, 
the shifting political debate which took place between 1945 and the passing of the 1968 
Transport Act has implied a disconnect between the government’s determination to reform 
transport management and the operational needs of the industry.  Bonavia highlights that 
the ‘pendulum’ of nationalisation and subsequent denationalisation was inconvenient from 
an administrator’s perspective, yet in the case of independent long-distance road transport, 
the process helped to stabilise the industry.348 In contrast, BR underwent a series of 
financial crises and reorganisations which disrupted continuity and prevented the 
nationalised industry from responding expeditiously to the changing demands of traders.  
The government’s discursive approach to transport between 1953 and 1975 alternated 
between improving coordination between rail and road, imposing moratoriums on 
investment in the interests of supporting macro-economic policy and investing in 
motorway construction, which suggests a persistent lack of clarity of vision.        
 Whilst this chapter has demonstrated that rail and road transport functioned within 
the broad parameters laid-down by Britain’s changing political and economic 
environments between 1919 and 1975, this is a convenient point for reiterating that this 
thesis will take a new direction by placing the supply of transport within the broader 
context of its demand.  Consequently, food distribution presents an important lens for 
viewing transport within the supply chain, as the structure and agency of participants other 
than the transport provider is key to shaping demand.  How factors such as cost, service, 
technology and the overall governance of supply chains influenced Britain’s transition to 
road-based food distribution is the focus for subsequent chapters, beginning with a case 
study of an everyday food staple which continues to demand efficient distribution: milk. 
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Chapter 3 - Milk distribution by rail and road, 
1919-1975 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has provided a general context for freight transport in Britain from 
the existing historiography.  Its relevance to food distribution becomes clear throughout the 
following chapters, as the narrative of technological and regulatory change within the 
transport sector provides an important backdrop for the development of food logistics 
between 1919 and 1975.  However, the focus upon the why and wherefore of the transport 
industry only provides part of the freight story, and it is therefore necessary to place the 
supply of logistical services within the context of the supply chain.  In doing so, this 
chapter proposes to consider the reasons how and why a transition from rail to road took 
place in the transport of a highly perishable staple food commodity, with milk providing a 
useful starting point for this analysis of food distribution in Britain because of its 
importance as an essential commodity with daily demand.     
 The existing literature on milk distribution is diverse and falls into five categories.  
Firstly, agricultural historians such as Edith Whetham, Jonathan Brown, Richard Perren 
and John Martin have noted the commodity’s importance to British agriculture, as it played 
a role in providing the farming community with a stable market throughout an agrarian 
depression experienced between 1873 and 1940.349 The bulk of the historiography 
considers the pre-Second World War period, and this chapter will establish, using the 
foundations laid by Brian Holderness and Martin, how post-war agricultural developments 
influenced milk distribution.350 It will consider how shifts in milk supply chain governance 
between wholesalers, producers and government acted as a catalyst to innovation in 
transport technology or hindered operation.   
 The second historiographical strand incorporates the business histories of firms 
and organisations involved with milk distribution.  Bryan Morgan’s account of Express 
Dairies has provided a useful introduction to the development of the wholesale industry 
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since 1864, whilst Stanley Baker’s account of the Milk Marketing Board (MMB), Milk to 
Market, highlights the efforts required to market the product to both consumers and 
manufacturers to the benefit of the producer.351 Both give reference to transport operations, 
but once again lack an analysis of how the relationship between both organisations 
influenced rail and road transport technology and operation.  The third strand, milk 
distribution in the Second World War, highlights the influence of government regulation 
upon milk transport whilst controlling supply and demand, which provides the focus for 
accounts by R. J. Hammond and Alan Wilt.352 
 Another relevant area is food hygiene, with Michael French and Jim Phillips’ 
account of food regulation in Britain providing an important contribution to this aspect of 
food history, which Deborah Valenze considers a key marketing tool within an 
oligopolistic trade.353 However, the focus on regulation rather than hygiene in the practical 
sense means that consideration of the problems of spoilage and excessive handling during 
transport remains elusive, although the fifth historiographical strand, literature dealing with 
specific aspects of road and railway operations, provides some assistance in this regard.354 
This chapter therefore combines and builds upon this literature with archival material 
pertaining to United Dairies and the MMB to establish the role of the milk wholesaler in 
the development of rail and road distribution.  It begins with a brief supply chain analysis 
for the London milk trade, the most prominent example of long-distance milk distribution 
in Britain, which accounted for an estimated 12 per cent of the national market in 1938.355 
Figure 1 (p. 101) shows the stages of milk distribution, which consist of farm collection; 
country depot; ex-country depot transport, London depot and distribution to the retail 
dairy.  The supply chain analysis therefore gives an overview of organisational change, 
thereby providing reasons for the sector’s transition from rail to road transport. 
 Having established the structure of the London milk trade at various points 
between 1919 and 1975, the transport operations of United Dairies and the MMB will be 
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examined.  In doing so, the impact of changes in supply chain organisation and external 
pressures such as the interwar economic decline will be considered. Graph 6 below 
provides a rough indication of the size of the distribution problem between 1901 and 1937, 
and shows a fluctuation in production between 1919 and 1921 that encompasses the 
implementation of the 1920 Agriculture Act’s price guarantees for domestic arable produce 
and its repeal in 1921.356 Thereafter, the growth in milk production remained steady from 
1925 until 1934, when a rise is observed following the establishment of the MMB.   
 
Graph 6 
Liquid milk for consumption in the UK, 1901-1937
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 6 (p. 300). 
 
Although ‘success in dairy farming [depended upon] the exercise of efficiency and 
economy in all departments of the industry’, a consideration of the government’s control 
over milk distribution in the Second World War provides a useful prelude to an analysis of 
the post-war trade.357 The relationship between the MMB, the railways and private haulier 
after 1945 provides the focus for this section.  With transport proving a ‘major investment’ 
for wholesaler and MMB alike, the chapter aims to consider precisely how the trade’s 
stakeholders drove technological innovation in transport, whilst establishing the main 
turning points in the transition from rail to road distribution.358 Finally, the chapter will 
                                                 
356
 E. Whetham, “The Agriculture Act, 1920 and its Repeal – the ‘Great Betrayal,’” Agricultural History 
Review, 22 (1974), pp. 36-46. 
357
 Ministry of Agriculture, Modern Milk Production (London: HMSO, 1938), Foreword, p. iii. 
358
 Captain A. H. Amor, “Notes on Our Transport,” Our Notebook, 1 (October/November 1921), p. 14. 
  
98 
detail the contemporaneous shift in supply chain governance from wholesaler to MMB, 
thus presenting a reason for the milk supply’s modal shift from rail to road haulage. 
 
3.2 Milk supply chain analysis 
 
A review of the key changes taking place within the milk supply chain will provide an 
analytical framework for exploring the evolution of the sector’s demand for transport.  
Whilst existing analyses focus upon the economic performance of the trade, detailed 
accounts dealing specifically with transport are rare; indeed, Michael Chisholm’s 1959 
account of milk collection and delivery provides the only detailed analysis of the efficiency 
of this operation.359 The account is notable for the use of data obtained from 285 
contractors and the MMB, and uses statistical analysis to argue that there were no 
economies of scale emerging from large road haulage firms.  The use of the lorry in large 
catchment areas may also have proved a diseconomy because of the possibility of ‘dead 
running’ between farms.360 However, the passage of time has meant that the present author 
has been unable to obtain access to similar data series or interview industry participants, 
and consequently any attempt to establish how financial economies of scale influenced the 
transition from rail to road milk transport is prone to assumption, a problem perpetuated 
when using data from a company’s financial accounts. 
 This is exemplified below by Graph 7, in which accounts data permits the 
calculation of the cost of transport as a proportion of total sales for United Dairies between 
1927 and 1938.  The author has assumed that the data includes both milk collection from 
farms and the depot-to-depot trunk haul.  Although factors such as seasonal variation in 
production preclude accurate analysis, the graph shows that the cost of carriage and 
haulage declined between 1927 and 1930, which coincides with the firm’s adoption of the 
rail tank and lorries.  The dip in 1932 might therefore be consistent with economies 
achieved by the use of innovations in transport technology such as the bulk rail and road 
tank; indeed, whilst it occurred during the depths of an economic recession, United 
Dairies’ sales had increased by 14 per cent over the previous year, from £2,464,819 to 
£2,815,305 at current prices.361 Reasons for the subsequent rise in carriage and haulage 
costs in proportion to income between 1932 and 1936 are difficult to ascertain, although 
this may have been caused by the reconfiguration of the market after the establishment of 
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the MMB.  The graph also shows that the cost of collection remained broadly below one 
per cent of sales over the period apart from a dip in 1934, which in the absence of records 
concerning the volume of milk handled by the firm remains unexplained. 
 
Graph 7 
Cost of United Dairies' milk transport as a percentage of 
total sales, 1927-1938
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 7 (p. 300). 
 
Graph 8 below highlights the cost of farm milk collections undertaken by purchasers, 
which has been calculated using MMB data ranging from 1935 to 1975.  These costs were 
a direct deduction from the producer’s monthly contract until the MMB took responsibility 
for pooling the proceeds of all milk purchases.  The graph shows the reduction in farm 
collection costs over the period, reflecting the efforts undertaken by the MMB to reduce 
this cost to farmers; the value of the milk sold collectively by producers rose by 115.5 per 
cent, from £311,133,075 in 1935 to £670,765,834 in 1975.362 This corresponded with a rise 
in the volume processed by the MMB from 912,701,586 to 1,084,850,000 gallons, 
suggesting that the MMB and wartime rationalisation had generally succeeded in driving 
down costs from 0.031p to 0.025p per gallon at 1975 prices.363 Further decline before 1965 
coincides with the roll-out of bulk road collection direct from the farm, whilst the 
subsequent increase to 1975 may be explained by rising costs brought about by rising 
petrol prices following the oil crisis in 1973.364 
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Graph 8  
Milk Marketing Board transport deductions as a proportion of total 
producer contract income, 1935-1975
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 8 (p. 301). 
 
With the analysis of long-term trends hindered by fragmentary financial data series, a 
series of simple, heuristic supply chain analysis may be pursued instead to consider the 
impact of changes in the governance of milk distribution.  Figure 1 below provides a 
schematic of the London milk trade prior to the formation of the MMB in 1934.  It shows 
several distinct activities, with inbound logistics represented by the input of raw milk by 
the producer at the country depot.  Subsequent activities broadly fell under the remit of 
large wholesalers such as United and Express Dairies, with processing and subsequent 
outbound logistics operations organised by these firms.365 The fourth primary activity is 
sales to retail customers and company-owned outlets, whilst the fifth constitutes the 
services the retail dairies provided to the customer, such as home delivery.366  
 The milk supply chain is characterised by the need to balance supply with 
demand, yet is complicated by the fact that the product is perishable.  Consequently, the 
wholesale trade established its authority through the National Society of Creamery 
Proprietors and Wholesale Dairymen, which negotiated prices with producers, although a 
lack of enforcement meant that executive governance within the London milk trade 
became concentrated amongst four large wholesalers between 1919 and 1933.367 
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Consequently, decisions relating to transport and innovations rested with the wholesaler 
until 1933, when the creation of the Milk Marketing Board brought a shift in supply chain 
governance that ultimately worked in the producer’s favour. 
 
Figure 1 
The London milk trade to 1933 
 
 
The wholesaler’s executive governance over the milk supply chain began to decline after 
the Agricultural Marketing Act (1931) was passed, which called for the creation of 
marketing boards to ensure that produce was sold for the best possible prices.368 With 
regional and executive committee members elected by producers, the creation of the MMB 
in 1933 marked a shift in executive governance over the supply chain towards the 
producer.369 However, the Board also exercised control by implementing a form of 
legislative governance to control entry to the market, with milk sales controlled through 
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compulsory producer registration.370 Figure 2 shows the MMB’s position within the 
supply chain between producer and the wholesaler as a party to milk contracts to ensure 
fair prices were paid for milk sold as liquid or for manufacturing into other food 
products.371 Consequently, producer’s returns were pooled to ensure a minimum price per 
gallon of milk, with transport costs credited to the pool.372 
 
Figure 2  
The Milk Marketing Board and the London milk trade, 1933-1943 
 
 
Whilst the administration of the milk pool was intended to stabilise prices, the Board’s 
advisory role meant that influence over the primary activities associated with distributing 
milk was limited; the Board merely acted as a clearing house for payments and did not 
purchase milk direct from the producer.  However, milk shortages due to the lack of 
imported animal feed during Second World War prompted a further shift in executive 
governance away from the wholesaler, as the Ministry of Food granted the MMB authority 
to become the sole purchaser off-farm in 1942.373 The Ministry asserted legislative 
governance over the market via the Board to regulate the commodity’s supply according 
government priorities, a corollary of which was the rationalisation of distribution.  In 
becoming an executive agency of the Ministry of Food, the Board was responsible for 
arranging the collection of milk from farms, administering the pool and organising 
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subsequent distribution to customers, as seen in Figure 3.  The war thus saw the 
concentration of executive governance within the MMB, which became a central body for 
managing and improving milk distribution efficiency, and hence created the conditions for 
a transition to road haulage.374 
 
Figure 3  
The Ministry of Food and the London milk trade, 1943-1953 
   
 
The immediate post-war period saw little change in executive governance within Britain’s 
milk trade, as the MMB retained control over ex-farm collection and the milk pool, whilst 
the government continued to negotiate liquid milk prices with the wholesalers.375 
Furthermore, the government initially retained its ability to direct the milk supply through 
the Ministry of Food, although this eventually passed to the Board when it assumed overall 
responsibility for directing long-distance bulk milk transport by rail in 1954.376 The MMB 
thus used its position to effect improvements in distribution by trialling new collection and 
delivery methods, which included employing bulk road tanks to collect refrigerated milk 
directly from the farm. 
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Figure 4  
The bulk road tanker scheme, 1954-1975 
 
 
 
The scheme addressed the labour intensity of churn-based distribution as well as the cost of 
returning empty churns, and facilitated direct farm to retailer deliveries.377 Figure 4 
provides a comparison between the rail and road tank operations; the latter cutting the need 
for numerous depots to bulk and process milk for onward rail transit.378 Once again, the 
transition of executive governance within the milk supply chain from the wholesaler to the 
MMB benefited the producer, as it meant that efforts were focused upon making 
efficiencies within the supply chain to ensure a fair return on the milk supplied.379 This is 
not to say that wholesalers had stagnated; the post-war period was characterised by 
amalgamations to achieve economies of scale and secure greater market share, as 
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exemplified by the merger of United Dairies and Cow & Gate in 1959.380 The impact of 
the shift in supply chain governance upon transport will be covered in the following 
sections, beginning with an analysis of the principal elements of the distribution system 
established by the milk wholesale industry. 
 
3.3 Distribution before 1919 
  
Before 1860, Britain’s milk supply was distributed by producer/retailers, with urban and 
rural demand met locally.381 Whilst James Jefferys suggests this remained the case in 1938, 
urban and general population expansion throughout the mid-nineteenth century increased 
both consumer demand for this staple commodity and the distance between source and 
market, particularly in the case of the London trade.382 The population of Greater London 
expanded from approximately 3.3 to 8.1 million between 1861 and 1931, although the task 
of supplying the city’s population with locally-produced milk had been impeded by a cattle 
plague outbreak in 1865, causing a crisis amongst the urban producer/retail trade.383 
Although a supply shortfall loomed, the situation presented an opportunity for enterprise; 
since the 1850s, Britain’s expanding railway network had enabled the capital’s dairy 
owners to diversify by procuring fresh, unadulterated and disease-free ‘country milk’ on a 
small-scale for distribution to customers.384 The consequent division of production and 
retail functions therefore provided the basis for the development of London’s nationally 
significant milk wholesale trade towards the end of the nineteenth century.385 
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 The most prominent figure in this expansion was George Barham, who founded 
the Express County Milk Supply Company in 1864.386 Barham negotiated favourable rates 
with the Great Northern and Midland Railways to provide a milk trunking service from 
Derbyshire to King’s Cross, from where containers were shuttled to the company’s depot 
at Bloomsbury for subsequent sale.387 The responsibility for arranging and paying for milk 
transport from farm to railway station was delegated to the farmer, although the 
opportunity presented by Express Dairies was fortuitous for dairy farmers, as traditional 
farmhouse cheese and butter produced in regions with low local demand for milk was 
labour-intensive, required possession of specialist equipment and was open to foreign 
competition.388 When later coupled with falling butter and cheese prices in the 1890s, the 
liquid milk market, with its regular income, was favourable to producers.389    
 London retail dairies keen to engage with producers in areas away from regional 
centres such as Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool found willing participants amongst 
the farmers of Cheshire, Staffordshire and Wiltshire.390 The rapid expansion of the trade 
between 1860 and 1890 merited further investment, with Express Dairies’ subsidiary, the 
Dairy Supply Company, introducing the American innovation of the galvanised metal milk 
churn to Britain and developing on-farm fresh water cooling equipment, which eased 
handling and reduced the potential for milk spoilage during transit.391 Equally, the railway 
companies’ contribution towards the traffic, which was also sold at railway termini, was 
through the introduction of specialist rolling stock for conveying churns, an important 
example being the Great Western Railway (GWR) ventilated milk vans, or ‘Siphons’. 
 Direct railway investment in specific traffics was a rare occurrence; private firms 
owned coal, oil and mineral wagons, and the railways possessed non-specific ‘Common 
User’ vehicles for various uses.392 However, the stability of the traffic between 1870 and 
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1900 had provided a compelling case for the railway companies to permanently allocate 
vehicles to the milk traffic.  The GWR ‘Siphon’ therefore mirrors the development of the 
country milk trade, as the design was continuously enlarged after the first emerged from 
Swindon Works in the 1860s.393 These were converted passenger carriages due to the need 
to provide a high-speed service to maintain milk freshness, with purpose-built vehicles 
constructed thereafter.  With 600 in service by 1906, the final development was the bogie 
ventilated milk van of 1907, which preceded the longer, but essentially similar ‘Siphon G’ 
of 1913, underlining the fact that the trade was ‘locked-in’ to handling churn traffic.394 
 Churns were bulked at railway stations before being loaded into ventilated vans or 
passenger carriages for carriage to their final destination, or for transfer to other trains.395 
The use of passenger services meant that all transport costs to the first point of sale were 
paid up-front; farmers also faced a monthly deduction for onward transport to a 
distributing dairy, and were expected to transport churns by horse and cart and to assist 
with loading the vans themselves to minimise railway liability for spoilage.396 The 
principal characteristics of the supply chain described in section 3.2 were in place by the 
outbreak of the First World War, which profoundly changed the character of Britain’s milk 
market.  This was because hostile marketing conditions had prompted the merger of small 
rural suppliers into larger wholesale organisations, as exemplified by the formation of 
Britain’s largest milk wholesaler, United Dairies, in 1915.397 After the cessation of the 
conflict, the wholesalers took responsibility for overcoming the geographical challenge 
posed by farm location, and would assist producers and retailers by establishing rail-
connected country depots at key railway stations to coordinate and concentrate supplies, as 
well as provide a farm collection and delivery service.398 This was made possible by the 
lorry, and United Dairies consequently invested in a transport subsidiary, Mickleover 
Transport Ltd., to provide vehicles for use in farm collection and depot distribution. 
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3.4 Motorising churn collection 
 
The few surviving records detailing United Dairies’ early relationship with the haulage 
firm imply that the latter had been a subsidiary of the wholesaler since 1917.399 Its interest 
in Mickleover Transport Ltd. is representative of a wholesaler’s desire to exercise greater 
control over distribution in the interests of maintaining service reliability; a move which 
may be considered prudent in view of the disruption caused by the national railway strike 
of September 1919.  Consequently, this section examines the role strike action played in 
United Dairies’ attitude to road haulage.  Although the records consulted reveal little about 
plans implemented to mitigate the strike’s effects, national newspapers including The 
Times detail the preparations undertaken.  These included the stockpiling of milk in cold 
storage in the days before the strike, which enabled the wholesale dairies to continue 
supplying their retailers during the initial stages when rail distribution was severely 
curtailed.400 Indeed, the chairman of United Dairies emphasised that ‘no industry was so 
intimately affected by the strike than the dairy trade in relation to London and other centres 
of population’ due to the reliance upon rail.401 
 Other preparations included establishing a major road transport hub at Hyde Park 
for the reception and onward dispatch of milk supplies to retailers.402 Although the 
government provided ex-military lorries for general food distribution throughout the 
emergency, it was reported that milk wholesalers already operated some motorised 
collection services, and 1,000 vehicles were consequently used to deliver 9,000 churns of 
milk daily from farms up to a radius of 100 miles from London for the duration of the 
strike.403 The strike thus appeared to demonstrate that the ‘stranglehold’ of the railways 
over transport was slipping because of the lorry, which reportedly permitted the 
‘undermining of former [transport] monopolies’ held by the railway companies.404 
Consequently, what may have been considered a temporary switch to trunk haulage by 
road laid the foundations for adopting the lorry under less exceptional circumstances.  
 By 1920, investment in road collection services had become an important facet in 
differentiating United Dairies from its competitors; the firm’s chairman reported that ‘we 
are now required to collect at the farm or roadside stations’, and that this ‘innovation to get 
milk into our creameries’ was not something that was considered essential five years 
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previously.405 Consequently, the purchase of Mickleover was an example of vertical 
integration, as the firm provided the wholesaler with a self-contained transport operation 
that constructed and maintained 300 specialist vehicles for churn collection and delivery to 
depots nationwide.406 Furthermore, the ability to provide an alternative to rail transport 
during  the strike had provided confirmation that the wholesaler had made a wise 
investment in light of the post-war maintenance arrears and reliability issues afflicting 
Britain’s railways.407 
 Another advantage of road transport was its flexibility in use.  Through its 
Mickleover Transport subsidiary, United Dairies possessed three strategically-located road 
haulage depots.  The main works and depot at Mickleover, Derbyshire and another depot at 
Wells catered for churn collection in two major milk producing areas, whilst the third 
depot was located in London to provide a maintenance hub for vehicles used to collect 
milk from surrounding dairy farms and dispatch to retailers.408 The motorised operation 
also benefited the farmer by reducing the cost of transporting small quantities of milk over 
short distances, as milk distribution by rail attracted a premium because of the need for 
speed and care in transit.409 The railway industry’s justification for a premium charge was 
that urgent consignments imposed a ‘high cost [upon] the railways’, whilst farmers 
enjoyed lower charges when using dedicated milk services.410 In this respect, the railway 
industry’s implication was that it was subsidising Britain’s milk industry whilst the 
agricultural sector experienced a post-First World War recession in 1921.411  
 In contrast, motor haulage possessed better speed and range over horse and rail 
transport for the cost of vehicle operation and driver wages.  The ability to directly audit 
the cleanliness of individual motor vehicles allowed United Dairies to comply with the 
Milk and Dairies (Amendment Act) of 1922, which began the process of defining 
minimum milk production and sales standards in the interests of hygiene, quality and 
public safety.412 Furthermore, United Dairies could directly assist farmers unwilling to 
send milk to their local station using horses because of the general increase in motor traffic 
on the roads.  As such, United Dairies had amassed a fleet of 400 motor lorries with 
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substantial geographical coverage by 1924, thereby providing a service that ‘...obviates the 
countless instances [of] the same commodity being handled over and over again, with its 
consequent duplication and increased expense’ between farm and depot.413 Furthermore, 
Captain Amor, United Dairies’ transport manager, reported in Our Notebook, the firm’s 
staff magazine, that road haulage costs were ‘lower than the railway rates for the same 
journeys’, although details have proved elusive.414 The combination of resilience during 
industrial action, flexibility in operation and lower handling costs were therefore key 
characteristics for an industry engaged with the distribution of perishable produce. 
 
3.5 The railway response to competition 
 
In the absence of comparable figures between both modes of transport, one can speculate 
that the use of lorries for milk collection prompted a reduction in milk traffic forwarded by 
rail, as the railways experienced a seven per cent decline in milk revenue between 1926 
and 1928, from £1.5 to £1.4 million; indeed, revenue was to decline by a further eight per 
cent to £1.28 million in 1930.415 In spite of this, the railway industry remained heavily 
involved in country distribution, as farms situated in high-output areas such as 
Wensleydale collectively produced more than enough milk to justify rail transit alongside a 
road service.416 Britain’s railway companies also expanded their involvement in farm 
distribution once the Railway (Road Transport) Acts, described in chapter 2, were passed 
in 1928.  Despite being contested by the road haulage lobby, the acts enabled each of the 
‘Big Four’ to operate road haulage services in direct competition with private hauliers as 
an adjunct to railway operations, thus providing the opportunity to establish a feeder 
service on behalf of milk wholesalers.417  
 Such a service is described within a GWR Magazine article regarding the 
logistical operation for 600 small Cornish farms contracted to supply a Nestlé depot at 
Lostwithiel with milk intended for the London market in 1933.418 The area’s geography 
posed a problem for Nestlé, and the farmers lacked the time to deliver milk to the nearest 
depot or railway station themselves.  In response, the GWR offered to undertake a trial 
whereby a complete farm-to-London service was provided, which entailed the 
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establishment of ten sub-depots at strategic points around the county for housing the 
collection lorry fleet.419 The depots provided distribution hubs for 24 regular motor routes 
to farms throughout Cornwall, allowing the GWR to provide a door-to-door service and 
consolidate its grip on Nestlé’s London traffic.  The process was described as ‘further 
impressive evidence of the possibilities and advantages of coordinated road and railway 
transport’, implying that the ‘Big Four’ considered themselves capable of farm and depot 
milk distribution with equal aplomb.420  
 
3.6 The railways and wholesaler expansion  
 
Despite the self-congratulatory tone of railway reportage, these instances of collaboration 
depended upon the demands of the wholesaler, as evidenced by the search for new sources 
of supply when London’s demand for milk increased throughout the 1920s.  Consequently, 
this section argues that the wholesaler, rather than the railways through the advertising of 
services, drove expansion.  Express Dairies’ decision to establish its Westmorland depot in 
1927 revitalised a depressed agrarian economy in which local farmers had endured poor 
transport links and the decimation of their traditional milk market in the North East 
because of a decline in Tyneside’s heavy industrial economy.421 The new rail-connected 
depot and creamery at Appleby thus gave local farmers access to the lucrative London 
market via its wholesale dairy at Cricklewood.  The venture’s success is recorded within 
the company’s official history, which quotes traffic growth from 1,000 to 50,000 gallons of 
milk dispatched daily between 1927 and 1931.422 
 The rising demand for liquid milk was proving beneficial for farmers in regions 
beyond London’s traditional ‘milk shed’ such as Cornwall and South West Wales, where 
limited local demand resulted in surplus milk being used in the on-farm production of 
cheese and butter.423 The establishment of creameries in these areas after the First World 
War reduced this practice, although milk sold in this market attracted a lower price because 
of the influence of cheap, imported products.424 Both commodities were therefore treated 
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as ‘sinks’ for surplus milk, the creamery creating a paradox that the more milk produced in 
a given area, the less it needed to be moved.425 
 This emphasised the importance of cheap transport, as seasonal fluctuations in 
production affected prices and necessitated the careful management of the liquid market to 
balance supply with demand throughout the year.  Milk production peaked during the 
spring and summer months; to deal with any surplus, larger country depots incorporated a 
creamery that provided wholesalers with a means of balancing supplies and exercising 
control over the manufacturing market.426 In consequence, the increasing oligopoly 
enjoyed by the wholesaler over the various stages of milk supply created a buyer’s market, 
although David Taylor highlights that despite a lack of reliable data, the liquid trade 
remained attractive to dairy farmers in Somerset and Gloucestershire because of the 
superior quality and cheapness of cheese and butter imports; the latter region experienced 
an increase of 40 per cent in production. 427 Furthermore, arable agricultural holdings in 
Norfolk and Lincolnshire had diversified into liquid milk production because of the 
prospect of a regular payment for the commodity with minimal capital outlay, the railways 
being used to dispatch milk  to London.428 
 The ability to readily engage in liquid milk production was symptomatic of an 
unregulated industry, particularly following the introduction of the mobile milking bail in 
1922, which permitted the mechanised milking of cattle in the field, as any contract 
negotiated with milk wholesalers thus provided some financial certainty for the farmer.429 
The contract was a source of regular income when the government’s free trade policy 
permitted the sale of 60 to 80 per cent of global butter exports on the British market, which 
marked an increase from 6.1 to 8 million tons between 1928 and 1931 and starkly 
contrasted with an estimated 800,000 tons produced domestically between 1930 and 
1931.430 The country milk depot was therefore a lifeline for Britain’s agrarian economy, 
creating an assured market for producers, with milk accounting for 25 per cent of Britain’s 
agrarian output in 1930.431 However, the ‘technique of annihilating the gap between town 
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and country’ required constant improvement, and the speed at which technological 
innovations and service quality improvements could be adopted became an important 
battleground for service-based competition between rail and road transport.432 
 
3.7 Rail and road competition in depot milk distribution 
 
Although the railways had provided the backbone of long-distance milk distribution since 
1864, rate increases proposed after 1920 were considered ‘exorbitant’ by the National 
Farmer’s Union (NFU) for the quality of service offered.433 This section poses the 
hypothesis that the railways were complacent towards the traffic, an assertion which might 
explain the apparent lack of effort expended in advertising services to milk wholesalers.  
The hypothesis is confirmed by the NFU’s Milk and Dairy Produce Committee minutes, 
which refer to a deputation sent to the Railway Clearing House (RCH) to discuss the 
misuse of milk vans in August 1921.434 They reveal farmers’ complaints about ventilated 
milk vans used to transport other perishables, compromising hygiene.435 A subsequent 
minute from October 1922 drew attention to the continued use of dirty railway vehicles in 
milk transit, indicating that little progress was made before the 1923 railway grouping.436 
 These problems prompted a new development in milk transport as a Liverpool 
dairy began to experiment with glass-lined lorry-hauled tanks, thus marking the beginning 
of an era of intense inter-modal competition and technological advance.437 The bulk tank is 
an important example of the transfer of technical knowledge developed in the United 
States; its advantages included efficiencies in handling during and after transit whilst 
negating the expedient of transporting numerous empty churns over long distances.438 
Their use also reduced the cost of the seasonal transfers of liquid and manufacturing milk 
between depots to balance supply, whilst the ease in which tanks could be cleaned as a 
result of their vitreous enamel ‘glass’ or stainless steel linings promoted milk hygiene.439 In 
short, the tank presented a means of overcoming many of the disadvantages associated 
with being ‘locked-in’ to distribution with the milk churn. 
 The emergence of the bulk milk tank therefore presented road haulage with the 
chance to engage in service-based competition, and considerable cost and qualitative 
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advantages over the railways were reported for milk hauled direct from country depots and 
London.440 Uptake was rapid, with Express Dairies adopting the concept later in 1923; 
although the company considered itself an ‘ardent [exponent] of rapid delivery’ when road 
speeds were 20mph, the benefits of direct delivery, minimal charges for road access and 
low staffing costs were evidently attractive.441 Furthermore, although the 1919 strike had 
provided a taster of road transport’s ability in adversity, the road tank was able to play a 
role in the 1926 General Strike, particularly in relation to an emergency road operation 
implemented to collect milk from producers within a 100-mile radius of London which 
gave further proof of the lorry’s long-distance transport capability.442  
 In supplementing the churn haulage fleet during the General Strike, the road 
tanker had long-term ramifications for rail, as Garston Dairies was reported to be regularly 
conveying milk over 100 miles from Frome in Somerset to its London depot in ten hours 
by August 1926, which saved an estimated £6,000 per annum in railway rates and terminal 
charges.443 When considered against the developments taking place in road haulage, it is 
possible to argue that the railway industry’s response was lacklustre.444 The ‘Big Four’ 
companies remained ‘locked-in’ to pre-1900 principles, with the GWR ‘Siphon’ 
particularly emblematic of financial conservatism and entrenched working practices, and 
provides a succinct example of technological path-dependency when there was demand for 
new development to meet the dairy sector’s need for low-cost and seamless distribution.445   
 Instead of developing existing services, the grouping of the railway companies in 
1923 had placed emphasis upon attracting new traffic flows to meet the ‘Standard 
Revenue’, as discussed in chapter 2, once again supporting the hypothesis that the railways 
were relaxed about promoting and supporting existing traffic.446 Consequently, the 
wholesaler took responsibility for overcoming this disadvantage by unilaterally driving 
innovation in milk transport by rail; the railway industry’s lack of initiative in relation to 
rail-mounted tanks was highlighted by the Locomotive, Railway Carriage and Wagon 
Review.447 In 1925, the publication reported the successful use of tanks with cooling 
apparatus in the United States, thereby bolstering railway competition with road 
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transport.448 In 1926, the publication flew a higher kite when a daily road-based service 
conveying 2,500 gallons of milk from the West Country to London was used to emphasise 
the competition facing Britain’s railways.449 
 The case for adoption was to compare the road tank operation with the ‘old-
fashioned ...method of conveying [milk] in small capacity churns’, which was cited as 
being un-remunerative deadweight during long-distance transit.450 An analysis of the 
savings obtained implied similar benefits for the railways, as ‘allowing for depreciation... 
the working cost works out at £1,600 per annum, carrying over 2,000 tons of milk.  This is 
said to be less than half the cost of transport by rail’, with savings accrued in the reduction 
of handling and the economies of scale through bulk conveyance.451 The article therefore 
acknowledges that the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the rail operation had general 
scope for improvement, implying that Britain’s railways were more than capable of 
reducing the lead established by road haulage as the first mode of inland transport to adopt 
bulk tank technology for milk distribution. 
 
Image 6 
 
Restored LMS/United Dairies bulk milk tank No. 44057, which forms part of the National 
Collection of railway vehicles.  This example is a later six-wheeled vehicle, built in 1937.  
Source: National Railway Museum NRM_CT_937988. 
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Along with its rival Express Dairies, United Dairies, which already operated road tankers 
from Banbury, Petersfield and Moreton-in-Marsh to London, forced the issue by 
threatening a transfer to road haulage.452 Faced with a significant loss of milk traffic, the 
GWR and LMS entered into a compromise whereby United Dairies provided loading and 
cleaning facilities at its Calveley, Wootton Bassett and Mitre Bridge (London) depots, 
whilst the railways re-organised sidings and operated the services.453 The compromise was 
most evident in the unusual agreement whereby the railway companies would construct the 
chassis and mount 3,000 gallon glass-lined tanks supplied by United Dairies, creating 
similar vehicles to that illustrated above in Image 6.454 This dual-ownership had no 
precedent, as other traders purchased and registered their own ‘Private Owner’ tanks with 
the railway companies, allowing speculation that neither party was willing or able to fully 
commit to the enterprise alone; yet both stood to benefit from overcoming years of being 
‘locked-in’ to inefficient technology.455 
 Trial services between Cheshire, Wiltshire and London commenced on 15 
December 1927.  As with the road tanks, the potential benefits were threefold: the 
concentration of larger quantities of milk at fewer country depots; a reduction in 
unnecessary train movements and associated handling, the preservation of milk quality via 
insulation and near-complete protection from contamination.456 The economy of scale 
provided by the tank was also made clear; their 3,000 gallon capacity was double the 1,440 
gallons the GWR ‘Siphon’ vans could carry in ‘ideal conditions’, and could displace three 
LMS ventilated milk vans.457 United Dairies’ trial proved successful, whilst Express 
Dairies established daily services from Appleby to Cricklewood and Frome to South 
Acton; the latter route was in near-direct competition with Garston Dairies’ road 
operation.458 Although the concept was emulated by other wholesale dairies, it is necessary 
to reiterate the argument that this an example of change being driven by the transport user; 
whilst the benefits for both parties are clear, the adoption of the railway bulk tank had not 
emerged from railway industry actively responding to road competition for the traffic. 
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3.8 The London wholesale depot 
 
The London wholesale depots helped to fill the ‘widening gap between retailers and dairy 
farmers’ and were the natural successors to the small town dairy prevalent in George 
Barham’s era.459 In the case of United Dairies, a structural division of the firm’s wholesale 
and retail functions ensured that the reception, processing and subsequent distribution of 
liquid milk destined for the London market became the sole responsibility of a single 
organisation, allowing retailers to concentrate upon the disposal of milk to customers and 
consumers.460 The changes facing London’s wholesale depot operations before 1930 thus 
provides another factor supporting the hypothesis that transport innovation was governed 
by the milk distributors, rather than through proactive development by external providers.   
 The London depot was of paramount importance to the supply operation for two 
principal reasons.  Firstly, although the country depot provided an effective means for 
directing the flow of milk to liquid or manufacturing markets, daily calculations were 
needed to estimate demand.  Such calculations depended upon the daily collection of data 
regarding consumer demand, which could only be accurately performed at the wholesale 
depot.461 A second function was to process milk for retail, an activity synonymous with 
moves to promote milk hygiene in the 1920s.  However, government legislation in this 
regard lacked teeth due to the cost of enforcement, and distributors were left to voluntarily 
grade and licence their milk under the Milk and Dairies (Amendment) Act (1922). 
 The Act attempted to improve quality assurance in the interests of public health 
and food hygiene by preventing the sale of tuberculous milk, and United Dairies identified 
hygiene as a potential tool for establishing a competitive edge within an oligopolistic 
trade.462 From this perspective, investment in rail and road bulk milk tanks complemented 
a rolling programme of depot improvement, as the installation of improved pasteurising 
and bottling equipment guaranteed milk quality during the final stages of its journey to the 
consumer, with 90 per cent of London’s milk being pasteurised by 1934.463 This was 
supplemented by bottling, which aside from preventing contamination between wholesale 
depot and customer, permitted the retail of standard measures of milk.  Therefore, the 
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combination of bulk tanks, pasteurisation and bottling were products of the wholesalers’ 
governance over the supply chain to establish a near-seamless flow of milk to the 
consumer that minimised spoilage and reduced handling costs.464            
 
3.9 Developing the rail-tank operation, c.1928-1935   
 
The wholesaler’s ability to drive the railway operation is also demonstrated by United 
Dairies’ plans for its East Finchley and Vauxhall depots in 1928.  A small depot at East 
Finchley received milk in churns ‘from many points’; the daily quantity of milk ranging 
from 7,000 to 9,000 gallons provided the LNER with business worth up to £17,000 per 
annum.465 A memorandum submitted to the Traffic, Locomotive and Works Committee, 
which authorised engineering work, reported that United Dairies had ‘...decided to adopt 
the tank system’ at East Finchley and to ‘discontinue sending churns to that place’ from 
Ingestre, Staffordshire.466 It also highlights that new technological innovations increased 
competition between Britain’s ‘Big Four’ railway companies, as specific mention was 
made of the GWR and LMS’ services from Calveley and Wootton Bassett to Mitre Bridge.
 Whilst United Dairies’ proposal implies a desire to maintain a relationship with 
the railways, the memorandum’s tone suggests that the LNER did not relish the prospect of 
spending money.  Although the LNER would benefit from the release of milk vans for 
other duties and reduced labour costs at East Finchley station, this was offset by increased 
track maintenance costs in the long term.467 Furthermore, the Committee highlighted that 
‘every effort [had] been made to induce the firm to bear the whole of this expenditure’, but 
the precedent set by the LMS and GWR meant United Dairies threatened to transfer the 
traffic to Willesden for road transfer to East Finchley depot.468 Therefore, the loss of traffic 
and revenue compelled the railway company to participate.469 
The railway’s principal concern about acceding to United Dairies’ proposals was 
an anticipated decline in churn traffic once the tanks entered service, with estimates 
suggesting that the annual revenue for the East Finchley operation would reduce from 
£17,00 to £14,500.470 However, it was anticipated that the £2,500 shortfall would be 
mitigated by the concentration of United Dairies’ churn traffic at Finsbury Park depot.  The 
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memorandum also lists the extent of the works required, which included a siding with loop 
to hold three tanks at East Finchley depot; a siding to hold six empty tanks; a short 
extension to the milk stage at Ingestre, and the construction of seven tank chassis, all of 
which incurred a capital cost of £7,605.471 Whilst finite financial resources was the 
reason for the LNER’s reticence to participate, United Dairies also openly promoted its 
prowess ‘...in bringing milk to London in glass-lined road tanks’ in October 1928, which 
implies that the wholesaler considered its vertically-integrated road haulage operation as its 
principal means of milk distribution.472 The onset of economic depression at the end of 
1928 slowed expansion, with tank chassis construction by the GWR halted until 1931.473 
 
Graph 9 
Value of gross output of selected agricutural holdings in England 
and Wales and the economic Depression, 1927-1939
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 9 (p. 301). 
 
Although the Depression placed pressure upon the industry to maintain low distribution 
costs, the value of the gross output of milk detailed in Graph 9 remained stable in 
comparison with other agricultural food commodities, making the trade more attractive to 
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farmers in a depressed agricultural market.474 This stability might have encouraged the 
GWR to develop an insulated ‘Siphon’ that used dry ice to keep churns cool in 1930 and 
United Dairies to commence tank operations at Vauxhall depot by installing pumping 
equipment at the railway station.475 Vauxhall thus became the main reception point for 
tank-borne milk dispatched via the Southern Railway from United Dairies’ country depots 
at Semley and Gillingham, as indicated below in Map 2, with one million gallons received 
in the year ending January 1933.476 Further evidence of increased confidence was the 
GWR’s decision to design a six-wheel chassis to improve stability at speed in 1931, whilst 
United Dairies developed internal baffling to reduce churning in transit.477 
 Similarly, confidence in the principle of bulk tank operations is evidenced by the 
Southern’s decision to attract traffic from wholesalers without a direct rail connection in 
1931.  A scheme was developed in collaboration with the London Co-operative Wholesale 
Society (CWS) to serve several non-rail connected dairies in Somerset, from where churns 
were delivered to the nearest railway station for dispatch to its Clapham Junction depot.478 
The desire to reduce handling resulted in a new development in the bulk tank concept 
which combined the flexibility of the lorry with the efficiency of long-distance rail 
transport.  The CWS thus provided 2,000-gallon trailer-tanks for towing between its 
Bruton dairy and Cole station, where they were loaded and secured onto special flat-
wagons designed by the Southern before being worked the 138 miles to Clapham.479 
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Selected wholesaler depot locations on the Southern Railway network 
Key to map: 
 
Country depots and mileage to London depots 
 
1. United Dairies Chard, 138 
2. London CWS Bruton, 138  
(Clapham Junction via Templecombe and Yeovil Junction) 
3. United Dairies Gillingham, 104 
4. United Dairies Semley, 99 
5. United Dairies Tisbury, 95 
6. United Dairies Salisbury, 82 
 
London depots 
 
7. London CWS Clapham Junction 
8. United Dairies Vauxhall     
Map 2 
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Such collaboration is a rare example of full coordination between rail and road transport 
before the Second World War.480 A subsequent arrangement between the LNER and the 
CWS saw a similar service commence between Stowmarket and Stratford, East London in 
1934, where railway-owned lorries were used to provide a coordinated service, and Image 
7 shows that the concept was adopted by smaller milk wholesale firms.481 The scheme 
coincided with the expansion of the fixed-tank operation to new destinations, with United 
Dairies’ Wood Lane processing and bottling depot opening in early 1935.  However, 
although the GWR was keen to publicise its ‘vital part in the transport of milk from the 
countryside’ by highlighting its role in the depot’s development, it obscures the effort 
expended by the wholesaler in driving forward innovation in distribution.482  
 
Image 7 
 
 
Bradford Model Milk Company Limited 2,000-gallon demountable milk tank and flat-wagon, 
illustrating the arrangement pioneered by the Southern Railway and the London Co-
operative Wholesale Society at the latter’s Bruton dairy in 1931.  Although undated, the 
wagon was probably constructed by the LNER c1934.  Source: National Railway Museum 
DS130202-101926. 
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3.10 Motorising urban milk distribution 
 
The inter-war development of London’s wholesale depot network provides a barometer of 
the milk industry’s success in adapting to changing economic circumstances through 
centralisation, innovation and investment.483 Although the eradication of churns in favour 
of tank operations was a long-term ambition, investment in technologies such as 
pasteurisation and labour reduction ensured that some progress was being made towards 
maintaining overall market stability and competitiveness.484 These were important 
considerations when economic uncertainty and changing consumer and government 
attitudes towards milk quality influenced purchasing habits, and confirms the depot’s status 
as a crucial component in an integrated milk supply operation. 
 This was particularly true of the urban distribution of milk to retailers, which 
underwent a transformation between 1919 and 1932 equalling that experienced in rail 
haulage and farm collection.485 As already indicated, primary responsibility for urban 
distribution was with the wholesaler, and The Commercial Motor magazine published a 
feature-article about a successful trial motorised delivery operation initiated by Express 
Dairies in North London in 1920.486 However, whilst the willingness to motorise country 
depot collection services was prompted by longer distances and the need to improve the 
reliability of the flow of milk from the farm, the urban environment posed a completely 
different challenge for the wholesaler’s distribution operation.487  
 The stop-start nature of routes, shorter distances and the path-dependency of 
retailing infrastructure meant that the horse and float remained the predominant method of 
distribution from the depot, whilst growing congestion meant that motorised transport 
could not necessarily be used to best advantage.488 However, it is possible to hypothesise 
that the adoption of motor haulage for milk deliveries to retail customers stemmed from 
two motivations.  Firstly, the limited range of horse distribution meant the multiplication of 
wholesaler depots at strategic locations around central London; road transport could 
operate longer delivery routes from fewer depots, permitting a reduction in overheads 
through depot amalgamation.489 Secondly, the transformation of urban distribution was an 
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important marketing tool, as the use of horse transport ran contrary to the modernising 
image that the wholesale dairies wished to convey in 1930.490 
 It is also possible to hypothesise that the changes taking place in farm collections 
and long-distance distribution over the previous decade had prompted a fresh look at urban 
distribution in the interests of rationalisation.491 The modernisation of the firm’s London 
transport operations began in earnest in 1931, and 300 horses were replaced by 100 lorries 
constructed by its Mickleover Transport subsidiary in 1932.492 Although the adoption of 
motor transport for urban distribution illustrates the potential for economies of scale in the 
carriage of more milk with less vehicles over the course of a day, the rush to purchase 
vehicles fell foul of government regulations responding to the growth of motor transport.   
 A prominent example followed the implementation of the Road Traffic Act 
(1930), which introduced a punitive tax for operators of solid-tyre vehicles in favour of 
pneumatic tyres to reduce road damage.493 This had an adverse effect upon United Dairies’ 
modernisation programme as many of its existing vehicles featured solid tyres that required 
changing, concisely illustrating the potential expense of operating a fleet of vehicles on 
own account.494 Despite this setback, United Dairies’ acquisition of a motorised fleet for 
urban distribution ensured ‘that the high standard of purity and excellence maintained in 
the processing plant is kept up whilst milk ...is in transit’ whilst economies emerged from 
the longer operational range and repeat-reloading.495 
 
3.11 The Milk Marketing Board and milk distribution, c.1936-
1939 
 
Britain’s interwar milk supply was the product of a relationship between oligopolistic milk 
wholesalers and a monopolistic railway industry.  However, the emergence of the Milk 
Marketing Board (MMB) in 1933 represented the beginning of a shift in governance from 
the wholesaler towards the producer.  The supply chain analysis has already indicated the 
MMB’s position within the supply chain; the organisation was tasked with stabilising the 
milk market whilst other agricultural commodities experienced dire economic 
performance.496 The Board’s structure comprised of eleven regions in England and Wales, 
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which held statutory powers to wrest control from the wholesale industry by setting 
minimum producer prices and acting as a third-party in producer-wholesaler contract 
negotiations to ‘rationalise the flow of milk supplies and concentrate surplus in areas 
where manufacturing could be operated most economically’.497 
 The MMB’s interest in addressing distribution problems caused by the whims of 
the wholesale industry began in 1934, when the dairy economy west of Carlisle was hit by 
a local creamery’s review of contracts, removing a significant market in an area with 
limited local demand.498 The Board therefore established its own creamery for cheese 
manufacturing at Aspatria, although its lack of experience in transport operations presented 
an opportunity for the LMS to establish a working relationship by agreeing to operate an 
experimental ‘all-in’ collection and delivery service that assisted the MMB and prevented 
traffic loss to private road hauliers.499 The LMS’ willingness to cooperate with the MMB 
suggests that Britain’s railway companies were fully cognisant of the changes taking place, 
and the potential for further traffic opportunities instilled greater confidence in the 
longevity of both churn and tank traffic, with the LMS introducing an insulated churn van 
in 1935.500 However, initial optimism for a fruitful working relationship was receding by 
1936 when the MMB complained of railway complacency in the very road collection 
business it helped create. 
 The principal cause of tension was railway bureaucracy regarding the cost of an 
LMS road collection and delivery service at the MMB’s Wem creamery.501 Although no 
rates are quoted, a competing creamery with its own lorry fleet reduced its collection 
charges to entice local farmers into transferring their business.  The Board, having given 
the LMS ‘every opportunity of taking the business at the prices quoted by reputable 
hauliers’, was not given a prompt response, and issued the threat of transferring traffic to 
private road hauliers.502 The MMB’s ability to negotiate on behalf of the producer in 
transport matters demonstrates the shift in influence within the supply chain; the LMS’ 
apparent lack of regard for commercial pressures within the milk industry fuelled a belief 
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that the railways were complacent and inflexible, and that an alternative mode of transport 
was desirable.503  
 A second reason for declining railway traffic was the MMB’s policy of reducing 
‘unnecessary’ haulage by actively encouraging the local processing of surplus milk into 
dairy products.504 A report published by the LNER in 1937 about its Wensleydale milk 
traffic recorded a loss of 85,033 gallons of milk to road between December 1934 and 
December 1935 due to the short distance to a Cow & Gate creamery at Northallerton.505 
Although this was mitigated by the dispatch of dried milk and butter products, the MMB’s 
role in contract negotiations with wholesalers to improve the producer’s financial return 
brought uncertainty, as exemplified by the Board’s decision to direct the milk output from 
Express Dairies’ depot at Leyburn solely to the London liquid trade from January 1937.506 
This again suggests that the MMB’s concern for reducing the transaction costs facing 
producers underpinned supply chain changes, as farmers continued to provide a rebate to 
wholesalers for transport to the first point of sale through their monthly contracts.507  
 Such interventions provided a means of circumventing the MMB’s lack of legal 
powers to intervene in the choice of rail or road conveyance, which remained ‘a matter of 
arrangement between the individual producer and his buyer’ before the Second World 
War.508 In doing so, the Board could ‘...intervene in the matter of collection charges’ made 
to its regional ‘milk pools’, which were created in 1934 to provide a guaranteed price for 
milk.509 Buyer rebates originally deducted from the producer’s monthly milk contracts 
were therefore charged to the milk pool and were closely audited by the MMB; they were 
also differentiated according to whether the milk was intended for the liquid or 
manufacturing market to create a complex payments system that demanded accurate 
record-keeping by all parties.510  
 Further evidence of the MMB’s interest in transport matters is provided by 
records of a meeting held at the RCH in March 1938.  The resultant memorandum 
indicated that the Board had requested details of the quantity of milk passing by rail 
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between November 1936 and April 1937 from all points of origin.511 The request 
ostensibly formed part of a broad-ranging review of transport arrangements to identify 
unnecessary long-distance milk haulage to reduce the £5 million charged to producers in 
rail and road transport costs annually.512 As this was a long-term ambition, the MMB 
suggested that the data could also provide ‘material assistance’ for an ‘increase in the rail 
carryings of Milk traffic’ in the short-term as long-distance traffic was gradually 
concentrated at fewer locations.513  
 Whilst the MMB indicated that it was purely an exercise to ascertain the hitherto 
unknown quantity of milk conveyed by road, there was apprehension that the data would 
be used to ‘force the present users of the railways to seek cheaper transport costs to the 
detriment of the Companies’.514 This defensive attitude provides further indication of the 
MMB’s increasing influence over the milk supply chain, particularly as a reduction in the 
average price per gallon of milk from its peak in 1922-23 to the persistently lower levels 
between 1930 and 1939 indicated in Graph 10 appears to support a hypothesis that railway 
receipts would have to be squeezed further to assist the producer. 
 
Graph 10  
Annual average liquid milk prices in England and Wales, 1922-1938
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 10 (p. 302). 
 
The Board’s ambition to improve the producer’s remuneration was to be achieved through 
transport efficiencies such as increased road haulage, and may be considered within the 
context of concurrent political interest in the cost of food distribution in Britain between 
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1936 and 1938.  The examination of factors affecting milk distribution costs was the focus 
of the Cutforth Report, published in 1936 to inform a projected Milk Bill to intervene in 
the retail price of milk.515 Although the report laid part of the blame upon the MMB’s 
minimum pricing, a memorandum by the report’s author, Arthur Cutforth, considered how 
practices followed by retail dairies inflated the retail cost of milk.516 Cutforth paid 
particular attention to urban milk distribution, and highlighted that retailers were 
‘compelled to concede courtesy to the customer in order to retain business’.517 
Retail competition within a crowded, cost-conscious market prompted service-
based competition through elaborate delivery rounds, and a survey undertaken in 1939 
indicated that in Battersea alone, 11 per cent of families bought milk from more than one 
roundsman per day.518 The situation was caused by customer loyalty, with firms extending 
milk rounds into new territory whenever valued customers moved away.519 Although the 
projected Milk Bill failed to proceed in Parliament due to the government’s devotion ‘...to 
questions of foreign affairs and defence’ following the German annexation of Austria in 
March 1938, it is possible to argue that the broader rationalisation debate informed the 
MMB’s approach to transport.520 The publication of a Board memorandum on long-
distance milk transport in 1937 implied an ambition to obtain powers to rationalise milk 
transport through the vertical integration of farm collection to reduce the producer’s 
transport costs.521 Such direct intervention in milk distribution meant that whilst the 
railways would retain long-distance trunk traffic, it would be the MMB, and not the 
wholesalers, that made executive decisions in transport matters.   
 
3.12 The Second World War: planning and prioritisation 
 
In retrospect, the rationalisation debate that followed the Cutforth Report’s publication was 
prescient when considered in the context of the Second World War, as it advocated the 
implementation of profound structural change within the milk trade that would make a 
                                                 
515
 See: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Milk: Report of Reorganisation Commission for Britain 
(Economic Series No. 44) (London: HMSO, 1936).  
516
 TNA: MAF 69/86, Memorandum on Enquiry on Behalf of the of the Food Council into the Costs and 
Profits of Retail Milk Distribution in Great Britain, 1937, p. 35. 
517
 TNA: MAF 69/86, Memorandum, p. 36.  Sir Arthur Edwin Cutforth (1881-1958) had a background in 
finance.  He was President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 1934-1936 and was appointed to the 
Food Council in 1932.  He was appointed to committees examining the coal (1925-1937) and milk industries 
(1932-1938).  “CUTFORTH, Sir Arthur Edwin,” Who Was Who, A & C Black, an imprint of Bloomsbury 
Publishing plc, 1920–2016; online edn, Oxford University Press, 2014, accessed 12 September 2016, 
http://www.ukwhoswho.com/view/article/oupww/whowaswho/U236304.     
518
 H. S. Booker, “A Survey of Milk Distribution,” Economica, New Series, 6 (1939), p. 79, pp. 80-82. 
519
 Booker, “A Survey of Milk Distribution,” p. 82. 
520
 HC Deb 04 July 1938, vol 338, col 116. 
521
 TNA: JV 7/562, 15 April 1937 Long Distance Transport. 
 130
lasting impact upon the development of milk transport in post-war Britain.  However, 
whilst the MMB represented one of the few agricultural bodies with the experience 
necessary for administering milk production, any move towards influencing transport 
organisation was initially curbed by the enactment of emergency measures placing 
Britain’s agricultural output under the supervision of the Ministries of Agriculture and 
Fisheries and Food.522 The MMB’s pre-war task of using the milk contract to reduce 
excessive milk mileage by directing milk surpluses to creameries in producing areas had 
provided some experience of working with transport resources.523 This experience was 
instrumental in minimising transport charges levied upon producers whilst preventing the 
inflation of wholesale and retail milk prices within a fragile wartime economy.524 
Furthermore, the government exercised legislative governance over the supply chain 
through the Ministry of Food, which became responsible for implementing market and 
demand controls via price-setting and commodity allocation.525 
 
Graph 11 
Total wartime milk production (June-May year), 1939-1945 
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 11 (p. 302). 
 
As a de-facto government agency, the MMB was subservient to the Ministry of Food, 
which initially fixed milk prices at 1938 levels.526 To shield the consumer from 
corresponding retail price increases, milk was sold to buyers at a subsidised price, whilst 
the Ministry of Food set a flat-rate maximum retail price to provide an important incentive 
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to reduce distribution costs.527 The wholesale industry was therefore instrumental in 
ensuring that milk distribution continued without disruption after the outbreak of war.  The 
operation was almost immediately put under strain for two reasons; firstly, the setting of 
price guarantees failed to prevent a sharp decline in production during a contraction in 
Britain’s overall agricultural output in 1940, highlighted above in Graph 11, as supplies of 
imported animal feed declined.528 Secondly, United Dairies’ Annual Report for 1940 
indicated that the evacuation of children from urban areas in September 1939 had 
increased demand in rural areas.529 
 
Table 4 
Milk Marketing Board census of road and rail bulk milk tanks, 1942 
Wholesaler Road Tanks Rail Tanks Road-Rail Tanks 
United Dairies 24 157 8 
Express Dairies 5 68 0 
London Co-operative 
Wholesale Society 38 13 33 
Manchester Co-operative 
Wholesale Society 6 0 1 
Nestlé 7 35 0 
Wincanton Transport 
& Engineering Ltd. 16 8 0 
London Co-operative 
Society 17 16 0 
Milk Marketing Board 1 0 0 
Independent Milk Supplies 4 20 0 
Total: 118 317 42 
 
Source: TNA: JV 7/58, Summary of Milk Tank Vehicles, 1942. 
 
Although the situation assisted the MMB in its task of reducing milk mileage, urban 
demand was distorted to the extent that it proved difficult to calculate daily supply 
requirements, whilst dislocating the existing transport operation as country depots 
equipped to forward milk met rural demand.530 Despite the upheaval caused by the 
evacuation, the wholesale trade’s contribution towards preserving Britain’s milk supply 
during the early stages of the conflict was the pooling of 118 road and 317 rail-mounted 
bulk tanks for common use, as Table 4 illustrates.531 This measure ostensibly increased 
flexibility by allowing quick transfer of tanks during periodic spikes in supply, although 
Express and United Dairies’ pre-war rivalry meant their respective rail-mounted tanks 
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were fitted with non-compatible equipment, rendering the common use of some vehicles 
impossible.532 Each wholesaler therefore remained responsible for maintaining equipment 
and ordering new vehicles.533 However, new construction was hampered by material 
shortages and the cumbersome auditing procedure undertaken by various Ministries and 
the Railway Executive Committee (REC).534 
Although the REC assumed responsibility for coordinating Britain’s day-to-day 
railway operations on behalf of the government on 1 September, 1939, no obvious strategy 
had been devised to mitigate against disruption and dislocation; the focus was upon 
administrative, rather than practical preparations, prompting an eleventh-hour compilation 
of contingency plans by the milk trade.535 A retrospective article published by United 
Dairies in the spring of 1941 implies that the wholesale industry took the initiative, an 
assertion difficult to dispute because of the conspicuous lack of material in the railway 
company magazines and publicity material relating to milk transport.536 The article 
indicates that discussions were held soon after the outbreak of war to establish contingency 
plans in the event that key rail routes into London and other conurbations were destroyed 
or made temporarily impassable by aerial bombardment.537 Emergency road-rail 
transhipment points for pumping milk into road tanks to minimise wastage established on 
the outskirts of London, further substantiating the hypothesis that planners considered road 
haulage as readily interchangeable with rail.538 Furthermore, the article indicates that ¼ 
million gallons of milk was transferred in 1941 alone, ensuring that ‘London had its milk... 
even if it was a trifle late’.539  
 Aside from the implementation of price guarantees and contingency plans during 
a period of aerial bombardment between 1940 and 1942, the drive to increase milk 
production and minimise wastage was followed by efficiencies in the administration of 
milk distribution.540 A distinct change in executive governance within the supply chain 
emerged in October 1942 when the MMB was given the responsibility for purchasing milk 
from producers for subsequent sale to the Ministry of Food, which in turn allocated 
supplies to the market by reselling at strictly controlled prices.541 The MMB’s new role, 
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described in section 3.2, represented an important milestone in the history of milk 
distribution in Britain as it constrained the wholesalers’ influence over the supply chain.542 
The Ministry of Food instigated a comprehensive review and reorganisation of the 
collection and delivery operation, with the MMB’s new role having long-term 
consequences for milk transport.543 
 
3.13 Consolidating control and rural distribution, 1942-1945   
 
A crucial consequence of the MMB’s role as sole purchaser of milk from the farmer was 
its additional responsibility for organising transport operations to the first point of 
demand.544 The Board’s pre-war ambitions to pursue the rationalisation of farm collection 
was propitious whilst various government departments laid claim to scarce transport 
resources, although the difficulty in meeting these multiple demands are somewhat 
underplayed by Wilt.545 As such, the period between 1942 and 1945 was marked by the 
Board’s strenuous efforts to obtain financial and logistical efficiencies in collection ‘...to 
secure the utmost economy in transport and manpower’.546 Further change emerged from 
the initiation of a ‘zoning’ scheme by the Ministry of Food to reduce excessive transport 
usage by retailers, particularly with home deliveries.547 A system of customer registration 
at the retail dairy was implemented to fix the level of consumer demand at each 
establishment, with licensing and enforcement schemes established to curb unnecessary 
cross-haulage and manpower.548 However, Hammond suggests that attempts to concentrate 
creamery transport resources at fewer locations in 1943 by closing smaller concerns and 
redirecting their business proved less successful, as a series of legal objections resulted in 
the Ministry of Food abandoning the scheme.549   
 As part of the Ministry of Food’s rationalisation scheme, the bulk rail services 
between rural and urban depots were placed under the direct supervision of the Milk 
Movements Department to ensure that supplies entered priority markets.550 However, 
whilst the Ministry could call upon the well-defined wholesale structure for this purpose, 
the MMB had to devise its own system of organising farm collections.  The Board’s 
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regional structure provided an administrative system which could be adopted by Regional 
Transport Officers appointed to ensure that milk travelled the shortest distance to the first 
point of demand.551 As such, the Board turned its attention towards addressing the practical 
idiosyncrasies of rural road collection.  Problems abounded in isolated areas, where the 
choice of contractor was restricted to firms that monopolised road haulage operations.  
However, internal correspondence concerning inefficient farm collection in West Wales 
between October and November 1940 supports a hypothesis that wartime conditions set an 
important precedent for the MMB in demonstrating the value of direct intervention in 
transport management.552 
 The correspondence concerned the road-based milk collection service at the 
MMB’s Pont Llanio creamery, near Tregaron, which produced butter in an area of high 
productive output and low demand.  The creamery was acquired by the MMB in 1937 and 
was the recipient of investment to incorporate equipment for forwarding milk by rail in 
tanks.553 After the outbreak of war, the prioritisation of liquid milk for human consumption 
meant that butter production ceased at the depot, which was subsequently solely used as a 
facility to cool, bulk and dispatch milk to destinations determined by the Ministry of Food.  
The first letter, written by the depot manager at Pont Llanio to the MMB’s General 
Manager highlights that road haulage had yet to reach its apogee in farm collection in the 
remoter areas of Britain, with milk souring en-route to the creamery attributed to the local 
contractor’s poorly-maintained lorries.554 The General Manager’s response in November 
1940 implied that this was a widespread issue, and highlighted that the poor quality of 
local roads and the geography of the catchment area were also critical factors in causing 
late arrivals and wastage.555   
 The government’s ‘every gallon counts’ directive had increased the pressure to 
improve farm collection, yet the consequent expectation for consistent performance in 
straitened wartime conditions was taking its toll upon vehicle reliability.556 Haulage 
contractors were plagued by the lack of spares, whilst route planning had to account for the 
location of the contractor in relation to the milk depot, a problem which seriously 
hampered the Pont Llanio operation.  A letter written in 1941 reveals that whilst the haulier 
serving the creamery possessed six lorries, it was based at Llanybydder, a town located 
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thirteen miles south of the creamery.557 The MMB was thus a hostage to fortune because of 
its reliance upon small haulage contractors, which was cited as being ‘unable to cope’ in 
the case of Pont Llanio, thereby providing the impetus for the MMB to assemble its own 
fleet.558 A single vehicle was acquired to supplement the Pont Llanio operation, beginning 
a process of vertical integration to improve reliability.559 However, whilst the war revealed 
the benefit of direct intervention, the wartime economy was not conducive to a full 
programme of expansion.560 Therefore, the Board’s aspirations to internalise a proportion 
of the road operation would not be realised until after the war. 
 
3.14 Post-war transport policy and road collection 
 
Table 5 
The growth of the Milk Marketing Board’s road transport fleet, 1945-47 
Year 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 
Number of lorries 107 136 152 163 214 
Gallons Carried (millions) 23.7 35.2 37.8 39.3 60.4 
Number of road tanks 2 2 11 15 18 
 
Source: TNA: JV 5/61, 19 January 1950 Report No. 272. 
 
Once the principle of the Board organising its own collection service had been proven, 
road haulage was considered a focus for future investment by the MMB, as the lorry had 
demonstrated flexibility and economy under difficult circumstances.561 The impact upon 
the Board’s transport policy is clearly evidenced in Table 5, which clearly demonstrates 
the expansion of the MMB’s road fleet between 1945 and 1949.  However, the MMB’s 
position as principal buyer of raw milk on behalf of the Ministry of Food ensured that its 
transport aspirations would attract hostility.  In November 1945, The Commercial Motor 
reported that the ‘Producer’s Board’ had managed to vertically integrate milk collection by 
deliberately offering un-remunerative rates to private hauliers.562 Whilst such an accusation 
reveals concern for the private haulage sector’s well-being, the negative reportage receded 
once the detail of the government’s peacetime transport policy became clearer in 1946.563 
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The nationalisation of rail and long-distance road transport in Britain was a core 
tenet of the Labour Party’s 1945 manifesto, and The Commercial Motor turned its attention 
towards highlighting the threat it posed to milk distribution as a whole.564 The 1946 
Transport Bill’s clauses for nationalising long-distance road haulage emphasised the need 
for transport coordination through centralised management.565 The magazine, in 
representing the haulier’s interests, commented upon the possibility of haulage firms that 
boasted several years of experience in milk distribution being dissolved in favour of a 
system run by faceless officials who were distant from the actual business of transport.  
Furthermore, it expressed concern that the bureaucracy generated by a centralised 
management risked a decline in customer service whenever a variation from standard 
procedure was required by a customer.566 
 The situation was of equal concern to the MMB, which published an assessment 
of the potential implications in February 1947, concluding that the level of transport 
coordination demanded by the government was not compatible with the unique and 
specialist demands of farm collection.567 This was because the Bill determined that long-
distance transport, defined as the ‘carriage of goods by the person carrying on the 
undertaking for a distance of forty miles or upwards in one goods vehicle or a succession 
of goods vehicles’, should be the preserve of the mode best suited to the task, namely the 
railways, or else undertaken by the nationalised road service.568 Private road hauliers with 
‘A’ and ‘B’ licences thus faced an operating restriction of 25 miles radius from their 
depots.569 This exercise in asserting legislative governance had the potential to constrain 
the operations of private hauliers contracted by the MMB to undertake its collections in the 
short-term.570 In the longer-term, the concurrent Agriculture Bill provided a potential 
solution as it included price guarantees, thus permitting farmers to invest in farm 
mechanisation and lorries, a process considered in more detail in chapter 4.571   
 There were other challenges; although the Bill contained provisions for the British 
Transport Commission (BTC) to issue permits through vehicle Licensing Authorities that 
waived the distance limit, their consideration on a case-by-case basis provided little 
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guarantee that any glut of applications would be cleared expeditiously.572 Furthermore, the 
MMB’s policy of primarily using its fleet to gauge operating costs for external contractors 
was compromised by the fact that its ‘C’-licensed vehicles were restricted to carrying 
goods for up to 40 miles under the proposed legislation.573 With 3,945 private firms 
employed to collect milk from 130,000 farms to over 10,000 destinations, the Board had 
few means of taking over routes affected by the proposed restrictions.574 
 In contrast, meat was granted a full exemption from the mileage legislation, 
ostensibly because the firms involved with this equally perishable commodity were already 
operating as a self-contained transport unit, as revealed in the next chapter.575 As such, the 
Board expressed concern that the Bill had failed to account for the similarly unique 
circumstances of milk distribution, particularly as it was a strategic commodity that 
enjoyed considerable legislative support in the government’s drive to shore-up Britain’s 
ailing post-war economy.576 The MMB’s desire for equality of treatment with the meat 
trade consequently became a source of heated debate with the Labour government as it 
corresponded with the Ministry of Transport to request a Bill amendment, and adds further 
evidence of the Board’s influence over the supply chain. 
 In a letter written to Alfred Barnes, Minister of Transport in March 1947, the 
Board’s General Manager highlighted that its longer hauls, ‘almost exclusively within a 
radius of 40 miles, are allocated to [private] hauliers under contract’, with vehicles 
‘generally [providing] an exclusive milk service’.577 The request for exemption was argued 
on the grounds that private haulage firms engaged in milk collection could not obtain other 
work for their vehicles without significant outlay because they were designed for churn 
traffic.  However, the Minister’s commitment to the Bill prompted the Board’s Chairman 
to lobby the House of Lords for an amendment debate.578 The House of Lords approved the 
amendment, although Lord de la Warr, leading the debate on the MMB’s behalf, expressed 
concern that any decision on the matter might be made on ‘the wider constitutional 
relationship between the two Houses [of Parliament]’, and not the interests of the milk 
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industry.579 Labour’s hostility towards non-state monopolies raises the suggestion that the 
government was suspicious of producer-led marketing boards because of their conservative 
character.580 The MMB’s alliance with the road haulage lobby may have confirmed this 
assumption, and informed Barnes’ response that there was ‘...insufficient ground for 
including milk among the traffics specially dealt with in the Act’.581 
 
3.15 Railway milk in decline, 1950-1957 
 
Although the Labour government’s intervention threatened to unsettle the MMB’s existing 
farm collection plans, the Board’s defence of an independent operation brought it into 
closer alignment with the road haulage industry.582 However, the nationalisation of road 
haulage was ultimately undermined by administrative issues which delayed the vesting of 
private hauliers into British Road Services (BRS) until 1950, whist the election of a 
Conservative government in 1951 threw the policy of transport coordination into disarray, 
as chapter 2 highlights.583 The Transport Act (1953) thus dismantled BRS’ hegemony over 
long-distance haulage and The Commercial Motor marked the occasion by publishing an 
article announcing that milk haulage had returned to ‘free enterprise’.584 However, the 
extent to which free enterprise had returned is debatable, as BRS remained a major force 
within the long-distance haulage business, whilst the MMB remained the lynchpin of farm 
collection.585 The Act therefore presented the Board with opportunities to expand its 
governance over the rates charged by private contractors, as the purchase of former BRS 
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depots enabled the MMB to acquire route knowledge before tailoring rates to the specific 
duties under negotiation.586 
  
Table 6 
Analysis of rail tanker use in year ending September 1953 
Mileage Gallonage 
(millions) 
0-20 1.8 
21-50 4.6 
51-75 5.6 
76-100 13.3 
101-150 37.4 
Over 151 120.8 
 
Source: TNA: JV 7/563, c1954, Data Memorandum. 
 
A further example of the MMB’s expanding executive governance over the milk supply 
chain was the Conservative government’s decision in 1954 to devolve milk distribution 
and restore the Board’s marketing powers.  The Ministry of Food was no longer the 
principal buyer of liquid milk, thereby enabling the MMB to deal directly with the trade by 
negotiating prices and supervising any rail tanker operations to the first point of sale.587 
However, Table 6 demonstrates that the rail tanks predominated on bulk flows of distances 
over 151 miles, with only 12 million gallons carried over shorter distances, implying that 
road transport had captured the majority of low-mileage traffic.588 The railway operation 
illustrated below in Image 8 was thus in decline; the wartime reorganisations undertaken 
by the MMB had seen a reduction in the long-haul churn operation, rendering ventilated 
wagons increasingly redundant.589   
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Image 8 
 
A mixed train of milk tankers, ventilated milk vans and road-rail tankers, hauled by ex-
GWR 47XX class 2-8-0 No. 4702 at Ruscombe, Berkshire, 26 August 1950.  Note the grubby 
condition of the vehicles.  Photographer: J. F. Russell-Smith.  Source: National Railway 
Museum 1996-7821_363. 
 
 
The post-1945 political emphasis was upon increasing agricultural production to meet the 
needs of a growing population; the annual per capita consumption of milk sharply 
increased between 1947 and 1948, as Graph 12 indicates below.  Although a crude 
indicator that takes no account of the income levels of various social strata, the graph 
shows that milk consumption was 3.9 pints per capita per week in 1945, rising to 4.6 in 
1948, with weekly consumption generally stabilising around 4.6 pints thereafter.590 Rising 
demand was met with improvements in farming practices, which included the MMB’s 
programme for developing high-yielding breeds of dairy cows, with supplies from farms 
near demand centres reducing the requirement for long-distance milk distribution.591 
Another development was agricultural specialisation, where ‘mixed’ farming gave way to 
commodity-specific agriculture, which resulted in more milk being produced by fewer 
producers on larger farms.592 Both help to explain how a 32 per cent increase in liquid milk 
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sales from 1.2 to 1.6 million gallons was achieved between 1945 and 1964.593 However, 
there was no commensurate rise in milk forwarded by rail; indeed, surviving data for the 
year ending September 1953 indicates that of the 660 million gallons of milk conveyed to 
urban depots, 55 per cent was conveyed in road tankers as opposed to 25 per cent by rail, 
indicating that a modal shift from rail to road was underway in the milk trade.594 
 
Graph 12 
Estimated average weekly milk consumption per capita in the UK, 
1945-1964
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 12 (p. 303). 
 
The MMB’s growing executive governance over the supply chain was characterised by a 
resumption of its rationalisation programme, which compounded the modal shift to road 
distribution.  Firstly, the Board continued to establish creameries in remote areas where 
supply outpaced demand, with examples acquired and built at Egremont, Derbyshire and at 
Llangefni and Felin Fach in Wales.595 This was accompanied by the continued expansion 
of road distribution; improvements in the operational range of lorries permitted the closure 
of less viable establishments to achieve further cost reductions through economies of 
scale.596 Furthermore, whilst demand for liquid milk rose, rural population increases meant 
that the supply of milk to balance the London market shifted westwards throughout the 
1950s, rendering many pre-war rail-connected depots redundant.597 
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Table 7 
Bulk conveyance of milk by rail, 1955-57 
BR 
Region 
Gallonage 
Oct.-Sept. 1955-56 
Gallonage 
Oct.-Sept. 1956-57 
BR (E) 9,806,037 10,458,000 
BR (M) 24,786,899 27,892,000 
BR (NE) 1,684,060 1,838,000 
BR (S) 29,394,146 20,618,000 
BR (W) 86,793,138 90,013,000 
Total: 150,781,904 150,819,000 
Percentage increase 1955-57: 0.03% 
 
Source: TNA: JV 7/563, Rail Tanker Despatches by Region (Annual Tables). 
 
The perennial issues of service quality and cost were further factors militating against the 
railways, as post-war maintenance arrears caused declining wagon reliability.598 Firstly, 
underinvestment had compromised the reliability of the railway operation since 1945, with 
the maintenance situation worsening as the decade progressed.599 Secondly, the threat of 
disruption from declining labour relations within BR, which culminated in a sixteen-day 
railway strike by the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) 
over pay in May 1955, as highlighted in chapter 2.600 The result was severe disruption and 
dislocation.601 When the strike ended on 14 June, the damage to BR’s reputation within the 
milk sector appears to have been considerable, and it is possible to hypothesise that some 
milk wholesalers were moved to re-examine their distribution arrangements.  This is 
exemplified by the London CWS, which commenced a gradual transfer to road haulage, 
with rail-mounted tanks continuing to operate from its creameries at Llangadog, 
Melksham, Puxton and Wallingford in 1956.602 Both hypotheses are supported by the fact 
that although archival evidence concerning the London CWS’ decision to reduce rail usage 
has proved elusive, Table 7 indicates a substantial loss of milk traffic on BR Southern 
Region, which served the wholesaler’s depots in Somerset; the region experienced a 
decline of 8,777,146 gallons despite an overall national increase in gallons carried of 0.03 
per cent between 1955 and 1957.   
The dissatisfaction with BR’s service is also demonstrated in correspondence 
between the MMB management and British Railways (BR) between 1956 and 1957, which 
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provides a concise record of the Board’s concern for value for money.  The Board alleged 
that a railway rates increase of 7.5 per cent in 1956 would adversely affect the MMB’s 
transport costs.603 A second rise of 7.5 per cent was scheduled later the same year, resulting 
in charges increasing from approximately 0.5p per gallon in 1946 to approximately 1.5p 
per gallon in 1956 notwithstanding inflation, whilst a further ten per cent rise projected for 
1957 prompted the Board to begin ‘...negotiating for the transfer of rail milk to road 
haulage wherever possible’.604 An article on BR’s financial management by John Quail 
might provide a reason for the situation, as freight flows were being analysed for the more 
profitable traffic, allowing speculation that BR perceived milk as being subsidised by 
cheap rates.605 Equally plausible is BR’s failure to consider the commercial pressures 
facing the milk industry, echoing the complaints the MMB levelled at the LMS in 1936.606 
 This is revealed in an exchange between the Board and the BTC’s Chief 
Commercial Officer in October 1956.  The latter expressed the Commission’s concern 
about a decline in rail-borne milk, to which the MMB responded that the ‘costs of 
conveying milk by road have been considerably lower’ than the rates offered by BR.607 
Furthermore, the Board was candid in its assessment of BR’s service by suggesting that ‘in 
our view, the railways are largely to be blamed for losing traffic’, highlighting the erosion 
of goodwill towards the railway industry from both service and financial perspectives.608 
By 1957, the annual cost of sending milk to London £2.391 million by rail and £1.031 
million  for road; assuming that the quantity conveyed was similar in proportion to 1953, 
BR was charging double for approximately half of the work undertaken by road 
transport.609 Consequently, the MMB encouraged a further development in road haulage. 
 
3.16 Developing bulk milk collection by road, 1953-1975 
 
The development in question attempted to resolve the ‘churn problem’ that had plagued the 
dairy industry, and provides further indication of the executive governance exercised by 
the MMB over the supply chain.  In 1953, the Scottish Milk Marketing Board (SMMB) 
trialled another scheme pioneered in America, which entailed the bulk transport of raw 
milk direct from producer to the first point of sale by road, thus entirely avoiding rail 
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distribution, as indicated in section 3.2.610 This required the storage of milk in on-farm 
refrigerated tanks; however, the initial cost of equipment necessitated the accumulation of 
substantial financial economies for success.611 Isolated Kirkcudbrightshire was chosen to 
examine what economies could be made in areas isolated from the main liquid markets.612  
 The Commercial Motor covered the trial, highlighting that the existing churn 
collection operation was not economically viable for farms over 35 miles from the dairy 
because of the risk of spoilage as the churns heated in transit.613 It was anticipated that the 
adoption of insulated tankers would extend this range and open-up new areas to the liquid 
market, whilst on-farm refrigeration increased operational flexibility by allowing the 
alternate scheduling of collections to concentrate vehicles in high-output areas.614 
Furthermore, the number of farms on a collection route could be increased during the 
winter to ensure full loads and maximum cost-efficiency, whilst refrigeration enabled the 
tankers to reach town dairies with increased regularity in summer months. 
 The rate of adoption was initially hindered by poor road access to farms; the 
potential for high empty tanker mileage and dairy delays caused by traffic congestion.615 
The gradual expansion of farm collection by tanker thus provided a temporary respite for 
BR, although its position remained precarious as the MMB dragged its heels over a long-
term contract being pushed by the newly-merged Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Fisheries between 1956 and 1964.616 It is possible to hypothesise that cost was a key factor, 
as Table 8 below suggests that a loss of 48 per cent in the volume of milk carried by rail 
between 1947 and 1962 appears to be consistent with the aforementioned rises in railway 
rates, with the cost per thousand gallons of milk rising in real terms between 1947 and 
1957.  The reduction in 1962 was therefore caused by a 35.7 per cent reduction in milk 
conveyed by rail, rather than any offer of rate reductions from BR.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
610
 Martin, The Development of Modern Agriculture, p. 24.   
611
 “Scotland Pioneers Milk Transport Experiment,” The Commercial Motor, XCVIII (November 13, 1953), 
p. 420. 
612
 “Scotland Pioneers Milk Transport Experiment,” p. 420. 
613
 “Scotland Pioneers Milk Transport Experiment,” p. 421. 
614
 “Scotland Pioneers Milk Transport Experiment,” p. 421. 
615
 “Pinta in Tanka,” The Commercial Motor Magazine, 114 (January 19, 1962), p. 830. 
616
 TNA: MAF 251/605, 17 July 1968 Rushforth Note; TNA: JV 7/563, 20 October 1956 Davies to Pike; 
TNA: JV 7/563, 8 February 1963 Rail Transport of Milk; TNA: JV 7/563, 20 April 1964 Second Stage Rail 
Transport, pp. 1-4. 
  145 
Table 8 
Milk conveyed by rail, 1947-1962 
Approximate cost 
per thousand 
gallons  September 
Percentage of 
total depot 
despatches 
Gallons 
(millions) 
Total cost 
of railed 
milk (£-
thousands) 
(£ at 
current 
prices) 
(£ at 
1962 
prices) 
1947 37 200.2 1260 6.2 11.4 
1952 28 191 2267 11.8 15.9 
1957 26 162.3 2625 16.1 18.2 
1962 17 104.2 1612 15.4 15.4 
 
Source: TNA: JV 7/563, 8 February 1963 Rail Transport of Milk, p. 1.  To facilitate a crude 
real-terms comparison of cost per thousand gallons over time, values have been adjusted to 
equivalent 1962 values using Office of National Statistics retail price index data.  See note 
accompanying Table 1 on p. 45 and: J. O’ Donoghue, L. Goulding and G. Allen, “Consumer 
Price Inflation Since 1750,” Economic Trends No. 604 (London: HMSO, 2004), pp. 38-46. 
 
BR’s attempts to engage with the Board in the late 1950s to increase milk traffic might 
therefore be considered ‘too little, too late’, as the combination of the Board’s influence 
over supply chain inputs from producers and its commitment to developing tanker haulage 
direct farm to first point of sale meant that it could no longer guarantee railway business 
from a commercial perspective.617 Although discussions between BR, the MMB and the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries would produce an annual agreed charge that 
guaranteed continued railway involvement in the traffic, the trend of decline hastened with 
the amalgamation of United Dairies with Cow & Gate to form Unigate in 1959.618 
The amalgamation between the two firms was a response to changes taking place 
in the retail sector, where mergers had created large corporations capable of leveraging the 
supply chain to drive down costs, a factor highlighted later in chapter 6.619 This combined 
with the influence held by the MMB upstream to squeeze the wholesaler and transport 
providers between competing interests; the latter wishing to maximise returns to the 
producer, and the former minimising the cost to consumers.  Therefore, the pressure from 
retailers and producers favoured a flexible distribution operation capable of intensive use at 
short notice; such a concept proved beyond the capabilities of BR, which remained wedded 
to traffic regularity and planning.620   
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 The amalgamation and subsequent expansion of Unigate’s road fleet therefore 
administered a partial severing of the wholesaler’s historic link with the railways, although 
the endgame was ultimately initiated by BR with the publication of Reshaping of the 
Railways in 1963.  Although the Board stressed that inflexibility and an unwillingness to 
reduce rates had demonstrated BR’s lack of enterprise in regaining traffic lost to road 
haulage, the closure of routes in the interests of running a rationalised, commercial railway 
network represented a turning point in the railway industry’s relationship with milk 
distribution.  This prompted the MMB to observe that the ‘...drastic closure of the more 
uneconomic services... may affect the ability of country creameries to load milk direct onto 
rail’, further highlighting the benefit of farm collection by road tanker as a flexible means 
of maintaining continuity.621  
 The situation was eased during negotiations to establish a fixed annual charge for 
milk conveyed over the remaining milk runs to London in 1964.  The resultant ‘Western 
Agreement’ concentrated the traffic into three daily trains from Whitland in 
Carmarthenshire and Cornwall, and included a guarantee that the MMB would permit the 
forwarding of an agreed minimum volume of milk until October 1965, with a rebate paid 
on any milk above the minimum.622 The rebate was paid to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food and Fisheries in the first instance, which subsequently reimbursed the Board’s milk 
pool.623 This indicates that the government still maintained its watching brief over milk 
distribution; furthermore, the election of the Labour government in October 1964 makes it 
possible to hypothesise that continued support for the agreement in subsequent years 
stemmed from its desire to reconfigure transport policy by regulating road haulage. 
 This is highlighted by the Labour government’s Transport Act (1968), which 
imposed a series of regulations that appeared to undermine the agency of transport users to 
select their desired mode of transport by resurrecting the issue of transport coordination.624 
The MMB contended that the Act restricted the ability of bulk transport by road to reduce 
distribution costs, as restrictions imposed upon drivers’ hours necessitated the employment 
of relief drivers.625 It is also possible to detect the Board’s underlying exasperation that the 
government had not given due consideration to the expenditure required to update the 
railway operation and ferry milk to the remaining rail-connected depots.626 Although 
investment in refurbishing tanks was ongoing when the MMB finally ceased the rail 
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operation in 1981, an administrative change in 1971 saw the MMB take responsibility for 
financing milk distribution to the second point of sale using funds made available by 
government.627 Consequently, the MMB seized the opportunity to continue its 
rationalisation of the milk supply chain with a modal shift to road tanker distribution to 
customers situated closer to the source of production.  
 
3.17 Conclusion 
 
Milk was identified as a case study because of its status as a staple product and its 
inherently perishable nature, which created a broadly sheltered market for Britain’s 
beleaguered agricultural industry.  However, the lack of foreign competition did not ease 
the challenge from a logistical perspective, as the example of the London trade 
demonstrates.  The need to transport milk from farm to consumer both cheaply and 
efficiently necessitated the development of a complex supply network, highlighted in the 
diagrams, capable of channelling milk to centres of demand.  The basic structure for 
achieving this was already in place by 1919; the trade having emerged from the 
entrepreneurship and investment of the milk wholesaler, and the railway industry’s 
willingness to participate. 
 Whilst the origins of the trade stemmed from a close alliance between Britain’s 
railways and urban milk retailers, this chapter makes it clear that innovation was initially 
driven by the wholesaler’s governance over the supply chain.  The reasons are manifold; 
first and foremost, the need to transport a perishable commodity required reliable transport 
links, with distribution time-bound to preserve freshness.  Consequently, the wholesaler’s 
desire for cheaply maintaining freshness and minimising contamination were key drivers 
of technological change in transport.  However, the lack of innovation on the part of the 
transport provider and the need to engage in service-based competition with rivals 
prompted wholesalers to experiment and internalise some aspects of the transport 
operation, and use their initially dominant position in the supply chain to overcome any 
technological ‘lock-in’ by leveraging the adoption of new, labour-saving concepts, 
particularly in relation to Britain’s railways.         
 The wholesaler’s governance over the supply chain also reveals the lengths to 
which service reliability was pursued.  Although United Dairies had commenced the 
motorisation of farm collection in 1919, the railway strike of that year demonstrated the 
flexibility of road haulage in an emergency, and called the railway industry’s reliability 
into question.  This combined with the issue of cost, which prompted wholesale dairies to 
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adopt insulated bulk tank technology in 1923; this, coupled with the omnipresent risk of 
strike disruption provided an excuse to commence long-distance tank operations by road.  
The adoption of insulated tank technology for rail operations once again supports the 
hypothesis that change was wholesaler-driven, which leads to the chapter’s second point, 
namely that the shifting focus of supply chain governance between wholesalers, producers 
and government between 1934 and 1953 was key to modal shift from rail to road.   
 The emergence of the MMB in the latter stages of the inter-war Depression began 
a reconfiguration of the trade that was only temporarily interrupted by the outbreak of war 
in 1939.  In governing the milk supply chain, the Board upheld the producer’s interests 
from the outset, and highlighted the shortcomings of the railway industry in relation to 
service provision.  Further rationalisation was imposed by wartime expediency, as the 
government delegated the purchase and distribution of milk to the first point of sale to the 
MMB.  Consequently, problems experienced with rural road distribution provided a 
foundation for the Board’s post-war policy of the part-vertical integration of road haulage 
to assist with setting the terms of private haulier participation, although this was 
temporarily constrained by the nationalisation of long-distance road transport.  Despite 
this, the distribution of milk to customers near producers and improving milk yields from 
herds after 1945 contributed to a reduction in the long-distance rail transport of milk. 
 Whilst the use of bulk rail tanks was a step towards improving milk quality, the 
use of churns at both ends of the haul meant that risks of contamination and the expense of 
handling remained.  Therefore, the MMB used its position in the supply chain to initiate 
experiments in farm collection with road tankers from 1953, which extended the door-door 
principle established by the wholesalers to provide a seamless, yet flexible operation 
between farm and customer which was compatible with the demands for low-cost milk 
being made by retailers.  This, coupled with the Beeching report’s closure of branch lines 
marked the beginning of the final demise of railway milk.  However, the fundamental issue 
of governance over a commodity’s supply chain and its ramifications for transport 
operations is also present in livestock and meat distribution, the focus of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 - Meat distribution, 1919-1968 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter on milk introduces several of the main themes relating to food 
transport in Britain and how they influenced the competitive relationship between road and 
rail.  Speed, cost and reliability were paramount in the timely transport of perishable foods 
such as meat, although these factors were influenced by the geography of supply and 
demand; how the commodity’s market was governed, transport regulation and the state of 
consumer demand.  Although the existing literature on Britain’s meat industry provides 
rich pickings for the historian interested in the development of trade regulation, demand 
and technology, the process of distributing the commodity is ripe for research.  Since the 
publication of a three-volume narrative entitled The Meat Trade in 1935, subsequent 
analyses such as Derrick Rixson’s The History of Meat Trading and Robert Malcolmson 
and Stephanos Mastoris’ The English Pig have focused upon meat processing, nineteenth-
century market development and preservation technology.628  
 Similarly, literature on British agriculture, such as John Martin’s The 
Development of Modern Agriculture: British Farming Since 1931 only hints at what took 
place beyond the farm gate, whilst Richard Perren’s Taste, Trade and Technology: The 
Development of the International Meat Industry Since 1840 places the British trade within 
the context of the global trade.629 The effect of the Second World War upon the trade is 
again covered in R. J. Hammond’s multi-volume official history, which describes how 
meat transport was controlled by government agencies throughout the conflict.630 Britain’s 
post-war meat trade has seen little meaningful analysis, and as such, this account will use 
the changes experienced in livestock and meat transport to deduce the character of the 
sector between 1950 and 1968 and ascertain when the transition to road transport occurred.     
 This chapter will therefore consider how the fragmented livestock and meat trades 
meant equally fractured supply chain governance, which determined the character of their 
relationship with transport providers.631 Whilst geography and the governance exercised by 
the Milk Marketing Board helped to shape the transport requirements of Britain’s milk 
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market, domestically-produced perishable foods such as meat experienced modest home 
advantage.  As a luxury commodity encompassing home-killed and imported meat, as well 
as canned and processed products, this chapter will primarily focus upon the two principal 
elements of the meat supply chain, namely ‘livestock’, encompassing live cattle, pigs and 
sheep; and ‘meat’, comprising fresh, chilled and frozen carcases.  This chapter will 
therefore reflect upon how competition between domestic and foreign meat supplies 
created a complex environment for transport between 1919 and 1968, with Figure 5 (p. 
153) demonstrating some of the different routes of entry into the market. 
 
Graph 13 
Comparison between total British cattle population and imported 
Irish cattle (estimated to nearest 1,000), 1901-1926
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Sources: See Appendix 2, Table 13 (p. 304). 
 
Before 1850, long-distance livestock distribution was achieved through droving, which 
entailed the movement of cattle ‘on the hoof’ from farm to market, with a period of 
fattening taking place before sale.632 The railways rendered long-distance droving 
redundant, and permitted cattle to be marketed in better condition and with less fattening.  
Furthermore, they facilitated the sale of Irish cattle in the British market from 1861, with 
Graph 13 indicating the potential number of cattle transported from ports to arable areas 
for fattening and slaughter by intermediaries before distribution as fresh meat between 
1901 and 1926.633 The graph suggests that Irish imports helped balance periodic falls in the 
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domestic cattle population in 1902, 1913 and 1920, the latter coinciding with a post-war 
readjustment of the trade, sporadic outbreaks of foot and mouth disease and the preferential 
treatment given to arable farming under the terms of the Agriculture Act (1920).634 
However, the period after the partition of Ireland in May 1921 was marked by peaks and 
troughs as competition emerged from global sources such as Canada.635  
Technological innovation in transport was instrumental in the development of a 
competing meat import trade; in 1875, consignments of natural ice-cooled beef and lamb 
were shipped from New York and New Zealand to England.  Competition emerged from 
consumer demand for low-price meat, the inability of the domestic trade to keep pace with 
population increases and the smoothing of seasonal shortages.636 Ignoring inflation, Graph 
14 demonstrates the price difference between imported and domestically-produced meat 
between 1914 and 1947, with the cheapness of the former placing a downward pressure 
upon domestic retail prices after the First World War.  This conflicted with high domestic 
production costs, which combined with increasing government regulatory intervention in 
distribution to render British meat uncompetitive on price.  Consequently, the chapter aims 
to consider whether this tension within the trade generated the modal shift from rail to road 
distribution. 
 
Graph 14 
RPI price comparison between British and imported beef ribs, 1914-1947
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 14 (p. 305). 
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Beyond analysing the relationship between transport provider and the multitude of interests 
within the meat trade, the chapter will also consider the evolution of meat transport 
technology, whilst the influence of government presents another point for analysis.  The 
chapter will therefore detail the government’s interventions, which initially ranged from 
laissez-faire with emphasis on self-regulation to statutory obligations regarding animal 
welfare, import tariffs.  Subsequently, the government imposed control over the meat 
supply during the Second World War, thus presenting an opportunity to describe the 
changes made to meat distribution, and consider whether experience during the conflict 
and beyond influenced the balance between rail and road transport.   
 Post-war challenges facing both modes of transport include the 1947 Smithfield 
meat drivers’ strike; the implications of the Agriculture Act (1947) and food decontrol, the 
effect of the 1955 railway strike and the Beeching Report of 1963, all of which raise the 
importance of maintaining reliable transport links in the distribution of perishable products.  
Finally, the chapter will consider briefly the effects of a post-war shift in supply chain 
governance towards the chain retailer upon the rail-road dynamic; a process which is also 
considered in greater detail in chapter 6.  In considering this, it will be possible to assess 
the relative successes of Britain’s rail and road transport industries in adapting to the 
changing needs of a fragmented meat trade between 1919 and 1968.  This date range has 
been selected because the British Rail Board had concentrated the traffic to a single point 
of origin at Holyhead by 1968; indeed, subsequent financial losses, as reported in the 
contemporary press, precipitated the complete withdrawal from the business in 1975.637  
 
4.2 Meat supply chain analysis 
 
The following supply chain analysis explores the structural changes experienced within the 
meat trade.  Consumer demand for cheap and plentiful supplies and government 
intervention during the Second World War key factors in driving the trade’s distribution 
priorities.638 A logical outcome of this was that stakeholders sought transport technologies 
that catered for the perishability and vulnerability of meat and livestock during transit, yet 
also minimised costs by improving efficiency in handling and reducing transhipment.  An 
analysis of Figure 5 below gives an approximation of the different input, processing and 
sales activities taking place within the peacetime meat supply chain, and suggests that 
executive governance was highly fragmentary between 1919 and 1960.  In doing so, it 
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isolates the three main sources of meat sold in the British trade throughout the period, 
namely the domestic and imported livestock markets for fresh meat production, and 
imported pre-prepared chilled and frozen meat. 
 
Figure 5 
The structure of distribution within the British meat trade, 1919-1960 
    
The potential distributive challenges facing Britain’s meat trade are established below in 
Figure 6, in which J. E. Hobbs and L. M. Young have tabulated the uncertainties 
associated with marketing agricultural produce in several quality-based scenarios that 
detail the market circumstances that influenced meat distribution.  The resultant table is of 
particular relevance to the meat trade; as a perishable commodity, the buyer faces 
uncertainty in product quality and quantity, which in turn drove efforts to preserve meat 
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products during and after transit.639 Furthermore, transactions within the domestic livestock 
trade were made on trust, with farmers forming long-term relationships with salesmen to 
obtain the best prices for their animals, yet this highlights a vulnerability to long-term 
market changes.640 This is exemplified by the demands of a rising population, which could 
not be met by domestic agriculture alone, and created a market for imported products that 
supplemented the domestic supply.641  
 
Figure 6 
Hobbs and Young’s relationship between product characteristics  
and transaction type in agri-food chains 
 
Abstract from: J. E. Hobbs and L. M. Young, “Closer Vertical Co-ordination in Agri-food 
Chains: A Conceptual Framework and Some Preliminary Evidence,” Supply Chain 
Management, 5 (2000), p. 133. 
 
Product differentiation stemmed from the trade in imported processed meat, as frozen meat 
presented an opportunity to extend the shelf-life of the commodity and increase distance 
from source.  The potential to store frozen meat enabled import merchants to engage in 
market speculation by releasing supplies during seasonal dips in the domestic supply, with 
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consumers substituting domestic supplies with the cheaper product.642 Price changes borne 
from such competition were factored in decisions made by domestic supply chain 
participants, with innovative technology adopted for the inbound logistics and processing 
stages to reduce the impact of these activities upon final commodity prices.643   
 
Figure 7  
The structure of meat transport in wartime Britain, 1940-1945 
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With executive governance dispersed throughout Britain’s meat supply chain, legislative 
governance determining the conditions of market participation assumed high importance, 
with local authorities responsible for maintaining hygiene standards at the abattoir, in 
transit and at the retailer.644 Similarly, animal welfare legislation precipitated changes in 
livestock handling, with the Ministry of Agriculture providing statutory guidance on best-
practice in activities such as transit and slaughter.645 However, direct government 
intervention in the supply chain occurred during the Second World War when the Ministry 
of Food, in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture, assumed control to manage and 
rationalise the trade to save scarce labour and production resources.646 An approximation 
of the wartime organisation of meat transport in Britain is illustrated above in Figure 7, 
which reflects the restructuring undertaken to control wartime demand, which in turn 
established a basis for further changes in peacetime. 
 It is possible to note that the government took control of the meat trade by 
licensing marketing and wholesale organisations to operate as executive agents on its 
behalf, with the former designated collecting centres and the latter amalgamated into 
Wholesale Meat Supply Associations (WMSA).647 With the Ministry of Agriculture 
controlling the production of domestic livestock inputs, the Ministry of Food exercised 
control over the point of sale.648 Retail buying committees were formed under government 
direction to purchase and distribute meat to registered retail customers, whilst the 
customer’s meat consumption was controlled through rationing.649 Similar controls were 
implemented for the import trade, although frozen meat assisted with mitigating shortfalls 
in domestic supply as a result of animal feed shortages and seasonality. 
The third visible shift in the character of the meat supply chain reflects a common 
theme within this thesis; that post-war socio-economic change drove a restructure of the 
food supply chain that promoted retailer control, as Figure 8 illustrates below.  Despite 
rising consumer affluence, food price reductions and convenience became key as other 
activities assumed importance within family budgets.650 As large retail chains provided a 
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concentrated market for meat suppliers, they played an active role in the supply chain by 
extending their influence over inbound logistics towards their primary suppliers.651 How 
changes in executive governance within Britain’s meat supply chain impacted upon 
transport operations in practice will form the basis of the following sections. 
 
Figure 8 
British meat distribution post-1960 
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4.3 Livestock and meat distribution by rail: service quality, 
rates and regulation 
 
Britain’s population growth after the First World War did not coincide with a 
commensurate increase in domestic agriculture’s contribution to the meat supply, as Table 
9 indicates.  The table compares Britain’s pre-First World War domestic meat supply with 
that of the inter-war period in relation to population, and shows that whilst domestic 
supplies accounted for 61 per cent of tons consumed per thousands of population in 1901, a 
sharp post-war decline in the cattle population is highlighted in Graph 13 (p. 150), and 
coincides with a reduction to 46 per cent in 1921.  The balance was met by imported meat, 
which increased market share from 39 to 59 per cent between 1901 and 1931; its post-war 
cheapness as global production was wound-down precipitated a slump in domestic meat 
prices in 1921.652 With Britain’s agricultural sector both geographically and 
organisationally fragmented amongst a mixture of arable and livestock farming, farmers 
were unable to internalise transport costs easily nor exercise firm supply chain governance, 
yet they were under pressure to minimise mismatches between production costs and 
marketing receipts.653 This section therefore hypothesises that as transport provided the 
essential link between farm and market, as described in section 4.2, Britain’s railways, as 
principal means of securing long-distance livestock distribution, came under scrutiny from 
farmers and representative bodies aiming to secure cost efficiencies during the slump. 
 
Table 9   
Estimated British meat supply and consumption in census years, 1901-1931 
 Population 
of Great 
Britain 
(thousands) 
 
Domestic 
meat (tons) 
 
Imported 
meat 
(tons) 
Tons of 
domestic meat 
consumed per 
thousand 
population 
Tons of 
imported meat 
consumed per 
thousand 
population 
1901 37,000 1,452,000 938,000 39.2 25.3 
1911 40,831 1,442,000 1,079,050 35.3 26.4 
1921 42,769 1,169,000 1,362,050 27.3 31.8 
1931 44,795 1,019,000 1,477,450 22.7 32.9 
 
Sources: B. R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 210; B. R. Mitchell, Second Abstract of British Historical Statistics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 63. 
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This was because of the railway industry’s traffic monopoly resulting from the dearth of 
alternative transport modes capable of effecting timely conveyance to destinations 
nationwide.654 Whilst Graph 15 indicates that livestock dispatches by rail increased 
slightly between 1920 and 1927 in line with the rising total livestock population, transport 
costs were closely associated with service quality; although the railways were handicapped 
by post-war wagon shortages and maintenance arrears, farmers were revealed to be 
‘...[wasting] time and money ...in sending in their loads to the station only to find no trucks 
available’ during a Parliamentary sitting in December 1919.655 The issue continued into 
1920, as The Times editorial included ‘...strong complaints of the difficulties farmers are 
meeting with in regard to the transit of cattle’.656 One farmer in Northamptonshire was 
forced to ‘...leave 72 beasts on someone else’s land because the railway trucks were not 
forthcoming, although the trucks were ordered six days previously’, a reminder sent three 
days later indicating the strain which sometimes emerged in the relationship between 
Britain’s domestic livestock and railway industries.657  
 
Graph 15 
Total British cattle, sheep and pig population and livestock 
conveyed by rail, 1920-1937
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Sources: See Appendix 2, Table 15 (p. 306). 
 
This supports the hypothesis that scrutiny stemmed from a perception that service quality 
failed to justify the rates charged by the railways, although the difficulty in obtaining 
comprehensive statistical data precludes comment on individual cases.  Another example 
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of the domestic farmer’s rates-service grievance was the perception that preferential rates 
were being offered by railway companies to livestock importers which dispatched animals 
by rail from ports including Birkenhead and Holyhead; indeed, P. J. Cain’s article on the 
relationship between agriculture and the railways prior to the First World War clearly 
demonstrates that this was a long-standing issue.658 The railway industry robustly defended 
its position, for example, at the final Annual General Meeting of the London and South 
Western Railway in 1923, with the efficiency of the port and better loadings cited as 
reasons for the cheaper rates, emphasising that costs varied according to the quantity and 
type of livestock forwarded, distance travelled and the handling required.659 However, this 
also implies that the lack of supply chain governance caused by the fragmentation of 
Britain’s domestic livestock trade amongst numerous producers ensured that such 
economies of scale were difficult to obtain. 
 The claims about service quality also suggests a failure of the farming community 
to acknowledge that livestock rates were expensive due to the finesse required in handling 
the traffic, which was strictly governed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries’ 
statutory Animals (Transit and General) Orders.660 These established basic vehicle 
construction standards to maintain the condition of live animals during transit, and 
imposed a requirement to apply for licences from the receiving local authority to effect 
disease control.  This posed a further challenge for long-distance traffic passing through 
diseased areas of the country, as strict guidelines prohibited the unloading of animals for 
feeding or watering, despite having to take place every twenty-four hours.661 Furthermore, 
the implementation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries’ disease control 
regulations required considerable manual labour.662  
To ensure that wagons, such as that illustrated below in Image 9, and related 
infrastructure were suitable, a strict regime of thoroughly scraping wagon floors and walls 
before washing, scrubbing and applying disinfectant was imposed, which meant the 
unremunerative empty-running of vehicles to dedicated stabling points after each use.663 
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Consequently, it is possible to hypothesise that the Orders are an example of the attempt to 
assert legislative governance over the supply chain by setting the terms for the involvement 
of transport in the market.  However, this placed the provider at a disadvantage, as any 
lapse harboured the threat of costly legal proceedings, whether genuine or malicious, as 
demonstrated by a test-case lodged against the Southern Railway in 1925 regarding the 
cleanliness of the goods yard at Petersfield railway station, Hampshire. 
 
Image 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The basic features of the British Railways 8-ton cattle wagon, such as this example at the 
North Yorkshire Moors Railway had changed little from the standard Railway Clearing 
House design.  Each wagon could be split into compartments with dividers.  Note the 
apertures for draining effluent and the outside structural members on the wagon ends, so-
designed to prevent injury to animals.  Author’s collection. 
   
The complainant alleged that the yard was in breach of the Animals Order, which 
stipulated that the ‘“railway company on whose premises any pen ...is situated shall keep 
the floor ...in such a condition as to enable them to be properly disinfected and cleansed”’, 
a practice actively enforced since the passing of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act 
(1866).664 The defence asserted that as all goods traffic had to pass through the yard, the 
Order only applied to livestock pens; although the jury found in favour of the railway, the 
case highlights the potential for penalties and rectification costs.665 Similarly, the statutory 
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guidelines for disease prevention also had implications for the Irish livestock import trade, 
as a mandatory ten-hour minimum quarantine period was imposed before movement 
licences could be issued, regardless of whether the animals were scheduled for immediate 
slaughter or onward transit.666 This obliged port authorities licensed to receive cattle to 
provide suitable lairage, fodder and independent veterinary supervision.  The attendant 
costs were thus incorporated into ‘through’ rates from port of origin charged to the 
consigner, again highlighting the more stringent governance of the traffic. 
 The issues raised by the farmers regarding the rail distribution of livestock were 
echoed by the domestic meat trade, and again confirms the hypothesis that the railway 
industry’s monopoly over long-distance inland transport ensured that it was the subject of 
scrutiny over quality of service and cost.  Although a 1921 report into meat handling 
published by the Ministry of Health commended the railway companies for their desire 
‘...to afford the utmost facilities for [meat] traffic’, it also highlighted complaints about 
delays, wagon cleanliness, high charges and allegations of pilferage during transit between 
slaughterhouse, processor and retailer.667 For instance, Marsh & Baxter, a Shropshire meat 
processing firm, listed 53 occasions between October and December 1920 when products 
dispatched via the GWR and LNWR were damaged or failed to arrive at their 
destination.668 Although the GWR cited problems during the busy Christmas period, the 
Ministry of Health concluded that ‘...the existence of so many complaints must indicate 
that [the railway industry’s] good intentions ...are not always carried into effect’.669 
 The report commented upon the condition of the meat wagons, which were 
refrigerated, insulated or ventilated depending upon whether meat was frozen, chilled or 
fresh, with the former stacked on wagon floors in muslin sacks, and the latter hung 
manually from hooks.670 The existence of three individual wagon types ostensibly 
associated with a single commodity raises the hypothesis that the railway industry’s 
continuous search for new traffic flows resulted in piecemeal vehicle development to 
account for advances in meat preservation technology since refrigeration was adopted in 
shipping after 1875.671 Equally, few meat wholesaling organisations were large enough to 
exercise executive governance over Britain’s meat supply chain and drive service 
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improvement through unilateral investment in the manner of United Dairies in 1927.672 
Consequently, the trade relied upon the railway companies to provide the necessary rolling 
stock, although the path-dependency of railway infrastructure gave the railways little 
incentive to invest in new technology for existing traffic.673 
 Complaints were also received about the state of repair of railway vehicles, which 
was influenced by a lack of standard construction practice amongst the pre-1923 railway 
companies.  Referring to an investigation by the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research (DSIR) in 1919, the Ministry of Health report indicated that meat was spoiled by 
damaged seals and doors on insulated wagons allowing the ingress of warming air, 
although the plethora of run-down rolling stock inherited by the ‘Big Four’ railway 
companies at the 1923 grouping meant little prospect of improvement in the short term.674 
The 1919 railway strike demonstrated the traffic’s vulnerability to disruption; whilst initial 
meat shortages were curbed by stockpiles at various wholesalers’ cold storage sites, fresh 
meat from Scotland and elsewhere experienced prolonged curtailment and dislocation as 
congestion was eased, which in turn demanded patience and understanding from traders 
dispatching further traffic.675 Consequently, military and civilian lorries were used by 
‘...local committees [which] had been formed to direct the use of these lorries’ to effect 
distribution during the strike and clear subsequent congestion.676 The strike and its 
aftermath thus demonstrated the lorry’s potential, and symbolised the beginning of a shift 
in the monopoly held by the railways over long-distance meat transport, which was 
challenged further as rate increases implemented in 1920 coincided with rising public 
concern about the cost of living in Britain. 
 
4.4 Domestic meat distribution and the cost of living debate: 
accusation, response and the logistical challenge, 1920-1925 
 
The previous section has highlighted the challenges posed by regulation and the quality of 
railway service for the domestic livestock and meat trades.  With both fragmented amongst 
numerous concerns, the lack of executive governance being exercised by one or more 
parties within the supply chain through investment hindered demand-side pressure for the 
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development of cost-effective rail transport at a time of high food costs and falling real 
wages.677 With the 1921 cost of living index 41 per cent above 1913, the Liberal-led 
coalition government commissioned a Departmental Committee on Distribution and Prices 
of Agricultural Produce to investigate the difference in prices received by producers and 
those paid by the consumer.678 The Committee, chaired by Viscount Linlithgow, published 
an Interim Report in 1923, concluding that the natural monopoly enjoyed by the railways 
over long-distance traffic was injurious to British agriculture’s competitive position.679  
 In response, pamphlets published by the RCH implied that such a conclusion was 
disingenuous, as rates were raised by the Ministry of Transport during the period of 
government control following the First World War.680 The railway companies were also at 
pains to highlight that rates were ‘voluntarily reduced by the railways from 75 per cent. to 
50 per cent. above the pre-war rates’ after decontrol, and that perishable traffic, including 
meat, benefited from being conveyed at passenger train speeds, and at cheaper ‘owner’s 
risk’ rates.681 The implication was that the problem lay elsewhere, as aside from the costs 
accrued in rearing, fattening and marketing the live animal, domestically-produced meat 
prices also reflected the cost of slaughter, processing, wholesaling and retailing. 
 This was confirmed by a Royal Commission on Food Prices chaired by Sir 
Auckland Geddes, which analysed food distribution in greater detail.682 The Geddes Report 
of 1925 concluded that whilst railway rates were 50 per cent higher than in 1913, this was 
less than the average increase in food prices, suggesting that they assisted with reducing 
the final retail price of meat.683 In the case of livestock distribution, the GWR went further 
by suggesting that rate reductions provided a de-facto agricultural subsidy, particularly 
                                                 
677
 Jefferys, Retail Trading in Britain, 1850-1950, p. 183; Walworth, Feeding the Nation in Peace and War, 
p. 91. 
678
 P. Self and H. J. Storing, The State and the Farmer (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962), p. 86. 
679
 “The Cost of Living,” Great Western Railway Magazine, XXXIII (1921), p. 167; TNA: RAIL 1124/213, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Departmental Committee on Distribution and Prices of Agricultural Produce: 
Interim Report on Meat, Poultry and Eggs, Cmd. 1971 (1923), pp. 35-36.  Victor Alexander John Hope, 
second Marquess of Linlithgow served in the Territorial Army during the First World War and was appointed 
Civil Lord of the Admiralty between 1922 and 1924.  This was undertaken in tandem with his role on the 
Committee investigating the distribution and prices of agricultural produce, a position which reflected his 
interest in agriculture.  He was appointd Viceroy of India in 1935.  R. J. Moore, “Hope, Victor Alexander 
John, second marquess of Linlithgow (1887–1952),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004; online edn, January 2011, accessed 12 September 2016 http://www.oxforddnb.com 
/view /article/33974.   
680
 See: Railway Clearing House, Railway Rates: How They Affect the Cost of Living (London: Railway 
Clearing House, 1923). 
681
 F. P. Larkin, “The Conveyance of Meat, Poultry and Eggs,” Great Western Railway Magazine, XXXV 
(1923), p. 453. 
682
 Auckland Campbell Geddes was the brother of Eric Geddes, the first Minister of Transport.  Geddes was 
elected a Unionist Member of Parliament for Basingstoke in 1917.  After a spell as President of the Board of 
Trade from 1919, he later beacame Chairman of the Royal Commission on Food Prices and joined the board 
of the Rio Tinto mineral company in 1924.  K. Grieves, “Geddes, Auckland Campbell, first Baron Geddes 
(1879–1954),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, January 
2008, accessed 12 September 2016, http://www. oxforddnb.com/view/article/33359.  
683
 D. Hawkswood, “Railway Rates and Food Prices: A Comparison and a Contrast,” Great Western Railway 
Magazine, XXXVII (1925), p. 224.   
  165 
when considering that as ‘statutory carriers’ with no effective long-distance road 
competition, the railways were obliged to offer ‘reasonable facilities’ and accept the 
logistical challenges associated with the traffic.684 
 As previously suggested, the domestic livestock industry’s relationship with the 
railways was influenced by its fragmentation; it is possible to hypothesise that conflicting 
priorities within the sector had constrained its political influence, and hence its ability to 
hold the railways to account as a collective.685 This is exemplified by the individualistic 
nature of livestock farming; the size of farm and the seasonality of the trade meant the 
quantity of domestic livestock requiring transport to market fluctuated, whilst their 
relatively short length of haul contrasted with imported livestock.  This created tension 
between the farmer and railways on two counts.  Firstly, fragmentation prevented the 
efficient distribution and loading of cattle wagons.  This prompted complaints of wagon 
shortages in a Gloucestershire newspaper, to which the railway company responded that 
‘“...it is not reasonable to expect us to supply trucks for consignments that would not even 
half fill them.”’686 Secondly, inefficient loading meant that rail rates were expensive, 
prompting the accusation that ‘preferential treatment’ was being given to import merchants 
enjoying lower rates at the expense of domestic agriculture.687 However, these favourable 
rates were obtained by the importers for dispatching full wagons of animals requiring long-
distance transit from port to pasture on a regular basis.688  
 As with livestock, the long-distance conveyance of domestically-produced meat 
by rail to more lucrative markets depended upon its dispatch in sufficient quantities and at 
sufficient distances to obtain cheaper rates.689 Profitable long-distance traffic was therefore 
confined to the London trade from regions where supply far outweighed local demand, 
such as Scotland and the west of England; for example, traffic from Aberdeen had been 
conveyed by rail since 1855.690 It is also possible to assume that the domestic trade was 
predominantly localised, as an estimated 20,000 slaughtering establishments operated 
nationwide in 1922.691 However, seasonal variation presented a challenge for Britain’s 
domestic meat trade, as prices varied according to availability; consequently, high prices 
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meant rising demand for cheap and reliable supplies, thereby sustaining and growing the 
market for imported meat between 1920 and 1931, as indicated in Table 9 (p. 158).692 
 
4.5 The benefits of road haulage 
 
It is possible to hypothesise that the disadvantages associated with rail transport, namely 
the excessive cost of short-distance distribution and the risk of disruption during strikes, 
had prompted a fresh examination of road haulage.  Despite initial misgivings by the 
Ministry of Health’s over the hygiene of horse-drawn and sheeted lorry transport, the 
development of fully-enclosed, insulated motor transport by 1922 allowed hauliers and 
wholesalers alike to market their businesses on principles of cleanliness and 
convenience.693 Firms such as Lancashire Cold Storage Ltd. of Canada Dock, Liverpool 
specialised in the direct distribution of frozen meat from port to retailer by road, thus 
minimising the risk of spoilage and mishandling.694 The insulated lorry was also flexible; it 
was possible to schedule multiple stops, with Lancashire Cold Storage noting that ‘as many 
as thirty calls ...[could be] made to discharge the load of meat’, thus making longer-
distance door-to-door conveyance direct to the customer’s premises possible.695  
 The firm regularly conveyed meat 80 miles from Liverpool to Sheffield with 
lorries loaded after 6pm for dispatch at 10am the following day.  The delivery was 
scheduled to arrive at Sheffield at 5:30pm, with the lorry garaged overnight before 
unloading.696 Pilferage was prevented by the padlocking of doors, which contrasted with 
the vulnerability of rail consignments during intermediate handling and transhipment 
operations.   As such, the firm was distributing 11,000 tons of meat per annum by February 
1923.697 Aside from offering secure, reliable transport, the lorry also offered economy of 
scope for the meat trade; whilst larger importer-wholesalers amassed vehicle fleets, smaller 
firms employed specialist haulage contractors to overcome the barriers of maintenance and 
infrastructure costs.  However, the lack of suitable return loads for insulated vehicles 
meant unremunerative return journeys, a handicap in common with the railways.698  
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Image 10 
A 1912 colour plan of the GWR goods depot beneath Smithfield Market, central London with proposed alterations.  Note the curved road ramp and the 
circles denoting turntables for shunting wagons in the confined space.  Two lifts allowed meat to be directly conveyed to the market floor above.   
Source: TNA: RAIL 1030/213, 1912 Great Western way, ‘Smithfield Station: C.G.M.O.’ 
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The insulated lorry’s utility and overall flexibility in crowded streets was an advantage 
exploited by firms engaged in transporting traffic to Smithfield market by horse, the latter 
location supplying London’s expanding population with 40 per cent of Britain’s meat 
imports.699 Although quantities of rail-borne meat arrived from goods depots at Nine Elms, 
Broad Street and Somerstown, fresh and frozen meat arriving from Aberdeen, Birkenhead 
and Southampton was more than matched by the supplies arriving by road direct from the 
Port of London.700 Meat of British or Irish origin represented 16 per cent of that sold at 
Smithfield in 1922 whilst the 1938 estimate remained 15-20 per cent.701 With imports 
accounting for over 84 per cent of London’s supply, it is possible to hypothesise that a 
substantial proportion came from the local docks due to convenience of location, and that 
the role of the railways in the trade was generally peripheral.702 
 This is further substantiated by an article published in The Meat Trades Journal 
and Stockbreeder’s Gazette in 1920 which suggests that despite possessing a depot directly 
beneath the market, as illustrated above in Image 10, only 2.5 per cent of the total tonnage 
arriving at Smithfield was conveyed by the GWR in 1913.703 However, the import trade 
was also vulnerable to fluctuations in demand, which determined whether imported meat 
was forwarded straight to wholesale or cold storage; an article in Modern Transport 
indicated that cold storage establishments at Smithfield and Royal Albert Dock had the 
capacity to balance the meat supply locally.704 This had implications for the regularity of 
meat arriving by rail from ports outside London, and highlighted the necessity for road 
vehicles to convey meat over the eight miles between Royal Albert Dock and Smithfield, 
sometimes at short notice to meet the changing tides. 
The proximity of meat import merchants to demand centres at London, Liverpool, 
Glasgow and other sea-connected cities implies that rail distribution assisted with 
balancing periodic supply shortfalls at these locations.705 In contrast, livestock imports still 
required rail distribution to grassland areas for fattening.  However, The Commercial 
Motor reported in 1924 that the domestic trade was already benefiting from specialist 
lorries constructed for livestock contractors and farmers’ cooperatives, which permitted 
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direct transit between farm and market.706 Other benefits included more efficient use of 
capacity.  Whilst the average capacity of the eight-ton cattle wagon was seven head of 
cattle, the two-ton capacity of the average contractor’s lorry permitted the conveyance of 
four head of cattle per journey based upon a live-weight of 1000lbs per animal.707 
Therefore, the combination of flexibility, convenience and loading efficiency made the 
lorry suitable for Britain’s fragmented and geographically diverse livestock trade, and 
provided a means for the domestic trade to compete against the importer without a 
representative organisation asserting executive governance over the supply chain 
 
4.6 The 1926 General Strike 
 
In contrast with import merchants, which were capable of stockpiling chilled and frozen 
meat at port warehouses, wholesalers specialising in the long-distance distribution of 
domestically-produced fresh meat faced the prospect of severe disruption when railway 
services were suspended during the General Strike of 1926.  The Times described how a 
voluntary transport organisation consisting of 3-ton lorries was consequently established 
by the authorities at Smithfield Market, and The Meat Trades Journal noted that fresh meat 
bound for London from the west of England was conveyed by road with a police escort.708 
A similar operation was undertaken by Hay’s Wharf Cartage, which dispatched lorries to 
meet ships docked at Harwich and Folkestone, whilst an Emergency Committee of 
Smithfield consignees used market employees to operate the LMS and LNER goods 
terminals at Broad Street and Farringdon Street.  The operation entailed the unloading and 
distribution of 2,000 tons of Scottish beef and mutton in six hours.709 
 The author has been unable to gauge the speed at which road haulage was adopted 
by the livestock trade after the General Strike, as the NFU’s Committee minutes are 
surprisingly silent about its effects.710 However, its impact can be ascertained through an 
analysis of the head of livestock carried on Britain’s railways over the period.  Graph 16 
below reveals that the strike had caused a brief decline in livestock conveyed by rail in 
1926, presaging a prolonged reduction after 1927.  Whilst this may be attributed to the 
wider economic depression experienced from 1929 and its impact upon consumer demand, 
                                                 
706
 “Transporting Livestock in Numbers,” The Commercial Motor, XL (October 28, 1924), p. 329. 
707
 A Chadwick et al., The Meat Trade Vol. I, (London: Gresham Publishing Co., 1935), p. 128. 
708
 “The General Strike: How Smithfield Overcame the Difficulty,” The Meat Trades Journal and Cattle 
Salesman’s Gazette, LXII (May 20, 1926), p. 930. 
709
 “The General Strike,” p. 930. 
710
 MERL: SR NFU AD1/23, NFU Cyclo B. 74/25, Minutes of General Purposes Committee, 20.2.1926. 
  
 
171 
it is also possible to speculate that a proportion of this decline was caused by a transfer to 
road transport.  The strike’s effect upon meat distribution is also difficult to gauge, 
although it is possible to hypothesise that it reinforced lessons learned in 1919 regarding 
the reliability of the railways and the capabilities of road haulage, as wholesalers appeared 
more willing to employ insulated lorries on the longer-distance London import traffic.  
Whilst precise figures are unavailable, a sense of this shift is gained from the annual 
revenue received by the ‘Big Four’ railways from meat distribution, which decreased by 
£48,000 between 1925 and 1926 to £178,000, and a further £30,000 by 1927.711   
 
Graph 16    
Inter-war cattle traffic by rail, 1920-1938
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 16 (p. 307) 
 
The decline might therefore be consistent with domestic traffic undergoing a modal shift 
from rail, a situation exemplified by the Southern Railway’s service conveying imported 
meat from Southampton docks to Nine Elms goods.  The reason for this was that the road 
operation offered a door-to-door service without transhipment for the ‘final mile’ to 
Smithfield, a process that rendered meat vulnerable to spoilage and pilferage.712 However, 
the competition prompted a shift from the railway industry’s previous inertia; in 1928, the 
Southern developed an insulated demountable railway container, which could be sealed by 
the consigner and was less susceptible to damage caused by shock during shunting, a 
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problem which contributed to the failure of door seals on fixed-body wagons.713 The 
scheme was detailed within the Southern Railway Magazine, which reported that the 
containers allowed higher prices to be realised for meat conveyed by rail, and reportedly 
allowed the company to claw back the traffic by 1929.714 Whilst the benefits of the 
container are considered in detail by Keith Harcourt, specialist meat hauliers still attracted 
traffic at premium charges, implying that Britain’s railway companies continued to face 
service-based competition from road transport for existing meat traffic.715 
 Another change with the potential to improve the railway industry’s position in 
livestock traffic came from the Conservative-led government.  The government sanctioned 
local authority rebates in a scheme designed to support Britain’s struggling staple 
industries and direct traffic to the railways.  The scheme entitled the ‘Big Four’ companies 
to 25 per cent relief from local authority rates, of which part was being used to fund road 
construction and maintenance.716 The concession was granted on the proviso that money 
was pooled into a fund from which certain traffics received a rebate on the standard rates 
charged by the railways; the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries reported that rates for 
nominated domestic traffics, including livestock, could be reduced by ten per cent.717 
 The fact that Graph 16 has already demonstrated a decline in livestock traffic 
between 1928 and 1929 suggests that the scheme’s effect was limited; indeed, the traffic 
was vulnerable to market fluctuation, with the numbers carried declining between 1928 
and 1934.  Another reason for the decline may have been the logistical difficulty caused by 
the seasonality of the traffic, as highlighted in a London and North Eastern Railway 
(LNER) Magazine article published in 1929.  Despite possessing 7,183 cattle wagons, 
cleaning meant that a round trip on the LNER could take six days, with the full 
complement of wagons rarely available to meet spikes in demand between August and 
October.718 The article summarised that ‘...the heavy live-stock season tests the efficiency 
of our district stock control offices’, and it is possible to surmise that the difficulty in 
meeting orders for wagons might have been another factor in the modal shift to road.719  
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Whilst wagon shortages provided grounds for complaint from consigners, it is 
possible to hypothesise that the railway industry’s livestock policy was ultimately shaped 
by the economic challenges facing British agriculture after 1930.  This is confirmed by an 
article produced by the LNER, which noted that cheaper imported beef offered ‘...serious 
competition in the higher grade home markets to prime English beef’, which provides 
some indication of where the ‘Big Four’s traffic priorities lay and adds some credence to 
the farming community’s suggestion that the railways were complicit in the domestic meat 
market’s difficulties.720 However, another key spur for growth in the meat import trade by 
1930 was the government’s long-standing commitment to ‘free trade’, which became a 
major political issue throughout the economic depression.721  
 
4.7 Macro-economic policy and domestic livestock distribution 
 
The challenging conditions facing Britain’s livestock farmers during the early 1930s were 
exacerbated by the government’s adherence to ‘free trade’, which suggests that legislative 
governance within the supply chain in relation to trade tariffs to protect the domestic trade 
was not necessarily benign.  This is borne-out by the rising tonnage of imported meat since 
1901, and its relative parity with domestic production by 1931, as already demonstrated in 
Table 9 (p. 158).  Whilst this indicates that the domestic industry was unable to produce 
enough meat to render Britain self-sufficient, the government’s inclusion of the commodity 
in the Import Duties Act (1932) only partially eased the situation.722 Although the Act 
imposed a ten per cent tariff upon most imported consumer goods, including beef and 
bacon, in the interests of protecting British industry from ‘dumping’, subsequent trade 
negotiations served to undermine its effectiveness.723  
 The fragmentation of Britain’s agricultural industry and the lack of large domestic 
trading organisations capable of driving the governance of the domestic meat supply chain 
was thrown into relief at the Imperial trade conference at Ottawa between July and August 
1932.  Despite the NFU pressing for negotiated import quotas, the resultant trade 
agreement granted preferential tariffs for specific foodstuffs from Imperial sources.724 This 
provided scant protection for the domestic trade, as any supply deficit could be met by 
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meat from Australia and New Zealand; indeed, between 1932 and 1933 beef supplies from 
Empire sources increased by 35 per cent from 78,650 to 106,250 tons as supplies from 
elsewhere contracted by eight per cent from 489,750 to 449,800 tons.725 In consequence, 
the NFU complained that the concerns of British agriculture were ignored as the Ottawa 
Agreement gave ‘...Dominion producers an advantage in the British market over their 
foreign competitors’ and denied the home farmer ‘first place in his own market’.726  
 The railway industry also expressed concern about the performance of British 
agriculture, allowing one to assume that an impact upon traffic levels was being felt.  An 
LNER Magazine article published in 1930 noted that whilst a depression in arable farming 
had precipitated a shrinkage in acreage under crop in favour of permanent grassland, this 
did not coincide with a proportionate increase in cattle numbers, reporting that a reduction 
in domestic cattle prices between 1927 and 1930 in line with global prices was affecting 
the sector because of its persistently high production costs.727 This had ramifications for 
Britain’s railways, as the NFU’s efforts to improve the livestock farmer’s position turned 
to the subject of rate reductions in May 1932, although the continuing downward slide in 
the traffic highlighted in Graph 16 (p. 171) implies that this did little to arrest the decline 
in loadings.728 
 
4.8 Railway and user investment in imported livestock and 
Palethorpe’s sausage traffic 
 
With Britain’s fragmented livestock industry unable to employ effective supply chain 
governance and drive railway service enhancements for domestic traffic, it is possible to 
discern a shift in the railway industry’s focus towards import traffic, despite the challenges 
posed by varying shipping times, trading conditions and consumer preferences.  This is 
evidenced by investment in port facilities, an example of which was the GWR’s 
improvement of its facilities at Cardiff Bute Docks in 1932 to cater for Canadian cattle.729 
This included the construction of lairage, an auction mart, provision for weighing, chill 
room and abattoirs for cattle to be immediately slaughtered at the port, along with facilities 
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for livestock and carcases to be loaded directly into wagons for dispatch to the West 
Midlands, London and the South West. 
 Another example was an LMS-funded project to expand Dublin North Wall Dock 
cattle yard, completed in March 1935 and demonstrating how Britain’s railway companies 
provided a coordinated sea and rail operation for its customers.730 However, despite its 
ability to house 1,170 cattle before transit across the Irish Sea, the financial viability of the 
project might be questioned in the light of a trade suffering the effects of the Irish Free 
State (Special Duties) Act (1932), which was the product of an economic dispute between 
Britain and southern Ireland.731 Punitive duties of up to 40 per cent were imposed upon 
imports, which contracted from 835,000 head of cattle in 1930 to 641,000 in 1937, the 
effect being demonstrated above by the 1934 Irish export figures in Graph 17.732 
 
Graph 17 
Total Irish cattle exports, 1930-1938
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 17 (p. 308). 
 
This investment contrasted with the railway industry’s treatment of domestic meat 
processors.  Although the potential for a regular flow of inputs for processing and the 
subsequent distribution of the finished products nationwide initially prompted the railways 
to attract traffic with the offer of permanently-allocated rolling stock, the ‘locking-in’ of 
the firm to railway distribution provided little incentive for further investment in 
developing the original service.  Consequently, any development depended upon the firm’s 
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ability to negotiate and commit its own financial resources to obtain bespoke services, a 
comparable situation to that experienced by the milk trade.  It is possible to hypothesise 
that such relationships were confined to large businesses in full control of a well-developed 
trade; their market position bestowing the necessary executive governance over their 
individual supply chains to leverage favourable terms for their logistical requirements.733     
 This is confirmed by a long-standing example of a ‘locked-in’ food processing 
firm, Palethorpes’ Sausages, which possessed a rail-connected factory at Dudley Port in the 
West Midlands with ready access to both the GWR and LMS networks.  The history of its 
‘perishable and urgent’ traffic is detailed in popular literature, which records that 
Palethorpe’s had made the decision to capitalise upon the logistical opportunities provided 
by the railways in 1852; consequently, the firm was able to receive live pigs from Ireland 
and expand the reach of its finished products to establish markets in London and the North 
East.734 Despite establishing a nationwide demand for its sausages, Palethorpe’s had to 
unilaterally seek any changes to its logistical operation that matched the strenuous efforts 
expended upon marketing its meat products in 1933.735 
 A lack of evidence makes it necessary to assume that Palethorpe’s negotiations 
with the GWR and LMS was underpinned by the threat of a modal shift to road haulage, 
thus prompting the railway companies to undertake steps to ensure the traffic remained 
rail-borne.  Further negotiations in 1934 resulted in the creation of a flat-rate ‘agreed 
charge’ for Palethorpe’s consignments under a clause contained within the Road and Rail 
Traffic Act (1933) and described in chapter 2.736 The measure was administered by the 
Railway Rates Tribunal, which was granted the power to sanction or reject applications 
under the 1933 Act.737 Alongside exceptional rates, agreed charges thus provided a 
platform for competing with road transport by tying firms to rail distribution; in the case of 
Palethorpes, the scheme paved the way for further change when the firm authorised the 
LMS to design, construct and maintain eight innovative ice-cooled insulated vans to the 
firm’s specification in 1936.  This was required investment on the part of Palethorpe’s, 
which was obliged to forward traffic by this means and pay an additional premium of £100 
per wagon per annum to the railway company for a minimum of five years.738 
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4.9 Road regulation and railway collaboration 
 
The Palethorpe’s case demonstrates the challenges facing traders wishing to move beyond 
a basic railway service.  However, Table 10 (p. 181) has already demonstrated that 
livestock traffic continued to decline throughout the 1930s, thus removing the incentive for 
improving services.  Aside from the ebb and flow of international trade, the railway 
industry’s lukewarm attitude towards embarking upon measures to retain livestock 
transport might also have been informed by the lorry’s ability to meet the farmer’s needs.  
However, the free-rein enjoyed by road hauliers throughout the 1920s gave way to 
increasing regulation after the government-commissioned Salter Report into road and rail 
transport was published in 1932.739 The report proposed increased taxation for all road 
vehicles, which attracted an objection from the NFU as it threatened to negate any 
financial savings farmers had accrued from mechanization.740 
 The NFU’s response to the Salter Report’s conclusions in 1933 was unequivocal, 
and a letter to the Minister of Transport argued that British agriculture was ‘vitally 
dependent upon having ...the best and cheapest possible means of conveyance’.741 The 
letter drew attention to the fact that by setting the terms for participation in road 
distribution, the Report’s proposals risked making the agricultural sector a heavy tax 
contributor due to vehicle weight and load, which by extension affected price competition 
with imported produce.  Whilst the NFU acknowledged the essential service provided by 
the railways, the existence of private hauliers would force them ‘...to provide the best 
facilities [at] the lowest charges they can afford to offer’.742 These representations 
successful, as the Road and Rail Transport Act (1933) safeguarded the agricultural interest 
by retaining licensing discounts for agricultural road vehicles.743 
 Whilst road haulage consistently demonstrated its ability to overcome the 
challenges posed by Britain’s fragmentary agricultural sector, the threat from road 
encouraged the railway industry to focus upon improving facilities for the meat trade.  The 
‘Big Four’ railway companies collaborated to develop efficient ‘Common User’ insulated 
wagons, handling equipment and expertise via the establishment of a joint Low 
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Temperature Transport Committee (LTTC) in February 1936.744 The Committee was a 
clear example of the companies observing wider market developments; they recognised 
that ‘the modern treatment of perishable commodities ...indicated the growing necessity of 
the Railway Companies being in a position to afford a low temperature transport service 
when required’, with ‘the transit time ...in many cases the only interval remaining between 
producer and consumer when goods are not refrigerated’.745 The LMS had investigated the 
traffic since 1934, and became convinced that such facilities were essential for ‘retaining 
[the] traffic to rail’.746 The provision of a unified service was therefore essential in the 
promotion of bulk and long-distance meat transport.   
 
Image 11 
 
An LMS demountable insulated container being manually unloaded at Smithfield Market in 
1938.  The expansion of demountable insulated container use was one of the initiatives 
discussed by the inter-railway Low Temperature Transport Committee.  Note the 
wholesaler’s lorry in the background.  Source: National Railway Museum 1997-
7409_LMS_8495. 
 
The railways observed that specialist road hauliers were charging railway rates for the 
traffic, suggesting that users were willing to pay more for services that maintained product 
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quality; Palethorpe’s payed £30 per week for ice refrigerant between May and September 
1935.747 However, the railways remained hamstrung by the inconvenience of transhipment 
for the ‘final mile’ to the destination, whilst the potential solution offered by the 
demountable refrigerated container was hampered by the fact that it accounted for only ten 
per cent of total refrigerated rolling stock in 1936.748 Furthermore, one can speculate that a 
long-term relationship with firms such as Palethorpe’s had placed the railways at a 
disadvantage, as operations were path-dependant with technology generally ‘locked-in’ to 
unloading in private sidings or public goods yards. 
 The ‘Big Four’ railways were therefore at a disadvantage when firms without a 
direct rail connection demanded a door-to-door service, with the work of the LTTC in 
1936 appearing a belated response to the railway industry’s need to adapt and compete.  
Although insulated containers such as that illustrated in Image 11 above were available, a 
lack of figures relating to the specific container types in circulation before 1939 underlines 
the continued dependence upon the fixed-body wagon, and that little progress had been 
made in the years after the 1919 DSIR report into the meat operation called for greater 
cooperation between Britain’s railway companies.749 Furthermore, the varying size and 
scale of meat importers meant that collaborative ventures with the railway companies were 
difficult to develop in comparison with processors.  However, the German invasion of the 
Rhineland in March 1936 prompted concern for the nation’s reliance upon imported food 
in the event of conflict and intense political interest was directed towards the resilience of 
the meat supply chain, which prompted the drafting of legislation to stimulate domestic 
production through subsidies and improvements in efficiency. 
 
4.10 Rail in decline: the Livestock Industry Act (1937) 
 
The Livestock Industry Act (1937) legislated for the creation of a Livestock Advisory 
Committee with powers to fix cattle prices, regulate imports and subsidise domestic 
production costs, thus providing a degree of much-needed stability for the cattle farmer.750 
However, the Act went beyond the promotion of domestic agriculture, and included 
legislation for the holistic reorganisation, regulation and coordination of the meat 
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distribution network.  This was to be achieved by establishing legislative governance over 
Britain’s numerous and hitherto unregulated abattoirs, which were to fall under a uniform 
inspection regime, incorporate standardised meat-handling procedures and become 
concentrated into fewer, central locations.751 The Act thus formalised a 1934 analysis of 
the American ‘factory abattoir’ by Lord de la Warr, which had experienced a profound 
change in the method of slaughter and the subsequent handling of meat following public 
outcry over insanitary conditions in 1906.752  
With Britain’s abattoirs similarly afflicted, and domestic meat being sold to a 
public increasingly ‘divorced from the production of food’, it was deemed necessary to 
follow the American example and reconfigure the supply chain to obtain the ‘advantages 
of single control ...[and] uniform condition ...of the finished products’.753 This approach to 
distribution was intended to set the terms of market participation, and promote greater self-
sufficiency by generating consumer demand for a quality domestic product.754 The Act 
also attempted to place hygiene at the heart of the meat trade, thus meeting the consumer’s 
demand for product consistency and efficient marketing, and meeting the producer’s desire 
to maximise income. 
 In the latter regard, road haulage, with its cost-plus pricing and flexibility to 
quickly adapt to changing situations, demonstrated a core advantage over the railway 
industry, whilst its flexibility as a unit of transport, whether used as part of a fleet or as a 
single unit, could be used to advantage despite the agricultural sector’s lack of an 
organisation that exercised executive governance over the wider supply chain.  The Act’s 
goal of rebalancing the market in favour of domestic agriculture also cast uncertainty upon 
the future requirements for imported livestock and meat, which was better-suited to rail 
distribution than the localised and seasonal home trade.755 However, whilst immediate 
traffic loss was averted by the piecemeal implementation of the 1937 Act, it is possible to 
hypothesise that a general five per cent railway rate increase appears to have been decisive 
in determining modal shift in livestock transport. 
 This is confirmed by Graph 4.4 (p. 171), which has indicated that the head of 
livestock carried by rail in 1938 had reduced by an estimated 810,726 since 1937.  Whilst 
this reduction might be considered a response to the rate increase, the graph also shows a 
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longer-term decline of 39 per cent in the head of livestock conveyed between 1931 and 
1938.  Despite operating under a statutory obligation to provide ‘reasonable facilities’ for 
goods traffic, Table 10 shows that the decline in livestock consignments prompted the ‘Big 
Four’ to adjust their facilities by taking 17 per cent of cattle wagons out of use .756 The 
conclusion that this was a traffic in decline is further supported by the fact that there was 
no contemporary enlargement of the wagon design, and the GWR made the decision to 
withdraw 300 cattle wagons standing idle in sidings for conversion into fruit vans.757 When 
coupled with the traffic’s logistical complexity, it is possible to conclude that the railways 
may have been willing to concede domestic livestock traffic to road haulage. 
 
Table 10 
Railway livestock traffic in decline: cattle wagon census, 1931-1938 
 
Year Number of 
cattle wagons 
1931 19,484 
1932 18,692 
1933 18,525 
1934 17,974 
1935 17,354 
1936 16,550 
1937 16,757 
1938 
  16,154* 
 
Source: Ministry of Transport, Railway Returns (London: HMSO, 1932-1938) 
(* = Estimated Figure) 
 
The 1937 Act therefore had mixed implications for transport; the concentration of abattoirs 
might have achieved economies of scale through the bulking of livestock and meat before 
and after slaughter to ensure the dispatch of full loads.  However, the Act also had 
ramifications for road and rail by attempting to govern the terms of market participation; 
hygiene in transport needed to be consistent with anticipated changes at the abattoir.758 The 
issue was complicated by the lack of cooperation between road and rail due to competition, 
as well as the ‘lock-in’ effect of previous railway investments, in which changes within the 
meat trade were not matched by design innovation.  This was demonstrated by the 
endurance of equipment such as the ventilated container illustrated in Image 12 below 
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when insulated versions were more flexible in reducing contamination during transit.759 In 
the event, the outbreak of the Second World War interrupted progress towards reorganising 
the trade and improving meat hygiene and quality standards.760 
 
Image 12 
 
 
Beef loaded in an LMS "M-type" ventilated container, 1936.  The carcases are protected by 
cloth sacking; also note the arrangement of carcases on the floor, a practice which allowed 
full utilisation of wagon capacity, yet shows little consideration for hygiene beyond straw 
bedding.  Source: National Railway Museum 1997-7409_LMS_7990. 
 
4.11 War preparations and government control, 1938-1940 
 
By improving the resilience of the domestic meat trade, the 1937 Act may be construed as 
an attempt to shore-up Britain’s domestic livestock sector and encourage greater self-
sufficiency in supplies.  However, the German annexation of Austria in March 1938 
diverted the government’s attention away from domestic affairs towards meeting the rising 
threat of Nazism.761 The implications of this was two-fold; firstly, the diplomatic situation 
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prompted a postponement of the Act’s full implementation, particularly the reconfiguration 
of the slaughter industry.  Secondly, emphasis had shifted towards defence planning, with 
government departments, including the Food (Defence Plans) Committee, adopting the 
railway network as the principal means of long-distance distribution in anticipation of fuel 
shortages affecting the availability of road haulage.762 By 1938 the Committee was heavily 
engaged in effecting coordination between different government departments, and 
therefore delegated the detailed planning of short-distance distance meat distribution in 
wartime to the industry itself.763  
 The principal meat wholesaling firms were invited to devise emergency road 
haulage schemes for the bulk transfer of meat from ships to cold stores, emergency depots 
and, in the case of the London area, retailers.764 Provision was made for all ‘...movements 
which might prove necessary under war conditions’, which demanded the flexibility ‘...to 
cope with any alterations at short notice in ports of arrival’.765 The scheme’s secondary 
objective was ‘to conserve petrol supplies and reduce transport costs to an irreducible 
minimum by economy in operation’.766 The meat wholesalers consequently developed a 
plan which entailed the voluntary pooling and central control of 1,241 lorries owned by the 
200 firms involved.  The plan was to create a Wholesale Meat & Provisions Transport 
(Defence) Association (WMPTA), which provided centralised control of operations, 
finance and remuneration, and liaison with other supply chain partners.767 Although the 
operational elements of the scheme were in place by March 1939, official government 
recognition of the Association was not confirmed until 11 August, whilst the process of 
payment to members was not in place when the scheme was implemented upon the 
outbreak of war on 3 September.  However, the regulation of meat and livestock transport 
was to become more stringent as the government exercised greater control over the supply 
chain for the duration of the conflict. 
 The Ministry of Food’s attention was initially focused upon asserting centralised 
control over the domestic trade and balancing meat supplies, with legislation passed to 
ensure that the market no longer determined demand.  Executive governance over the 
supply chain was established by the Ministry, which became sole purchaser of livestock 
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and devised a distribution system that could keep track of what was available for slaughter 
at any one time.768 The system entailed the appointment of  existing livestock markets as 
government collecting centres, with farmers requested to select their preferred market for 
the duration of the war and to notify auctioneers of their intention to deliver fatstock 
twelve days in advance of sale.769 Furthermore, generous maximum prices were introduced 
to reduce price speculation, incentivise production and cover primary distribution costs, 
and were adjusted by the Ministry of Food to account for inflated production costs. 
 Following sale, livestock traffic was directed by Area Meat and Livestock 
Forwarding Officers (AMLFO) employed to determine whether rail or road offered the 
best means of transport to demand locations.  To assist, the direct sale of animals to 
butchers was prohibited, whilst the slaughtering industry in England and Wales endured a 
forced contraction from 16,000 to 400 establishments as the terms of trade participation in 
wartime came under government control.770 This simplified meat allocation to abattoirs 
and processors and reduced pilferage, and the task of distributing the processed meat was 
administered by regional Wholesale Meat Supply Associations (WMSA), which issued 
permits to Retail Buying Committees.  The latter were tied to the local WMSA, and meat 
supplies were allocated to butchers in proportion to registered customer ration cards.771 
 
4.12 Meat transport: adaptation and rationalisation, 1940-1943 
 
Whilst the wartime road operation was being organised on a voluntary basis, another plan 
devised by the meat trade for supplying London had serious ramifications for the railways, 
as it was based upon the general assumption that Britain’s railways would provide the 
backbone of wartime distribution due to its use of indigenous fuel.  The scheme entailed 
the decentralisation of Smithfield market to depots at Ealing, Croydon, Romford and 
elsewhere to reduce disruption caused by aerial bombardment.772 However, it revealed the 
railway industry’s inflexibility when placed under strain, as it had hitherto worked with 
well-defined flows to long-term railheads such as Somerstown and Broad Street.773 
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Handling facilities and railway cartage services in the vicinity of the new depots were 
consequently overwhelmed by the autumn glut of Scottish meat.774 
 The logistical challenge was compounded by meat shortage in the winter of 1940-
1941.  The result was increased reliance upon imported meat, which depended upon the 
railway industry’s ability to successfully adapt to the peaks and troughs in supplies caused 
by the arrival of ships in port at irregular intervals.775 Furthermore, shipping had been 
transferred to ports deemed less vulnerable to bombing on the west coast in September 
1940, which caused severe dislocation and delay in shipping turnaround due to ‘serious 
periodical shortages of insulated rail vehicles and containers’.776 With petrol rationing in 
place, the transfer of meat consignments normally arriving at the Port of London to 
Liverpool and elsewhere posed a serious challenge for Britain’s railways. 
 Details of the challenge are confirmed within a Ministry of Food report, which 
highlighted that London required 5,000 tons of meat weekly to meet the ration when the 
railways handled only 1,000 tons under normal conditions; this meant that capacity for an 
extra 4,000 tons of meat needed to be found.777 The Railway Executive Committee (REC) 
was granted permission to supplement its combined fleet of 2,774 insulated wagons with 
5,897 insulated containers and banana vans with steam heat equipment removed.778 
Another challenge was the railways’ limited ability to assist with distributing meat from 
the railhead, which had been undertaken by sheeted lorries under normal conditions.  The 
time spent allocating meat to customers prolonged vehicle standing times, with assistance 
provided by the Wholesale Meat Transport Association (WMTA) to provide suitable 
insulated vehicles.779   
The challenges facing meat distribution therefore presented an opportunity for 
rationalising rail and road haulage to create the wartime distribution network detailed in 
section 4.2.  This is exemplified by the pooling of all insulated vehicles under ‘Common 
User’ principles to facilitate comprehensive national coverage, thus permitting the 
establishment of executive governance over all meat transport operations.  Control of the 
pool at the ports was undertaken by the Meat Importer’s National Defence Association 
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Limited (MINDAL), an agency combining representatives from the Ministry of Food with 
the WMTA and the railways to allocate meat for transport by rail or road, once again 
demonstrating that market forces no longer determined demand.780 However, the voluntary 
organisation of transport ceased in April 1941 when the government pressed for further 
controls over long-distance road haulage.  The WMTA was consequently absorbed by the 
Ministry of War Transport, the latter becoming the Ministry of Food’s sole transport 
agent.781  
 The Ministry of War Transport also introduced the ‘zoning’ of meat distribution 
to reduce cross-haulage, a process which caused further upheaval for meat conveyed from 
wholesaler to retailer and from retailer to consumer.  The policy entrenched the localisation 
of supply, and Major Gwilym Lloyd George, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of 
Food, emphasised that ‘...livestock must now be consumed as near as possible to the 
collecting centre and imported meat as near as possible to the port of entry’ to reduce 
cross-haulage.782 The Meat Trades Journal recorded that the Ministry of Food also gave 
serious thought to forcing wholesalers with fewer than 25 retailer registrations to transfer 
their customers to another firm to concentrate resources and centralise demand; the 
problem was ultimately resolved through the dispatch of goods on nominated days 783 
 The regulation of distribution to consumers was achieved through the pooling of 
retail vehicles, a complex task due to the irregularity of supplies and the need to distribute 
meat immediately.784 The Ministry of Food encouraged shoppers to assist by collecting 
their own shopping in order to limit the resources absorbed by home deliveries, with cross-
haulage restricted through the voluntary demarcation of areas served by particular retailers 
to account for local requirements.785 However, The Meat Trades Journal indicated that 
progress was sometimes frustrated by the lack of cooperation from individual retailers; the 
Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) caused the collapse of a scheme to exclude vehicle 
deliveries within a two-mile radius of the centre of an unspecified Cheshire town in 
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November 1942 by ignoring it, thus indicating the limit to which the diverse stakeholders 
within the meat supply chain could be governed, even in wartime.786 
 
4.13 Crises in rail and road distribution, 1944-1947 
 
Despite difficulties at the retail end of the supply chain, government intervention meant 
that an approximation of the transport coordination recommended by the Salter Report of 
1932 had been achieved by 1944.787 However, it is also possible to hypothesise that the 
success of road haulage provided a catalyst for a post-war modal shift.  This is confirmed 
by the challenges facing livestock distribution, as the prioritisation of military traffic 
during Allied offensives meant that tonnages of meat arriving at port declined.788 
Consequently, domestic livestock was released for slaughter at an earlier age and after less 
fattening to maintain supplies and ease seasonal variation.789 Although the railways 
maintained an important role in conveying animals from Scotland for fattening in northern 
England throughout the conflict, the quicker turnaround in cattle breeding and slaughter 
made REC assurances that the railways could convey the traffic untenable.790 A meeting at 
the Ministry of War Transport on 16 March 1944 revealed that the railways lacked spare 
capacity because of the preparations for the Allied invasion of Northern Europe.791  
Crew and locomotive shortages reduced the circulation of cattle wagons, and 
forced the REC to request a diversion of traffic to road to ease the pressure upon railway 
resources; the result was the transfer of 80 per cent of livestock traffic to road transport by 
August 1944.792 The ability of road haulage to shore-up livestock distribution might 
therefore explain reports that a request made by the Ministry of War Transport to return the 
traffic to the railways was not enthusiastically received by participants.793 Consequently, 
road hauliers associated with livestock and meat transport emerged from the Second World 
War in an advantageous position when compared with the railways.  Despite operating 
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under exceptional circumstances in relation to disruption caused by bombing, the railways 
had struggled to meet the expectations set by the pre-war planners from the outset. 
However, the immediate post-war period presented challenges for road haulage, 
the first being a debate about the decontrol of meat transport after the election of the 
Labour government in July 1945.  Although control through the Ministry of War Transport 
continued until 31 December 1946 to facilitate an orderly transition to peacetime 
operation, the government’s plans for nationalising transport were not finalised.794 The 
continuation of meat rationing provided a reason for maintaining control until at least mid-
1948, although the formation of a coherent policy was complicated by agitation from 
members of the pool of haulage operators that had been working under the auspices of the 
Ministry of War Transport since the dissolution of the WMTA in 1941.795 
 Although the Ministry of Transport wished to divest its controlling interest in 
livestock and meat transport, suggesting that the Ministry of Food should administer its 
own transport requirements, the latter insisted that the former should remain a party to any 
new contract because of its prior experience.796 The impasse continued until November 
1946, when it was decided that the Ministry of Transport would remain the Ministry of 
Food’s agent for negotiating contracts with the Meat Transport Organisation, Ltd. 
(MTOL), a new company established to ‘[coordinate] the activities of all Meat Transport 
Operators in London and the Home Counties, and certain other Operators whose main 
business is bulk movement with insulated transport throughout the country’.797 To 
minimise and resistance from hauliers, MTOL was exempted from absorption into the 
Road Transport Executive (RTE) under the Transport Act (1947) on grounds that that the 
RTE ‘ought not to hamper itself with [controlling] the Meat Pool’ whilst firms engaged in 
general long-distance goods haulage were being nationalised.798 
 Whilst disruption was averted, MTOL’s operation was interrupted when 250 van 
drivers at Smithfield Market went on unofficial strike in January 1947.  The Commercial 
Motor indicated that the Smithfield branch of the Transport and General Workers’ Union 
was ‘dissatisfied with a proposed award increasing their annual holidays from six days to 
nine days’ when they had requested 14 days.799 Furthermore, the drivers disputed a 
                                                 
794
 TNA: MT 35/73, 1 August 1946 Note of Meeting Held in Room 7045, Berkeley Square House, p. 1. 
795
 TNA: MT 35/73, 1 August 1946 Note of Meeting, pp. 2-3. 
796
 TNA: MT 35/73, 8 August 1946 Transport of Meat and Livestock, pp. 1-2. 
797
 TNA: MT 35/73, 28 May 1948 Meat Transport Organisation, Limited, p. 1. 
798
 Transport Act, 1947, 10&11 Geo. 6, c. 49, s. 52(1a); “More on the Meat Transport Pool,” The 
Commercial Motor Magazine, LXXXIV (January 10, 1947), 558; TNA: MT 35/73, 2 July 1948 Untitled 
Memorandum, p. 2. 
799
 “News of the Week: Big Haulage Strike,” The Commercial Motor Magazine, LXXXIV (January 10, 
1947), p. 557.  
  
 
189 
recommendation made by the Road Haulage Central Wages Board, an organisation 
established in 1940 under the Road Haulage Wages Act (1938) to set pay levels, for 
employers to reject a reduction in the working week from 48 to 44 hours without loss of 
pay.800 The government responded by employing troops in a skeleton distribution service, 
which resulted in 28,000 market, dock and haulage personnel joining the stoppage 
nationwide in protest against the use of substitute labour.801 
 Although the strike’s immediate impact was reported to be the loss of around 50 
tons of food, its scale paralleled the 1926 General Strike.802 In the case of London, he 
stoppage meant that 103 ships were held for up to three days each as they were unloaded 
by troops.803 The situation therefore inevitably ‘[interfered] with the equitable distribution 
of the meat ration’, with 80 per cent of London’s meat ration allocation not honoured; it 
also demonstrated the extent to which Britain relied upon road transport for its food 
supply.804 It was also emblematic of the state of Britain’s post-war economy as a whole, as 
the Labour government was using existing powers to regulate the economy and control 
production, demand and encourage wage restraint to overcome a balance of payments 
crisis, and presaged the passing of another example of legislation with ramifications for the 
transport of livestock and meat by rail and road haulage: the Agriculture Act (1947).   
 
4.14 The post-war causes of modal shift: legislation, decontrol 
and the ASLEF rail strike, 1947-1955.  
 
The Agriculture Act (1947) was a crucial factor governing the modal shift of livestock 
distribution from rail to road.  Firstly, the legislation was designed to improve Britain’s 
balance of payments by providing minimum price guarantees to stimulate domestic 
agricultural production, thereby threatening the volume of meat and livestock imports 
carried by rail.805 This appears to be confirmed by government statistics, as beef and veal 
imports as a proportion of total supplies declined by 7 per cent between 1946 and 1950, 
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indicating that meat imports were in decline as domestic output rose.806 Secondly, the 
Agriculture Act (1947) appears to have encouraged the newly-nationalised British 
Railways (BR) to invest in new cattle wagons between 1948 and 1952, as Table 11 
demonstrates.  However, and more importantly for the shift from rail to road, the price 
guarantees enabled farmers to invest in agricultural machinery, which resulted in a 56 per 
cent rise in agricultural lorries in England and Wales between 1946 and 1950.807  
 
Table 11 
Abstract of livestock conveyed by rail, ventilated and refrigerated containers and 
agricultural lorries, 1946-1962 
 
Head of 
Livestock 
Conveyed 
by Rail 
Livestock 
Wagons 
Ventilated 
Containers 
Insulated 
Containers 
Agricultural 
Lorries 
(2 Tons and 
Over) 
1946 - 12,206 - - 17,410 
1948 1,391,822 11,809 531 2,459 30,243 
1950 1,868,918 12,623 578 2,908 34,013 
1952 2,262,882 13,108 584 3,420 33,397 
1954 2,479,605 12,946 796 3,652 30,557 
1956 1,488,135 11,519 820 4,292 29,090 
1958 1,431,509 6,680 1,243 4,878 29,230 
1960 1,019,978 5,138 1,286 4,453 27,095 
1962 - 4,409 - - 28,480 
 
Sources: British Transport Commission, Reports and Accounts (London: HMSO, 1948-1962); 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food & Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for 
Scotland, A Century of Agricultural Statistics: Great Britain, 1866-1966 (London: HMSO, 
1968). 
 
The post-war peak in the number of livestock conveyed by the railways was 2,729,147 in 
1953.808 Although Table 11 implies that this occurred during a period of high lorry 
availability, the number conveyed by rail decreased by 9 per cent between 1953 and 1954 
as Britain’s total livestock population rose by approximately 2.5 per cent from 25,891,000 
in 1953 to 26,531,000 in 1954.809 This appears to confirm that a modal shift was taking 
place in favour of road haulage, as the number of agricultural lorries increased by 67 per 
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cent between 1946 and 1956, although the author has found no evidence about the specific 
use of these vehicles.  The head of cattle conveyed by rail failed to increase with the 
decontrol of meat rationing in 1954, which was accompanied by the disbandment of 
MTOL and the creation of United Carriers Ltd., a co-operative haulage organisation 
comprised of former MTOL members.810 A rough indicator of BR’s performance in the 
meat trade is gained from the insulated and ventilated container fleet; Table 11 indicates 
that the former experienced a 46 per cent expansion.  However, this percentage may have 
been distorted by containers intended for other traffics such as ice-cream, another 
commodity benefitting from the suspension of rationing.811   
 The expansion and consolidation of livestock and meat haulage by road allowed 
the distribution of Britain’s meat supply to continue uninterrupted when the Associated 
Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) called for strike action in May 
1955, as described in chapter 2.812 Trade reportage on the strike also appears to confirm 
that the railway operation was considered a liability, as The Meat Trades Journal noted 
that the ‘rail strike ...does not appear to have affected Smithfield to any appreciable extent’, 
and warned that as ‘road transport has filled the breach, ...[it] will mean a direct loss to the 
railways even when the strike is over’.813 The strike also restricted the Irish store cattle 
trade to port areas only; the resumption of a normal service was dependant upon BR’s 
priorities, particularly as the disruption to passenger traffic received media attention.814   
 It is possible to hypothesise that the 1955 strike was a decisive factor in the modal 
shift of livestock from rail to road, with the number of cattle wagons declining by 11 per 
cent between 1954 and 1956; indeed, BR’s much-publicised ‘Modernisation Plan’ 
contained little evidence of investment in livestock traffic.815 Whilst no official explanation 
has been found by the author, the lack of promotion may have been deliberate, as the wide 
geographical spread of domestic livestock traffic fell foul of the railway management’s 
desire to concentrate freight operations at fewer terminals to cut operating costs.816 The 
modernisation of freight services also presented the railway management with an 
opportunity to experiment with ‘management accounting’ on specific traffic flows which 
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incorporated traffic-level budget and account techniques, with traders charged rates that 
better reflected the overall cost of service provision.817  
 
4.15 The decline of domestic livestock and meat by rail, 1955-
1968  
 
John Quail argues that BR’s attempts to implement management accounting had resulted in 
a ‘collision between [its] desirability and the intractable practical reality of railway 
practice’ following nationalisation in 1948, which stemmed from the railway industry’s 
entrenched sense of obligation towards assisting traders in times of economic crisis.818 
However, the improved outlook for British agriculture in the years following the 
Agriculture Act (1947) removed the pressure to subsidise the sector by maintaining cheap 
rates, and allowed BR to adopt a more businesslike approach towards livestock traffic.  
The Transport Act (1953) made general rates increases easier to facilitate, a series of which 
were implemented between 1955 and 1962.819 This coincided with a 62 per cent reduction 
in the livestock wagon fleet highlighted above in Table 11 (p. 190), and suggests that BR 
had little desire to make concessions for retaining the domestic traffic.   
 The reconstitution of BR into the British Railways Board (BRB) under the 
Transport Act (1962) was accompanied by the repeal of nineteenth-century legislation 
determining the railway industry’s statutory obligation to provide ‘reasonable facilities’ for 
conveying traffic submitted.820 In consequence, the BRB informed the NFU that it was 
minded to concentrate upon the import traffic from Holyhead, Fleetwood and Heysham; 
the official downgrading of the traffic is evidenced by the fact that the quantity of livestock 
conveyed by rail was no longer reported in official statistics after 1963.821 Furthermore, Dr. 
Richard Beeching’s recommendation to close rural railway stations and goods facilities in 
his Reshaping of the Railways report in 1963 merely sealed the terminal decline of 
domestic livestock traffic.822 Despite protests from local authorities, 90 per cent of 
locations equipped for handling livestock were closed by the BRB throughout 1963.823 
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However, whilst this attempted to rationalise the service in the light of the continuing 
diversion of traffic to road as a result of the increasing range, speed and quantity of 
vehicles, the BRB was also facing a contraction of its fresh and frozen meat traffic in 1964, 
which had reportedly declined by 206,000 tons between 1952 and 1962.824  
 This situation had emerged for several reasons, with the executive governance 
being exercised by the emerging supermarket over the entire supply chain and changes in 
consumer habits having profound implications for meat transport.  Firstly, the service 
offered by the railways was no longer competitive with road due to excessive handling and 
out-dated rolling stock, with The Commercial Motor noting that BR was slow in 
‘...[developing] a more satisfactory meat container with greater capacity than the present 
two tons’, particularly as mechanical refrigeration had been developed for inland transport 
applications in America and Europe.825 Secondly, changing living standards placed greater 
emphasis upon the deskilling of cooking, with consumer demand shifting away from 
unprepared ‘straight foods’.826 In consequence, supermarket chains horizontally integrated 
items previously sold by specialist retailers; in the case of meat, this encouraged the 
production of hygienic, pre-prepared and packaged meat near the point of slaughter, 
thereby removing the need for the transport of carcases in bulk.827  
 It is also possible to hypothesise that the modal shift was in part assisted by the 
expanding motorway network, which created an alternative trunk network for goods 
carriage.  Whilst it has not been possible to quantitatively establish its precise effect upon 
the meat trade, qualitative observations can still be made.  A key concern for the 
supermarket and meat trade was the timing of distribution, and the opening of 80 miles of 
the M6 between Stafford and Preston in 1965, which traversed cattle grazing areas in 
Cheshire, Lancashire and Staffordshire and passed within 30 miles of Birkenhead docks, 
reduced journey times over the section from four hours in 1945 to 2.6 hours.828 The trade 
could therefore benefit from the improved connections between ports, agricultural and 
urban regions, whilst retailers could receive timely deliveries by road without the terminal 
costs and timetable inflexibility associated with rail transport.829 
                                                 
824
 “Rail-to-Road Switch is Vast,” p. 23. 
825
 “Rail-to-Road Switch is Vast,” p. 23; J. L. Rogers and R. Binstead, Quick-Frozen Foods, 2nd Edition 
(London: Food Trade Press Ltd., 1972), pp. 146-148. 
826
 Rogers and Binstead, Quick-Frozen Foods, p. 3. 
827
 H. W. Boyd, Jr. and I. Piercy, “Retailing in Britain,” Journal of Marketing, 27 (1963), p. 33; “Wholesale 
Packaging Will Help Supermarkets,” The Meat Trades Journal and Cattle Salesman’s Gazette, CLXXXVI 
(June 28, 1962), p. 909. 
828
 Journey times estimated according to the speed limits for goods vehicles in 1945 (20mph) and 1965 
(30mph). 
829
 D. A. Quarmby, “Developments in the Retail Market and their Effect on Freight Distribution,” Journal of 
Transport Economics and Policy, 23 (1989), p. 76. 
 194 
 
 This complements the second of the motorway’s attributes, namely the provision 
of a heavily-engineered road network free from urban congestion.830 In achieving this, the 
motorway facilitated a restructuring of the meat wholesale trade away from long-
established centralised markets in crowded urban districts to out-of town and retailer-
owned regional warehouses, with direct links to the road network permitting door-to-door 
conveyance to outlets, as the post-1960s supply chain diagram indicates in section 4.2.  
This flexibility created further scope for retailer involvement in the distribution process, as 
third-party haulage firms could be employed to curb supplier-organised distribution and 
develop new schemes meeting the retailer’s specific requirements.831 The change was 
driven by the economies of scope offered by the lorry, as developments in mobile 
refrigeration technology allowed hauliers to readily diversify into general food haulage; it 
can therefore be argued that this, coupled with the BRB’s inability to afford to adapt to a 
retailer-governed supply chain, underpinned the modal shift being experienced in meat 
transport by 1968.832 
 
4.16 Conclusion 
 
The transport challenges facing the domestic meat trade closely resemble those of other 
perishable food commodities such as milk, with the most obvious being the geographic 
locations of supply and demand, as well as the potential for contamination of freshly 
slaughtered meat.  However, whilst the basic logistical problems of speed, distance and 
service are common with other food commodities, meat distribution diverged from milk in 
the degree of supply chain fragmentation.  The lack of organisations exercising executive 
governance within the agricultural and wholesale sectors between 1919 and 1939 meant 
that notwithstanding the notable exception of firms such as Palethorpe’s, the domestic 
meat industry depended upon the railway industry’s ability to provide ‘common user’ 
vehicles whenever long-distance transport was required.   
 Another characteristic of the period under review was the pressure to establish 
plentiful supplies of cheap food when there was a disparity between retail and production 
costs in the domestic market.  When coupled to domestic agriculture’s inability to fully 
meet consumer demand for meat products, the latter problem was exacerbated by cheaper 
chilled and frozen meat imports.  The situation thus prompted allegations against railway 
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companies favouring the import merchant over the domestic farmer.  However, the higher 
volume of meat and livestock traffic generated at Britain’s ports were generally better-
suited to rail distribution, and permitted import merchants access to cheaper bulk rates for 
long-distance traffic.  However, the proximity of demand with supplies of imports 
delivered by road from cold storage in port cities such as London supports the argument 
that the railways were less critical to the overall supply situation than at first glance.   
 The domestic livestock market was susceptible to external economic pressures 
driving down prices, whilst the lack of supply chain governance via an effective produce 
marketing board prevented the pooling of resources which could have been directed 
towards improving the service provided by the railways on long-distance hauls.  When 
placed in the context of the supply chain diagrams discussed in section 4.2, the import 
trade merely added to the already complex flows of inputs and outputs within the meat 
trade.  The result was the need for a fleet of railway vehicles that met seasonal variations in 
both domestic and imported long-distance livestock traffic, and were free from 
maintenance and contamination issues.  Although these were covered by government 
legislation, the difficulty the railways experienced in delivering a basic service was a 
perennial source of complaint throughout the interwar period. 
 The evidence suggests that trade participants reassessed their relationship with the 
railways in the wake of disruption caused by industrial action.  With strikes taking place in 
1919, 1926 and 1955, livestock and meat traders increasingly looked to alternative forms 
of transport to obtain service quality and reliability; the ready availability of road facilities 
since 1919, though subject to similar design regulations to rail, offered the added benefit of 
door-to-door conveyance.  In this respect, the overall flexibility of the lorry and its 
economy for short and medium-distance hauls of up to 80 miles provided a means of 
overcoming the fragmentation of the meat trade amongst its multiple supply and demand 
centres, whilst its economy of scope permitted service improvements without the 
inconvenience of negotiating terms with the technologically path-dependent railways.       
 The lorry’s economy of scope whilst serving both the livestock and meat 
industries was demonstrated during the Second World War, which again highlighted the 
limitations of rail transport.  The combination of service unreliability, the challenges posed 
by the geography of supply and demand all worked in favour of road haulage.  The post-
war years, with the introduction of price guarantees for agricultural produce under the 
Agriculture Act (1947), saw an explosion in agricultural lorry use, partly caused by the 
railway industry’s inability or unwillingness to adapt both before and after nationalisation.  
Indeed, the reticence of BR to offer anything new in the 1955 Modernisation Plan and its 
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subsequent pricing-out of the domestic livestock trade appear decisive in hastening its 
transfer to road conveyance after the ASLEF strike of that year; the mass-closures of 
livestock-handling facilities in 1963 thus marked the conclusion of a long-term decline. 
 In the case of the meat trade, the rising influence of the supermarket chain in the 
supply chain compensated for the fragmentary nature of the meat trade by exercising 
executive governance over distribution operations as a corollary of the horizontal 
integration of previously specialist food products as part of a wider move to drive-down 
retailing costs, a process detailed in chapter 6.  The transition from an inefficient, 
producer-driven supply chain to a more streamlined and cost-focused retailer-driven supply 
chain is an important theme in food distribution, being the product of a willingness by food 
retailers to take advantage of new opportunities such as the development of the motorway 
network.  This characteristic is particularly evident within Britain’s confectionery industry, 
and the evolution of Rowntree’s distribution operation is the focus for the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
197 
Chapter 5 - Distributing confectionery: Rowntree,  
1919-1975 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 has indicated that the lack of oversight within the livestock and meat sectors was 
no barrier to a modal shift from rail to road.  Factors such as the regulation of trade, 
frequency of dispatch and the travel-worthiness of the commodity were key to effective 
distribution, yet the fragmentation and economic fragility of the domestic and imported 
livestock and meat trades created conditions for competition between rail and road on 
grounds of handling costs and service reliability.  The same basic themes of structure and 
agency can be ascertained in the British food manufacturing industry’s attitude to 
transport, as the addition of value to raw ingredients through processing into new, 
individually marketable food products meant that the maintenance of quality, flexibility, 
coordination and cost-effectiveness in distribution was high on the agenda.     
 Whilst the existing literature focuses mainly upon the business and social histories 
of Britain’s three major confectionery firms, it also tends to be Cadbury-centric.  Chris 
Smith, John Child and Michael Rowlinson’s Reshaping Work focuses upon the influence 
of individuals in organisational change, whilst John Bradley presents an overview of the 
firm’s frequent shifts in direction in its pursuit of increasing market share; its merger with 
Fry, and its performance within a tough economic climate.833 Deborah Cadbury’s 
Chocolate Wars is representative of the popular histories conveying a social-historical 
perspective of the development of Cadbury, reflecting upon how the Quaker roots of the 
firm’s founders influenced its development and engagement with the competition.834  
 A Cadbury/Fry focus is also replicated in the transport and enthusiast literature, 
which in turn displays a degree of preference towards the firm’s railway distribution 
operations.835 In contrast, Rowntree is little-studied, although Robert Fitzgerald’s business 
history of the firm makes an important contribution towards rebalancing the story of 
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confectionery manufacturing in Britain.836 However, Fitzgerald’s principal focus is upon 
the marketing strategies adopted to bring Rowntree’s product ranges into the public 
consciousness.  Similarly, aside from two publications by the Industrial Railway Society, 
comparatively little attention has been given to the firm’s railway distribution operation, 
thus presenting an opportunity for the chapter to explore Rowntree’s relationship with rail 
and road transport.837 
 
Graph 18 
Total confectionery output in Britain: Five-year averages, 1919-1959
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 18 (p. 308). 
 
Britain’s chocolate and sugar confectionery industries between 1919 and 1975 experienced 
a transition to the mass production of a branded luxury food product within a concentrated 
national market.  Such concentration placed the larger confectioners in a position to 
exercise governance over their respective supply chains to drive-down costs and hence 
ensure lower retail prices, as described by Vaughn White in his thesis on cost accounting in 
the British confectionery industry.838 Consequently, the trade experienced broadly rising 
popular appeal, as evidenced by the output of Britain’s manufacturers in Graph 18, which, 
notwithstanding the Second World War, indicates growing output between 1919 and 1959.  
Precisely how the drive to reduce overheads influenced transport usage is a salient point of 
this chapter, which uses material from the Rowntree-Borthwick archive to determine the 
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pace of modal shift in confectionery traffic.  It also examines how the long-running 
relationship with the railways, which had been instrumental in facilitating market 
expansion during the late nineteenth century, was affected by strike action, and how 
consequent experimentation with road haulage during the early 1920s secured a permanent 
place within Rowntree’s distribution operation, as Figure 9 (p. 201) demonstrates. 
The Rowntree material is also supplemented by an examination of some logistical 
developments undertaken by Cadbury and Fry to obtain a broader perspective.  Articles 
from The Commercial Motor also provide insights into the development of road 
distribution in confectionery, whilst the effect of rising railway rates, fuel costs and market 
fluctuation during the inter-war period are considered.  As with milk and meat, the effects 
of the wartime government’s assertion of legislative governance over the confectionery 
supply chain upon transport is explored, particularly as it set the terms of trade 
participation for the duration of the conflict.839 Finally, the chapter will also consider how 
transport nationalisation, the retail multiple’s rising influence within the supply chain and 
the concurrent growth of the British motorway network drove change within Rowntree’s 
distribution operation between 1945 and 1975.   
 
5.2 Rowntree’s confectionery supply chain analysis 
 
The British confectionery industry was predominantly concentrated amongst large firms 
such as Cadbury and Rowntree, and was also characterised by consumer demand being 
created by advertising that developed the brand as product differentiator.840 Consequently, 
the large confectioners also possessed the resources and prominence required to organise 
and maintain a national distribution operation.  The following supply chain analysis of 
Rowntree’s confectionery distribution operation will provide a means of establishing the 
principal changes facing Rowntree after 1919, thereby placing the confectioner’s use of 
rail and road transport into a wider context, whilst exploring the internal debates 
concerning a large manufacturer’s use of internal or contract road haulage.  However, in 
using the archival material available at the Borthwick Institute for Archives, York, the 
research has revealed the limitations of surviving statistical data, as it has proved 
impossible to differentiate between rail and road transport costs, or provide a consistent 
account of regional depot costs. 
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 Despite this, the available sales and aggregate transport cost data for outward 
goods from York have been combined in Graph 19, which hints at the economies and 
efficiencies achieved in Rowntree’s confectionery distribution operation.  An initial rise in 
carriage costs can be observed, with the cost of transport from its York factory increasing 
from 2.05 per cent in 1920 to 4.03 per cent in 1923, which appears consistent with railway 
rates increases prior to grouping and negligible sales growth during the period, as shown in 
Graph 20 (p. 207).  By 1935, this had reduced to 3.45 per cent, which corresponds with 
rising sales following a major step-change in Rowntree’s production strategy.841 The 
reduction to 1.89 per cent in 1952 occurs in the aftermath of wartime rationalisation, before 
returning to 2.18 per cent of sales in 1957.  Figure 10 (p. 202) sets out the confectionery 
value chain’s structure between 1919 and 1960, thus providing a heuristic analysis of the 
linkages between the confectioner and the rest of the chain in which Michael Porter’s 
input-operations-outbound logistics system can be identified.842 
 
Graph 19 
Cost of Rowntree's (York) outward goods transport as a 
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 19 (p. 309).  
 
Note: No data is available for the periods 1923-1935 and 1936-1947; data between 1947-1957 
presented at five-year intervals. 
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Figure 9 
Confectionery transport operations and distribution, 1919-c.1960 
 
 
 
The system encompasses broad scope for innovation at all stages; those adopted by the 
confectioners in processing and distribution created both tangible and intangible product 
value for its customers in terms of the quality, quantity and novelty of output, to increase 
product desirability and gain competitive advantage over rivals.843 The confectioner thus 
formed the heart of the supply chain, being able to directly negotiate with suppliers of raw 
materials, and subsequently ‘push’ their output into the retail sector, which is consistent 
with the principle that executive governance, when defined as the ability to drive change 
within the chain, rested with the individual firms.844  Furthermore, the confectionery 
supply chain was noted for the use of resale price maintenance (RPM) to control retail 
prices, ensuring that the confectioner received a minimum price for processing the raw 
ingredients and organising outbound logistics, whilst providing sufficient margin for the 
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retailer to stock and promote the product; the consequence for transport was that the 
constant pressure to save money, yet maintain a reliable national distribution network 
ensured that the confectioner constantly reviewed its rail and road operations, and kept 
informed of new innovation in transport technology.845 
 
Figure 10 
Confectionery transport operations and distribution, 1939-1945 
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Governance over the confectionery supply chain remained predominantly unchanged until 
the Second World War, when shortages of raw ingredients such as sugar caused by a lack 
of shipping space during the German U-boat offensive necessitated regulation.846 
Consequently, the industry initially self-regulated its consumption of ingredients through 
the Manufacturing Confectioners’ Alliance (MCA) before legislative governance of the 
chain was imposed through rationing from 1942.847 Furthermore the confectionery industry 
was the subject of enforced rationalisation to assist with the war effort by limiting waste of 
resources through duplication.848 Competition between confectioners was contained for the 
duration of the conflict, with product lines simplified to minimise labour demand and the 
complexity of distribution.849 Descriptions of the wartime changes are found in Figure 10 
above, which, in the absence of data, may have produced the decline in Rowntree’s 
transport costs in Graph 18 (p. 198) by 1947.  However, a longer-term impact of 
government control was the nationalisation of Rowntree’s haulage contractor in 1951; 
denationalisation under the Conservative government in 1953 prompted the confectioner to 
prevent future interference by purchasing the assets of its former contractor. 
 The end of food rationing in 1954 marked the commencement of another long-
term shift in the configuration of the confectionery supply chain, namely the rising 
influence of the retailer in determining how the products were distributed.850 Although 
already under government review, pressure from large regional and national retail chains to 
abolish resale price maintenance (RPM) had been increasing since decontrol as it restricted 
price competition.851 This prompted a shift in the rules of market participation, or what 
Raphael Kaplinsky terms ‘legislative governance’, as the passing of Parliamentary Acts 
outlawing collective and individual RPM between 1956 and 1964 also removed the 
confectioner from its prominent position within the supply chain.852 This post-war decline 
in influence is consistent with that witnessed amongst the other food commodities studied, 
and the transfer of power to the retail sector, which pressed for greater control over 
distribution to achieve cost efficiencies, favoured modal shift to road haulage at all stages 
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of the supply chain.  In doing so, the regional road distribution centre would therefore 
displace the railhead warehouse, as highlighted in Figure 11.853      
 
Figure 11 
 
Confectionery transport operations and distribution from c.1960 
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5.3 The character of Britain’s confectionery industry 
 
The production of confectionery requires a consistent supply of sugar and cocoa butter, the 
latter produced from processed cocoa beans grown in South America and West Africa.854 
The wide geographical spread of the raw ingredients makes the chocolate and sugar 
confectionery industry logistically intensive, with considerable food miles accumulated 
before being processed into the final product.  This complexity had implications for 
Britain’s chocolate confectionery industry before 1919; the value added to cocoa 
incorporated import duties and sea transport, resulting in a finished product which 
commanded a retail price that befitted a luxury food product.855 Distribution of the finished 
product to retailers was therefore the final stage in a long supply chain, albeit one that 
could be directly controlled by the cost-conscious confectionery manufacturer. 
 The development of the British chocolate and sugar confectionery market during 
the nineteenth century was closely linked with that of long-distance inland transport, which 
provided the opportunity for small, urban-based confectioners to expand into new 
markets.856 The expansion of the railway network intensified the industry’s growth by 
providing a means for creating new centres of demand nationwide and meeting it 
expeditiously.  However whilst the basic infrastructure for market expansion was in place, 
the development of the railway rates mechanism since the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 
was passed in 1888 meant that the carriage of low-value, easily transported goods would 
be cross-subsidised by low-volume, high value luxury products such as chocolate and 
sugar confectionery.857 Transport rates were thus a consideration whenever Britain’s 
confectioners priced the final product, with Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) adopted to 
set minimum retail prices that gave a favourable return on investments made in new mass-
production methods whilst covering the cost of distribution.858   
 With market share concentrated amongst a few large concerns and RPM in force, 
competition between Cadbury, Fry, Rowntree and Terry was therefore restricted to product 
differentiation; the principal source of supply chain governance lay in the tight control of 
overheads.859 This is evidenced by the fact that whilst the railways provided the principal 
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 See White, “The Role of Cost Accounting on Performance in the UK Confectionery Market,” pp. 60-64. 
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means of transporting finished products in bulk to distant markets, the canals retained their 
importance for transporting raw ingredients from port to factory; indeed, Rowntree and 
Terry used barges to transfer supplies to their bonded warehouses situated alongside the 
River Ouse in York, which provided cost-effective transport for high-value ingredients 
from Goole, Humberside.860 Location was therefore important; transport connectivity 
informed Cadbury’s decision to move production to Bournville in 1879 to obtain direct 
access to the canal and railway networks and space for expansion.861 Similarly, Rowntree’s 
move from a cramped, but well-connected site at Tanner’s Moat in the centre of York to 
Haxby Road in the north of the city in 1895 was undertaken to retain its transport links and 
permit future expansion. 
 At Haxby Road, Rowntree entered into an agreement with the North Eastern 
Railway (NER) for the construction of a private siding off the York to Scarborough line, 
thus permitting the inward conveyance of coal for the factory boilers and the outward 
transit of finished confectionery products to stations around the country.862 The consequent 
saving in terminal costs was obtained through rebates paid by the railway company, and a 
similar arrangement was undertaken by Cadbury’s.  In contrast, Fry, which struggled to 
modernise production at its cramped, poorly connected city-centre site in Bristol, was not 
directly connected to the rail and canal networks, thus relying heavily upon cartage 
operations between the Port of Bristol and the Great Western Railway (GWR) until a new 
factory was eventually established at Somerdale, Keynsham in 1923.863 However, the 
result was that all were ‘locked-in’ to rail haulage for the long term, a situation which 
created the distribution network described in section 5.2; the balancing of cost-efficiency 
and national reach with care in handling a fragile product was thus placed firmly in the 
hands of the railway companies. 
                                                 
860
 Dispatch by passenger train was commonplace in 1903, and an article in Rowntree’s Cocoa Works 
Magazine noted that the staff of the Railway Department were ‘working after midnight on Christmas Eve 
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 The confectionery trade in 1919 was characterised by its susceptibility to the 
economic cycle and trading conditions, as Rowntree’s post-First World War production 
output shows in Graph 20, which indicates that output between 1919 and 1924 was static.  
Fitzgerald notes that post-war inflation had initially driven-up the price of raw ingredients, 
whilst the 1921 economic slump prompted industry-wide agreements for price reductions 
that left Rowntree with a lower turnover and higher costs, and therefore unable to maintain 
its share of a market dominated by Cadbury.864 This contrasts with the sharp rise from 
1934, when Rowntree switched to high demand lines such as Dairy Box.  Low turnover 
also called for an interventionist approach to transport; although the confectionery industry 
was heavily reliant upon the railways for long-distance transport, the need to win retail 
customers and facilitate the speedy fulfilment of orders demanded an efficient distribution 
network that maximised contact with clients and promoted supply-chain resilience.865 In 
this regard, the disruption caused by the railway strike of September 1919 was an 
important watershed that demonstrated that road haulage could combine reliability and 
resilience with direct deliveries to customers.866 
 
Graph 20 
Rowntree's confectionery output at five-year intervals, 
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 20 (p. 309). 
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5.4 Road trials and rail tribulations in confectionery 
distribution, 1919-1923 
 
Although little evidence survives concerning Rowntree’s experience during the strike, the 
confectioner’s immediate response to the strike was to expand its use of road haulage when 
conveying goods from York.  Although a limited road haulage service was in operation 
before the First World War, it is possible to hypothesise that the strike provided an 
opportunity for Rowntree to overcome its inertia and embark upon a trial to analyse the 
cost of rail and road conveyance to selected towns and establish best-practice.867 This is 
because Rowntree subsequently approached ‘hire and reward’ contractor Northern Motor 
Services (NMS) of York to commence trials in 1920.868 Confectionery was forwarded by 
road to Leeds, Huddersfield, Dewsbury, Sheffield, Doncaster and Norwich for sorting and 
distribution by local company agents.  The consignments comprised ‘loose’ goods, which 
in railway terms were expensive less-than-wagonload traffic for smaller business 
customers, and were thus well-suited to smaller-volume, door-to-door road haulage. 
 
Table 12  
Abstract from ‘Goods sent out loose to Depôts during February and March 1920’ 
Weight Road Charges 
 
Rail Charges 
(including 
packaging) 
Monthly 
Totals: 
T CWT LBS OZ £ sterling £ sterling 
February 177 8 1 7 331.18 492.80 
March 196 7 - 15 357.50 530.57 
Rail and 
Road Cost 
Difference 
(per cent) 
Total Cost 688.69 1023.37 33 
 
Source: RMA: R/DD/TR/8, Undated Report (c. April 1920) Goods sent out loose to Depôts 
during February and March 1920. 
 
Note: The data refers to confectionery transported to Bradford, Manchester, Liverpool and 
Nottingham.  All monetary values are at current values and have been decimalised to the 
nearest new pence. 
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Initial runs were undertaken between York, Leeds and Sheffield throughout 1920, with 61 
loads of confectionery conveyed to Leeds by two private haulage firms and nine by 
Rowntree’s own motors.869 When compared with the conveyance of loose goods between 
by rail, the experiment achieved a saving; Table 12 highlights that road haulage to 
Bradford, Manchester, Liverpool and Nottingham produced savings of 33 per cent over the 
equivalent railway rate because of the haulier’s ability to quote on a ‘cost plus’ basis 
regardless of commodity value and packaging type, which were reflected in railway 
rates.870 However, the trial was not without challenges, and it was evident that railway 
crates were too large to fit in the rear of the lorries, thus preventing easy interchange 
between road and rail as the situation dictated. 
 Internal correspondence also noted that the savings accrued when using road 
haulage were sometimes negligible wherever high volumes of traffic were dispatched to a 
single destination, with the conveyance of packaged goods to Leeds favouring rail 
haulage.871 As such, Rowntree’s Packing Department responded with the suggestion that 
efficient use of the road vehicle on such routes was only be possible with a reduction in 
outer packaging.  The Department suggested that the use of road transport had to be 
weighed against the cost of obtaining the requisite casing, as the bulk-purchase of reusable 
packaging for the trial would eliminate ‘...any saving [when] sending goods made up in 
packages by motor’, whilst further penalties might have been incurred if the railway 
companies refused to convey the new cases.872  
 Rowntree was therefore experiencing some of the technical challenges associated 
with the transfer of traffic to road distribution, and actively sought solutions to reduce both 
the packaging bulk and costs associated with a confectionery consignment.  The Packing 
Department therefore concluded that ‘if it could be arranged to send goods loose direct to 
customers without the use of packing cases, we may effect a saving’, something which 
could not be contemplated with rail transport due to the risk of damage.873 The 
confectioner thus adopted the expedient of dispatching loose goods to ‘...save the carriage 
on the cases both ways’ and increase van capacity, whilst NMS had offered Rowntree a 
sweetener in March 1920 to undertake the haulage of confectionery over some long-
distance routes at existing railway rates on a trial basis to permit the calculation of costs.874 
                                                 
869
 RMA: R/DD/TR/8, 11 February 1921 Unsigned Letter to Appleton. 
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 The road trials were completed ‘...very satisfactorily, with the exception of one or 
two boxes which have burst open, due to falling down in the van’, an issue that was 
promptly resolved by ‘...having the goods packed on one level throughout the van, and also 
by packing the goods closer together’.875 Despite this, the limitations of using a contractor 
for short-notice work was evident, as NMS admitted that it did not always have the 
vehicles to spare, and that ‘...it does not pay to carry at Rail Rates on longer runs to 
Liverpool, Manchester and Nottingham’.876 The final report thus considered the potential 
for Rowntree to expand its own motor fleet, which could be quickly pressed into service 
‘when there was a shortage of wagons ...[for] urgent orders, or if it paid us to send them in 
preference to rail’.877 
 However, the report also noted that the use of own-account vehicles raised the 
problem of obtaining back-loads to offset costs, which could be more readily obtained by 
independent hauliers.878 Rowntree also displayed concern for driver workload by paying 
for a second employee to undertake the delivery of the goods, which was considered 
‘outside the scope of a motor-man’s duties’ because they were employees of NMS during 
the trials.879 Consequently, the confectioner made the decision to increase its monthly 
payment to the haulier on the proviso that the motorman’s wage included an unloading 
allowance to reduce overall handling costs.  Rowntree’s report concluded that the higher 
cost of long-distance road transport was sometimes offset by the ability to dispense with 
purchases of bulky outer packaging, whilst the expense of supplying and maintaining 
vehicles at a network of depots could be delegated to the haulage contractors.880  
 Other factors determining the confectionery industry’s increasing interest in road 
distribution were the various challenges facing Britain’s railways in the years following the 
strike of September 1919.  Firstly, the railway companies faced concerns over service 
reliability due to a chronic wagon shortage, caused partly because of maintenance arrears 
and partly because traders could retain wagons for extra warehouse space at private 
sidings, whilst there was the perennial risk of pilferage by railway staff.881 The latter was 
of particular concern to confectionery manufacturers because of the luxury nature of the 
product; the London and North Western Railway (LNWR) staff magazine acknowledged 
the problem in an editorial comment that attributed a spike in confectionery theft in 1920 
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to female porters still in railway employment after the First World War.882 Secondly, the 
railways remained under government control in anticipation of comprehensive 
reorganisation under the Railways Act (1921), and a general rates increase sanctioned by 
the government in 1920 demonstrated the risk that even large customers of the railways 
took when relying upon a distribution network operated by monopolist organisations.  
 The complexity and scope of the 1921 Act required an industry-wide approach to 
lobby both the Ministry of Transport and the Tribunal.  Britain’s confectioners had 
established the Manufacturing Confectioner’s Alliance (MCA), an organisation with broad 
responsibilities that included representing the industry in legal disputes with the railway 
companies.  The MCA was also associated with the Federation of British Industries (FBI), 
and both established a Joint Railway Committee that would take an active role in 
ascertaining the implications of the proposed revision of the rates schedule.883 The 
Committee’s task was to establish whether the existence of similar commodities in 
different classes merited a lower rate classification.884 By scrutinising the Railway Rates 
Tribunal’s proposed revision of the Standard Classification of Charges under the 1921 Act, 
which included the abolition of lower grocery rates, the confectioners were attempting to 
exercise governance over their supply chain costs.885 
 Concerns about cost were expressed in October 1923 when proposals for another 
tranche of rates increases during the revision of the Schedule of Standard Charges raised 
the ire of the confectionery industry.  In a letter submitted for consideration by the FBI, 
Rowntree asserted that the revised charges were extortionate.886 It suggested that the 
‘proposed charges for fruit [were] heavier than justified’, implying that the revised rates 
failed to sufficiently reflect previous exceptional charges granted for the traffic, the latter 
being described in chapter 2.887 Furthermore, the letter revealed that proposed terminal 
rates and ‘the scale of charges is too high ...for short distances’, and the industry identified 
a pressing need for disaggregated rates that specifically detailed the cost of cartage and 
returning empties to assist the application for rebates from the railway companies.888 
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Consequently, negotiations with the railway companies was a continuous process requiring 
the employment of dedicated staff. 
 The MCA and FBI thus provided platforms for industry-wide discussion about the 
challenges that railway distribution posed, and demonstrate that the problems Rowntree 
experienced were not unique.  The universal issue of high rates permitted discussion of its 
rivals’ experiences and their attempts to improve the cost, efficiency and flexibility of 
distribution.  This raises the hypothesis that the confectionery industry were not passive 
bystanders during the inter-war years, but were active in vertically-integrating transport 
into their organisations.  This is confirmed by a report detailing a joint meeting between 
the major confectioners noted that Cadbury operated its own road transport to a radius of 
65 miles from Bournville, whilst Fry operated at a radius of 16 miles.889 However, a 
combination of being ‘locked-in’ to nationwide rail distribution and rising consumer 
demand for Cadbury’s lines meant that its relationship with the railways was reinvigorated 
when space constraints at Bournville necessitated a constant rate of dispatch from its 
Birmingham factory.  Consequently, the firm approached the railway companies to 
develop cost-effective railhead distribution in 1921.890 
 The negotiations secured exceptional rates for bulk train-loads from Bournville to 
warehouses at major freight terminals such as Camden, where the administration and 
distribution of customer orders could be undertaken locally.891 The result was increased 
floor-space at Bournville for storing stock and catering for seasonal demand, whilst the 
scheme would eventually achieve a 57 per cent reduction in distribution costs per 100lb 
sales by 1936, as cited by White.892 Furthermore, the cessation of government control over 
the railways in 1922 was accompanied by a general reduction in charges; the railway 
companies were keen to promote lower rates for regular, bulk flows of products to well-
defined railhead locations to maintain a grip upon long-distance confectionery traffic.893 
However, the scheme was undertaken at Cadbury’s initiative, and provides an example of a 
confectioner exercising executive governance over its distribution chain. 
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5.5 Rowntree and Northern Motor Utilities 
 
The overall success of the road haulage trials in 1920 was followed by the expansion of 
Rowntree’s road operations at York.894 This coincided with a reduction in the use of rail 
transport, with Table 13 showing a considerable modal shift to road taking place between 
1921 and 1927; confectionery dispatched by rail displayed a 25.5 per cent decrease in 
favour of road haulage.  However, this figure belies the fact that company had adopted a 
policy of using road haulage on routes of up to 80 miles, permitting a hypothesis that the 
losses sustained by rail was restricted to smaller and less economic loads which were more 
conducive to door-to-door conveyance.895 This once again exemplifies the confectioner’s 
governance of the supply chain, as Rowntree coordinated its rail and road transport 
according to the traffic it was best suited to convey. 
Rowntree also investigated options for formalising relationships with specific 
road hauliers, and hence obtain greater security and leverage in route planning.  An internal 
report published in September 1923 indicated that the confectioner was actively 
considering direct investment in Northern Motor Utilities (NMU), which had become 
closely associated with Rowntree’s road distribution operations.896 The report concluded 
that NMU had a good reputation overall, having served Rowntree ‘quite well’, and had 
consequently enjoyed a near-monopoly over its road traffic since 1919.897  
 
Table 13 
Percentage analysis of the confectionery traffic forwarded from York, 1921-1927 
Mode of 
Transport: 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 
 
       
Rail % 74.5 63.5 55 48 47 45 49 
Road % 25.5 36.5 42 51 52 55 51 
Water %   3 1 1   
        
Total net 
tons 
outward: 
23,586 23,924 22,876 24,625 26,725 26,108 28,236 
 
Sources: RMA: R/DD/T/1, Transport Function Annual Reports, 1927-1928; RMA: R/DD/T/3, 
11 February 1924 Traffic Department Report- Traffic by Rail, Motor and Post. 
                                                 
894
 Bradley, Cadbury’s Purple Reign, pp. 79-80; Fitzgerald, Rowntree and the Marketing Revolution, p. 149. 
895
 The policy of coordinating between both modes of transport was highlighted in 1928: RMA: R/DD/T/48, 
16 April 1928 Transit of Goods between York and London. 
896
 The Managing Director of NMU was Major Dring, and the firm was established soon after the First World 
War.  RMA: R/DD/T/3, 23 September 1923 Proposed Closer Relations with NMU- Observations, pp. 1-4. 
897
 RMA: R/DD/T/3, 23 September 1923 Closer Relations with NMU, p. 1. 
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However, the confectioner believed that NMU were ‘not by any means, model employers’, 
and Rowntree’s Traffic Department was particularly reticent about establishing a 
connection ‘…to a company well known for paying minimum rates [which] might not 
…be to Rowntree & Co.’s advantage’, which can be interpreted in one of two ways.898 
Firstly, Rowntree may have wished to maintain amicable employee relations in all aspects 
of its businesses by ensuring generous rates of pay and secondly, the haulier may have 
been too generous.  Although the haulier’s scale of charges was not recorded, the 
confectioner expressed concern that NMU made little profit from its income, which 
contrasted with the returns obtained whenever Rowntree’s own small fleet of lorries were 
allocated distribution work.899 
These misgivings meant that Rowntree decided against investing in NMU, 
although the haulier’s services were retained on routes where road haulage was more 
convenient or cheaper than rail.900 Rowntree thus depended upon the cooperation of 
another third-party transport supplier, as well as an indirect line of communication when 
problems needed to be addressed.  The latter was highlighted when problems were 
encountered on the difficult trans-Pennine route to Liverpool in October and November 
1923.  Commenting on a delivery dispatched from York on 29 October 1923 and arriving 
at Liverpool on 1 November; NMU reported that the ‘...lorry was knocked off the road by 
a Traction Engine on the afternoon of the 30th at Ashton-under-Lyne’.901 Although the 
company had lorries in Manchester, they were scheduled for unloading the next morning, 
and the driver of the stricken vehicle was forced to wait on the road-side overnight. 
NMU’s report indicates that local roads were not conducive to intensive long-
distance transport operations due to traffic and the 20mph speed restriction, making 
progress over the Pennines slow and particularly challenging during the winter months.  
Furthermore, indifferent road surfaces caused the canvas frames on lorries to oscillate and 
deface the cardboard outer boxes used to display the confectionery.902 However, a second 
terse letter from the manager of Rowntree’s Liverpool depot to the Transport Manager at 
York complained that some deliveries were still taking up to six days by road, suggesting 
that a solution to the problem had yet to be found.903 Late arrivals hampered product 
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serviceability during the lucrative pre-Christmas sales period, and necessitated the 
expensive expedient of increased stock-holding to even-out delivery disruptions.904  
 The situation was unacceptable to a company whose reputation depended upon 
the ready availability of its products to promptly service customer orders.  Whilst external 
haulage contractors possessed the advantages of maintenance facilities and experienced 
personnel, an important disadvantage was similar to that of the railways, namely the loss of 
control over consignments once they were dispatched.905 However, the confectioner had to 
rely upon NMU’s own investigations, which attributed the ‘...constant delay of goods [to] 
...motors meeting with “exceptional circumstances”’ en-route.906 This suggests that 
Rowntree’s decision not to establish a financial interest in the haulier meant that an 
opportunity to integrate a road haulage subsidiary and exercise its position to effect service 
improvements was missed.   
 
5.6 From uncertainty to collaboration: Rowntree’s relationship with the 
railways 
 
Although labour disputes, wagon shortages and high rates had shaken business confidence 
in Britain’s railways in the years immediately following the First World War, the 
difficulties experienced with NMU’s longer-distance road operations and the retention of 
the requisite facilities at York encouraged Rowntree to follow Cadbury’s example and 
maintain its link with the ‘more regular and dependable railway’.907 However, the grouping 
of 120 railway companies in 1923 threatened further administrative upheaval, with 
potential implications for the confectioner’s long-standing transport agreements with the 
NER.  Whilst Rowntree’s distribution operation depended upon reliability and a 
willingness amongst all parties to negotiate, the confectioner was concerned that the 
newly-formed LNER would be intent on terminating the agreement to serve the company 
siding because of its precarious financial position.908 
                                                 
904
 RMA: R/DD/T/3, 27 November 1923 Rayson to Gilderdale.  Planning for Christmas began in July, as 
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 The LNER’s post-amalgamation difficulties were caused by the post-war 
economic downturn, and directly affected Rowntree’s distribution operations when the 
railway company proposed to remove a goods checker at the factory sidings employed to 
review wagon labels and ensure that confectionery was dispatched to the correct 
destination.909 The LNER’s proposition could also be construed as an attempt by the 
railway company to leverage Rowntree towards employing its own checker and 
dispatching goods at its own risk, thereby rendering the confectioner, rather than the 
railway company fully responsible in the event of loss or damage during transit.910 This 
accentuated the advantages of road haulage, which could offer savings in ‘...brown paper 
packing and packer’s time’, expedite delivery and provide improved accountability for the 
goods during transit.911 
 Despite the foregoing issues surrounding rates and service, relations between 
confectioner and railway company were ameliorated by the fact that local railway 
management at York remained substantially unchanged after amalgamation, with 
Rowntree concluding that the ‘railway Grouping has not materially affected our traffic’.912 
A prominent feature of the relationship between Rowntree and the railway industry were 
collaborative projects with beneficial results for both parties, which provides another 
example of a food manufacturer exercising executive governance over its distribution 
operation.  In this regard, Rowntree seized an opportunity to influence the rail distribution 
of its products and effect savings by developing, in conjunction with the railway company, 
new packaging that promoted cost-efficiency whilst preserving product condition; in 
return, the LNER would retain the custom of a large firm with a national market.913   
 With confectionery a branded product, its condition upon arrival at the retailer 
was a key area for cooperation, and a joint experiment was commenced in January 1926 to 
test the rail-worthiness of Rowntree’s own storeroom containers to ease handling when 
loading and unloading the 12-ton railway vans.914 The bogies were used on the 211-mile 
journey between York and Rowntree’s depot at St. Phillip’s Marsh goods terminal, Bristol 
over a route which covered LNER and LMS territories.  Feedback about their condition 
after transit was requested from the Bristol Depot Manager, who reported that the 
containers were flimsy, yet commanded high rates due to their weight, and expressed a 
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preference for loose-loading.915 A subsequent trial in March 1926 that entailed the loose-
loading of goods between partitions erected inside a wagon was successful, whilst a further 
wooden packing case design was trialled on the Bristol route, with mixed success.916   
 Rowntree’s experiments were temporarily interrupted by the General Strike in 
May 1926, which receives little mention in the firm’s surviving archival sources.  
However, Fitzgerald notes that various grades of factory and transport employees ceased 
work, making it possible to speculate that national distribution was seriously curtailed 
when considering the disruption experienced by other traders on Britain’s railway 
network.917 The trials had continued by 7 February 1927, when it was reported that several 
new cases had suffered shunt damage.918 With rail transport frequently necessitating the 
splitting and reforming of new trains at marshalling yards, the LNER agreed to adapt van 
interiors to permit the securing of their contents; the first modified example was sent to 
Bristol on 24 March.919 However, whether this development was completed on the LNER’s 
initiative or at Rowntree’s request was not recorded within the documents. 
  Railway bureaucracy was once again in evidence as Rowntree experienced 
difficulties in getting case designs accepted by more than one railway company, with the 
LMS proving hesitant.920 As the company was responsible for the St. Phillip’s Marsh 
goods depot, it made its own suggestions for improving container unloading procedures at 
Bristol.921 This confirms the hypothesis that despite wishing to retain traffic, the ‘Big Four’ 
railways were wary of straying away from long-established procedures, a trait which has 
already been discerned in chapter 3 in relation to the adoption of rail-mounted tanks by 
Britain’s large milk wholesalers.  Equally, the need to carefully pack consignments into 
containers risked employee negligence, as several cardboard outer boxes containing 
confectionery showed signs of scrubbing, thus spoiling the presentation of the product 
when put on display for sale.922  
 The maintenance of product quality during transit was therefore inextricably 
linked to the reduction of distribution costs, which represented 7.4 per cent per £100 of 
confectionery sales by 1926, and justified Rowntree’s close attention.923 The confectionery 
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industry thus maintained an interest in new rolling-stock developments, with Rowntree 
expressing an interest in the demountable container for deliveries to its non-rail connected 
depot in Birmingham.924 However, whilst the evidence suggests that Rowntree possessed 
few road vehicles for the national distribution operation, a small fleet was maintained for 
internal use such as goods transfer operations between the production lines and bonded 
warehouses located around the centre of York.925 
 
5.7 Confectionery distribution by rail and road, 1926-1930 
 
Despite road haulage’s advantage of door-to-door conveyance and efficiency in short-
distance journeys, government policy decisions made between 1926 and 1930 presented 
challenges.  The rise of road haulage nationwide made essential consumables such as tyres 
and fuel ripe for direct taxation, whilst new vehicles were subject to annual taxation under 
the Roads Act (1920).926 This assertion of legislative governance over rising road use by 
the government saw money pooled into a Road Fund intended to finance road maintenance 
until it was subsequently raided by the Treasury in 1926.927 A less obvious problem was 
that frequent changes in tax rates also enabled road hauliers to profiteer.  This is 
exemplified by a dispute with Carter Paterson in 1927, a contractor that transported 
confectionery between York and London, which began when rising tax was cited as a 
reason for a rate increase.928 
 Although the haulier gave Rowntree notice of an increase in charges for traffic 
dispatched to London after a road tax increase in January 1927, the confectioner’s internal 
correspondence suggests that Carter-Paterson was slow to pass savings to its customers, 
with the Transport Department suggesting that a concurrent reduction in tyre costs should 
have offset the increased taxation.929 It is therefore possible to suggest that this dispute 
prompted the signing of a long-term haulage contract between Rowntree and NMU in June 
1927 after seven years of spot-hiring.930 However, with fuel prices falling as supplies 
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increased, the government reintroduced fuel duty at a rate of approximately 2p per gallon 
in 1928, although the author has been unable to trace its impact upon product retail prices. 
 The imposition of fuel duty in 1928 also coincides with an increase in the 
percentage of confectionery dispatched by rail from York at the expense of road transport, 
demonstrated by Table 14.  However, it is also possible to hypothesise that the rise in road 
haulage accompanied the commencement of the revised Schedule of Standard Charges on 
1 January, which ended uncertainty over how railway rate changes would affect the firm.  
Although the original scheme proposed the elimination of exceptional rates, 
correspondence from concerned traders about excessive costs resulted in the ‘Big Four’ 
railways and the Railway Clearing House (RCH) permitting the continuation of all 
exceptional rates obtained before 1 January 1927.931 Rowntree noted that whilst standard 
rates had increased by 6.25 per cent over the pre-grouping Schedule, the cost of rail 
transport was not materially, and Table 5.3 shows that the tonnage of confectionery 
forwarded from York by rail increased by 22 per cent between 1927 and 1928.932 
 
Table 14 
Percentage analysis of Rowntree’s rail and road transport operations, 1927-1930 
Mode of Transport: 1927 1928 1929 1930 
 
    
Rail % 49 71 76 77 
Road % 51 29 24 23 
 
    
Total net tons outward: 28,236 28,763 27,780 23,827 
 
Source: RMA: R/DD/T/1, Transport Function Annual Report, 1930. 
 
Fuel duty remained a concern for Rowntree, and was given specific mention in a 1930 
circular prepared by the Transport Department concerning its contract with NMU.933 It 
highlights concerns that regular tax increases affecting fuel and vehicle consumables 
would place pressure upon the retail price of confectionery, particularly as the 
reintroduction of fuel duty was followed by an economic downturn.  Bulletins circulated to 
Rowntree’s regional depots also highlighted the importance of keeping tight control of 
distribution overheads including staff packaging and the organisation of delivery rounds, 
with the Transport Manager suggesting that ‘...it is essential that every effort is made to 
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keep delivery costs down’.934 The Transport Manager thus made recommendations for 
saving money by suggesting that whilst Rowntree had ‘...built up a reputation for quick 
service... customers may not ...complain if goods take three or four days in transit instead 
of our usual two or three days’.935  
 
5.8 The impact of competition upon distribution, 1930-1939 
 
One reason behind Rowntree’s decision to rationalise its road operation in 1930 was 
intensifying competition with Cadbury; White and Richard Bradley’s business histories 
indicate that the firm’s sales increased as a result of the savings achieved through 
mechanised production and efficient distribution, whilst the consolidation of Cadbury’s 
product range amongst fewer lines raised consumer perceptions of product quality, 
fostering demand and placing pressure upon competitors to produce savings in similar 
areas.936 Cadbury’s had succeeded in achieving an ‘overall reduction in the price of Dairy 
Milk between 1920 and 1934 [of] ...70%’ within a difficult economic climate, albeit 
qualified by its ‘...inability to know how much additional sales revenues [would] maximise 
their profits’.937 However, one of the changes Cadbury implemented to save money in 
distribution is described in an article published in The Commercial Motor which details the 
firm’s arrangements for collecting one of its raw ingredients. 
 Dairy Milk, a staple Cadbury product since 1905, required a cheap and reliable 
supply of fresh milk.938 The company established two condenseries at Frampton-on-
Severn, Gloucestershire and at Knighton, Powys, with the former dispatching condensed 
milk to Bournville by rail from Stonehouse, Gloucestershire.939 Although farmers within a 
twelve-mile radius of Frampton were encouraged to deliver milk direct or to intermediate 
collecting points, fourteen external contractors collected milk from outlying farms in a 
daily operation requiring up to 30 lorries.940 Churns deposited at collecting points on main 
arterial routes fifteen miles from Frampton were collected by Cadbury’s own fleet of nine 
lorries.941 The scheme, which reduced the distances travelled by raw ingredients, is 
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illustrative of the extent to which food manufacturers could determine the scale and scope 
of logistics, with Cadbury able to use its own fleet to regulate overall haulage costs.    
 Rowntree’s own attempts to reduce transport costs in adverse economic 
circumstances comprised a review of its depot distribution operations.  The proposal to 
delay road deliveries until full loads could be guaranteed rationalised the distribution 
process by eliminating the uneconomical empty working of vans and lorries on the return 
journey.942 However, the challenge of meeting fluctuating demand from existing retail 
customers and keeping pace with the business obtained by Rowntree’s travellers 
nationwide demanded further efficiencies in depot working.  The confectioner had 
identified the labour-intensity of stacking loose products before and after transit, and in 
1930 considered designing a lorry container to reduce vehicle loading times and hence 
improve labour productivity.943   
 The rationalisation scheme had other financial benefits, as savings could be 
accrued by laying-off vans which were superfluous to requirements, a process made easier 
by using third-party contractors using goods clearing houses to obtain new work for idle 
vehicles.944 The benefits of the relationship with NMU were first highlighted in 1926.  
Firstly, the haulier shielded Rowntree from the initial capital cost of purchasing vehicles; 
the firm’s overarching desire to maintain exiting retail prices meant that such costs would 
have to be met through other means, including a possible wage decrease for all 
employees.945 Secondly, any conversion of vehicles to Rowntree’s specifications could be 
undertaken by the contractor and paid by the confectioner via a small monthly charge, thus 
precluding the need to establish dedicated coachwork facilities.946 The scheme therefore 
provides another example of a food manufacturer’s ability to assert governance over its 
supply chain to meet the economic challenges of the early 1930s.947  
 Scope for continuing the long-term relationship between the confectionery and 
railway industries is demonstrated by the continuing effort to expand the product 
distribution depot network.948 In 1930, Cadbury concluded negotiations with the GWR to 
establish its fifteenth distribution depot on railway land north of Exeter St. David’s railway 
station with associated local distribution provided by railway company lorries, thus 
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providing a complete logistical service from factory to retailer under the terms of the 
Railway (Road Transport) Act (1928).949 The road fleet employed a number of bespoke 
Cadbury-liveried vans modified at the GWR’s Swindon railway works.  Whilst Peter Scott 
emphasises that such powers were ‘a targeted weapon against road hauliers’, the nature of 
the agreement raises the hypothesis that the confectioner, rather than the railway company, 
had exercised initiative in obtaining its fully-integrated road and rail distribution service.950 
 This hypothesis is raised by the fact that whilst the GWR was authorised to 
provide vehicles and construct a reception siding, the warehouse was designed by 
Cadbury’s own architect, an arrangement which bears a close resemblance to the bulk tank 
schemes proposed and developed by the milk wholesalers and described in chapter 3.951 
Furthermore, Rowntree commenced negotiations with the GWR in 1931 for a similar 
scheme to augment Rowntree’s existing Cardiff distribution depot operation, the railway 
company being contracted to provide two purposely-designed motor vans for the 
confectioner’s exclusive use to the specification demonstrated below in Image 13.952 
However, the investment made by both parties in the scheme meant that the confectioner 
was once again locking itself into the rail distribution of its products.  
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Image 13 
GWR Road Transport Dept., Slough: Van Body on Morris ‘C’ Type Chassis for Messrs. Rowntree’s Traffic, 27 April 1934 
 
 
Source: National Railway Museum (NRM): DS/50/D, GWR Motor Vehicle Drawings. 
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Rowntree’s review of distribution overheads coincided with a period of intense 
competition with Cadbury, which by 1934 was forcing the firm to maintain market share 
through product innovation.953 Consequently, Rowntree made a partial retreat from direct 
competition with Cadbury in the milk chocolate block market.  Instead, the confectioner 
invested in reconfiguring production lines to mass-produce products developed using 
market and consumer research, resulting in the emergence of ‘product brand’-based 
confectionery including Kit Kat and Aero, which provided a means of establishing product 
differentiation within a crowded confectionery market.954 The initiative’s success meant 
that by 1936, Rowntree’s improving business placed the firm in a position to negotiate a 
new permanent contract with NMU to reserve more vehicles during seasonal peaks.955 The 
railways also retained their role in the firm’s long-distance distribution operation, although 
Britain’s declaration of war upon Germany on 3 September 1939 presaged government 
intervention in the confectionery supply chain’s management. 
 
5.9 Confectionery at war: rationing and rationalisation, 1940-
1945 
 
The Second World War adversely impacted upon Britain’s confectionery industry in 
several respects, principal of which was the establishment of the Ministry of Food’s 
governance of the allocation of Britain’s raw food supplies.  This combined with 
legislative governance implemented through rationing to restrain consumer demand and 
initiate a profound reconfiguration of the sector’s inland distribution networks, as 
described in section 5.2.  R. J. Hammond’s official history of the Ministry of Food during 
the Second World War indicates that the production of manufactured foods such as 
confectionery was particularly vulnerable to disruption.956 The dearth of imported raw 
materials such as sugar and cocoa in the winter of 1940-1941 necessitated the imposition 
of permits and manufacturing quotas calculated from a firm’s ‘arbitrary proportion of pre-
war usage’ and the actual availability of raw materials.957  
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Table 15 
Abstract from Terry’s road distribution statistics, 1938-1945 
Year 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Total cost 
of 
contract 
and own-
account 
transport 
(£) 
52,024 50,009 38,474 33,928 26,931 24,145 24,858 21,041 
 
Source: The Borthwick Institute: The Terry’s Archive (BTA): Box 14, Sales and Distribution 
Costs: Despatch Department. 
 
The wartime government’s governance of the confectionery supply chain was established 
in 1942 through ‘points rationing’, which gave the consumer a limited degree of freedom 
to source a desired product.958 With consumer demand was under control, a second 
initiative was to concentrate production amongst fewer factories to release labour for other 
duties.959 The impact of concentrating production upon the requirement for transport is 
demonstrated by Table 15, which indicates that the cost of Terry’s contract road 
distribution operation during the war declined by over 60 per cent as a result of factory 
closure; from February 1943, the firm’s individual branded lines were reduced and 
simplified to facilitate production and distribution under contract by the remaining 
manufacturers.960 The scheme ensured that national brand names, rather than their specific 
products, remained to provide a semblance of consumer choice in wartime.  After the 
rationalisation of the centres of confectionery production, it became possible to undertake 
the more detailed process of local transport rationalisation, or ‘zoning’.961 
The concentration of sugar and chocolate confectionery production amongst fewer 
factories meant that an entire zone’s supply could be focused upon a single manufacturer, 
with Rowntree responsible for supplying confectionery for retail distribution in the north of 
England.  This responded to two interlinked problems, the first being the nationwide 
demand for a confectioner’s products in peacetime; the second being the resources required 
to distribute confectionery to retailers.  The scheme thus divided Britain into four zones, 
with factories in each meeting local demand to eliminate the cross-haulage of related 
products nationwide.962 Therefore, the government’s suppression of competition thus 
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reversed the effects of the peacetime rivalry between Cadbury and Rowntree by ensuring 
broad cooperation in preventing the unnecessary use of transport in the national interest.963 
 
Figure 12 
Rowntree Depot locations in the Second World War 
England MCA Scheme Depots Scotland 
Bath Brighton (Cadbury/Fry) Glasgow 
Birmingham Exeter (Cadbury/Fry)  
Bristol Leeds (Cadbury/Fry)  
Cambridge Sub-depot Isle of Wight (Cadbury)  
Canterbury Northampton (Meredith & Drew)  
Cardiff Sheffield (Cadbury/Fry)  
Carlisle Sub-depot Somerdale (Cadbury/Fry  
Culham Truro (Cadbury/Fry)  
Grimsby Sub-depot   
Horncastle Sub-depot   
Launceston   
Liverpool Sub-depot   
London   
Manchester   
Newbury Sub-depot   
Newcastle   
Norwich   
Nottingham   
Salisbury   
Sheffield Sub-depot   
York   
 
Source: RMA: R/DD/TO/27, Undated (c1942-1943) Rowntree Depot Delivery Areas. 
 
Whilst chapter 2 has suggested that the government relied upon voluntary, rather than 
coercive measures in the organisation of wartime road distribution, the railway network’s 
role as the main artery for distributing essential commodities and war materials meant that 
the confectionery industry was responsible for minimising its use of rail transport.964 In 
May 1942, Rowntree’s Transport Department published a report detailing a voluntary 
rationalisation scheme to supply retailers in the South Yorkshire area.965 The report 
indicated that the ‘Cadbury Sheffield Depot and Rowntree Nottingham Depot Area overlap 
to a considerable extent, and because of transport restrictions, it is necessary for this 
overlapping to be obviated’, with the affected area split equally between the two depots.966 
Similar arrangements were undertaken at depots affected by German bombing, with the 
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distribution operation at Rowntree’s destroyed Southampton depot spread between other 
confectioners until a temporary premises was constructed at Salisbury.967  
The wartime distribution system was also underpinned by the establishment of 
sub-depots at various strategic locations by the MCA for use by all manufacturers, as listed 
above in Figure 12.  The joint depot system made provision for serving remoter areas of 
demand, with Rowntree’s Cardiff depot combining products destined for remote villages 
such as Newgale, Solva and St. David’s in West Wales, to ensure efficient use of railway 
wagons.968 Assessing the confectionery scheme’s effectiveness, Hammond concludes that 
the ‘appearance of economy [was] ...more important than the reality’; persistent demand 
rarely tallied with the available supply of transport, particularly in 1944 when military 
activity intensified following the Allied invasion of Europe.969 However, it is also possible 
to conclude that the shifting focus of supply chain governance towards the wartime 
government through rationing and the enforced factory closures threw a spotlight upon the 
industry’s distribution arrangements, not simply because the wartime rationalisation 
programme emphasised that further efficiencies in road and rail transport use could be 
made, but that it also demonstrated the trade’s vulnerability to further interventions by 
government.970 
 
5.10 Nationalisation, integration and innovation, 1945-1959 
 
The vulnerability highlighted in the previous section reflected the fact that any optimism 
within the confectionery industry for a swift relaxation of controls and a return to normal 
market conditions after the Second World War was misplaced on two counts.  Firstly, the 
wartime suppression of the market economy meant that any sudden lifting of food 
rationing would have resulted in inflationary pressures if consumer demand outstripped the 
ability to meet supply.971 Secondly, Britain emerged from the war with a balance of 
payments crisis because of the prolonged loss of export markets, which combined with a 
dollar shortage to increase the expense of raw material imports.972 Whilst the transport 
zoning scheme was ended in 1946, the newly-elected Labour government consequently 
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made the decision to continue with food rationing to regulate consumer demand, with 
points rationing retained for commodities such as confectionery until 1949.973  
 Aside from supply problems, the passing of the Transport Act (1947) had serious 
ramifications for traders and industries, and once again highlights the firm’s vulnerability 
to issues affecting its transport supplier.974 The principal problem was that the vehicle 
fleets of ‘A’ licensed contractors would be nationalised; this included NMU, and the 
administration of all road operations was transferred to British Road Services (BRS).975 
Rowntree’s relationship with BRS is unknown due to a lack of documentary evidence, 
although it is possible to hypothesise that there was general mistrust of the nationalised 
organisation.  The reasons for concern were highlighted by The Commercial Motor, which 
claimed that a lack of competition would foster managerial complacency and reduce the 
incentive for service improvement.976 Referring to BRS in 1951, the publication argued 
that a decline in service reliability would force traders to sink capital into storing large 
stocks of goods to guarantee product availability, thereby driving-up overhead costs and 
retail prices.977 Nationalisation therefore appeared to threaten to tie the confectioner to a 
state-owned monopoly where governance on rates was remote from local management.   
 Despite the paucity of material, the hypothesis of a challenging relationship with 
BRS appears to be supported by Rowntree’s response to the Conservative government’s 
denationalisation of long-distance road transport in 1952 and the subsequent reduction of 
its fleet.  Rowntree’s management took the opportunity to purchase former NMU assets for 
incorporation into a new subsidiary company, NMU (1953) Ltd.  This action implies that 
nationalisation had provided an unwelcome distraction for the confectioner, and the 
vertical integration of road haulage gives credence to a hypothesis that Rowntree wished to 
secure its road haulage operation against future government intervention, and establish 
direct control of overhead costs.978 Conversely, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
relationship between Rowntree and the nationalised railways was similarly strained before 
the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen’s (ASLEF) strike over pay 
in May 1955.  The transition to British Railways (BR) was initially characterised by 
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continuities in personnel and procedures, and the railways maintained their role as the 
principal means of long-distance bulk transport.979   
 However, the integration of road haulage into Rowntree’s business portfolio 
proved fortuitous, as it provided the confectioner with a means of circumventing the worst 
effects of the strike.980 Although surviving records do not reveal the extent of the 
disruption faced by Rowntree, it would appear that the strike did not permanently damage 
the relationship.981 However, a potential reason for this is the extent to which Rowntree 
was also ‘locked-in’ to the railway operation, as existing facilities at the Haxby Road site 
and the lack of a competitive national road network might have prevented any fundamental 
change to the status-quo.  Furthermore, Rowntree’s focus may also have been directed 
elsewhere; sales figures recorded by Fitzgerald and reproduced in Graph 21 suggest the 
firm had experienced demand ‘plateaux’ between 1954-56 and 1960-63.  Although they do 
not provide a continuous record, the 1953-54 rise may be attributed to food decontrol, 
whilst later rises in sales might have been assisted by growing overseas markets and 
changing marketing technology via television advertising.982  
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 21 (p. 310). 
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Technological change also features in the hypothesis that Rowntree’s research into the 
packaging used to protect confectionery in transit was the one area where the confectioner 
could influence the cost of distribution in its long-term relationship with rail transport.  The 
firm reported that wooden cases commanded a high initial purchase and empty transport 
cost, and therefore looked to the pallet, which had been developed during the Second 
World War, as a cost-effective alternative because of the minimal amount of material used 
and its lower tare weight.983 The pallet thus permitted the dispatch of loose items in bulk, 
thereby reducing handling when loading and unloading at York and the receiving depots.  
However, Rowntree’s readiness to adopt the technology was hampered by BR’s initial 
reticence to invest in and then allocate the requisite equipment; it was not until after 1955 
strike that the ‘PALVAN’, illustrated in Image 14, was used for Rowntree’s traffic, albeit 
with mixed results.984  
  
Image 14  
 
   
Two unrestored ex-BR PALVANS at Toddington on the Gloucestershire-Warwickshire 
Steam Railway.  Introduced in 1953 as part of a rush to keep pace with advances in goods 
packaging, they represent a transition between the visually similar 12-ton goods van and the 
modern, pallet-friendly wagons introduced during the 1960s.  Source: Author’s collection. 
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The PALVAN emerged in 1953, and by preceding the goods rolling stock investment 
programme proposed under the Modernisation Plan of January 1955, demonstrates that BR 
was not necessarily displaying complete inertia in rolling stock investment.985 The design 
consisted of a modified covered van with 12-tons capacity and vacuum brakes to facilitate 
high-speed running.  The side doors were offset to permit forklift loading, allowing BR to 
offer a goods service that reduced handling for a quicker wagon turnaround at goods 
terminals.  However, initial batches were in limited circulation, with Rowntree’s use of the 
PALVAN beginning after a fleet enlargement in 1955.986 Whilst the basic premise 
demonstrates BR’s ability to adapt to new traffic flows, in practice the concept also 
encapsulates the inflexibility of the railway operation when compared with road haulage. 
Whilst offering a short-term solution to the pallet problem, the PALVAN design 
was constrained by existing standard construction techniques, resulting in overall capacity 
being restricted by the small chassis.  On occasions where only one side could be accessed, 
pallets had to be moved inside the van to obtain efficient use of internal space.  
Furthermore, the narrow width, dictated by the British loading gauge, prevented the 
stacking of standard pallets, which affected weight distribution and combined with the 
wagon’s short wheelbase to produce a propensity to derail at high speed.987 Their 
instability necessitated de-rating from 75mph to 40mph, although this still compared 
favourably with road haulage in 1957, when the maximum speed for lorries was 30mph.988 
However, the need for improvement prompted the replacement of the PALVANs with a 
new generation of purpose-built vans capable of reliable running at express speeds.989 
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5.11 Modal shift at last: Rowntree’s rail and road operations, 
1960-1975 
 
Map 3  
Rowntree Depot Locations, c.1972 
 
Source: R. R. Darsley, “Rowntrees of York,” Industrial Railway Record, 43 (June 1972), p. 
245. 
 
The two decades between 1950 and 1970 were marked by intense competition between the 
key firms for shelf-space at retailers, and the processing of orders demanded a flexible, 
efficient and reliable distribution system that could support a cost-controlled and demand-
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driven sales environment.990 Although possession of a haulage subsidiary provided a 
means of meeting this challenge, it appears that Rowntree remained ‘locked-in’ to the 
mode years after motorway construction had created an alternative national network for 
trunk haulage.  A reason might have been that the investment sunk into railway 
infrastructure over several decades had created path-dependency in distribution, confirmed 
by the quantity of wagons originating from the Cocoa Works in 1960 and 1972.  In 1960, 
75 wagonloads were dispatched in two trains per day, rising to 90 by 1972, and indicates 
that Rowntree’s rail operation was little-affected by the reorganisation of the railway 
network following the publication of Reshaping of the Railways in 1963, possibly because 
of the regularity and volume of the confectioner’s traffic.991 
However, the situation might also have stemmed from satisfaction with the 
service provided by BR, as an article in The Commercial Motor refers to the opening of a 
new London depot at Bounds Green in August 1965.992 The new depot was the latest in a 
substantial network operated by the confectioner, the locations of which covered the length 
and breadth of Britain, as illustrated above in Map 3.  However, this expansion took place 
when conditions within the food supply chain were in flux, as the emergence of self-
service retail, consumer demand for choice and emphasis upon price had precipitated a 
shift in supply chain governance towards chain retailers such as Tesco and Sainsbury, 
which could use their buying power and large store networks as leverage against RPM set 
by the suppliers.993 Collective RPM, or the setting of minimum prices via the mutual 
agreement of a group of manufacturers producing similar products, was outlawed by 
government in 1956, although individual RPM agreements between manufacturers and 
retailing firms remained, permitting Rowntree to continue its existing distribution 
arrangements well beyond 1960, as Image 15 indicates below.994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
990
 Bradley, Cadbury’s Purple Reign, pp. 186-187.  
991
 Reshaping of the Railways is discussed in Chapter 2.  Darsley, “Rowntrees of York,” p. 245. 
992
 “New Rowntree Depot,” Commercial Motor, 122 (August 27, 1965), p. 21. 
993
 Maunder, “Food Processing,” p. 193; D. A. Quarmby, “Developments in the Retail Market and their 
Effect on Freight Distribution,” p. 75; Bradley, Cadbury’s Purple Reign, p. 184. 
994
 J. F. Pickering, Resale Price Maintenance in Practice (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 115-
116. 
  
 235 
Image 15 
 
Ex-LNER J27 0-6-0 No. 65894 shunts BR PALVANS and coal hoppers outside Rowntree’s Cocoa 
Works, Haxby Road, 1962.  Note the works in the right background.  The train is on the branch that 
linked the York-Scarborough line to the cattle market at Layerthorpe; the line also formed a 
connection with the independently-owned Derwent Valley Light Railway, the route of which served the 
arable district between York and Selby.  Source: Kidderminster Railway Museum collection. 
 
The practice of individual RPM continued until rendered illegal by the Resale Prices Act 
(1964), which marked the transfer of the initiative to the retailer by permitting price 
competition in branded goods.995 The rising dominance of the large national multiple 
retailer in the food supply chain, with their market concentration and competitive outlook 
also marked a shift in approach to product logistics; the retailer’s desire to minimise prices 
and maximise product choice necessitated the acquisition of transport through direct 
negotiations with contractors based upon the needs to the retailer.996 In contrast, supplier 
RPM could be adjusted to account for transport costs, which had risked funding continuity, 
rather than adaptation on the part of the manufacturer.  A reduction in vertically-integrated, 
manufacturer-led distribution would therefore, in time, permit the use of third-party road 
haulage specialists to produce lower engineering and transport overheads and create 
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savings which could be passed to the consumer, the retailer governing the process through 
continuous quality control assessment.997 
However, the transfer to a retailer-controlled distribution network was gradual; in 
the interim, Rowntree focused upon maintaining best-practice and high standards in its 
own operations; the confectioner issued handbooks to its transport staff that  stressed the 
lorry driver’s role as the company’s ‘human face’ in daily contact with its retail 
customers.998 The manual emphasised that a driver’s ‘...job [was] to deliver to our 
customers, safely and with courtesy, the products of Rowntree’s and their associated 
companies’, whilst high driving standards assisted with ‘...[building] up and [maintaining] 
a reputation for courtesy’, indicating that road transport helped to ‘sell’ the Rowntree brand 
and ‘push’ product sales.999 The professionalization of road haulage staff accompanied an 
expansion of NMU (1953) Ltd. as both Rowntree and Cadbury continued to develop their 
distribution operations between 1960 and 1972.1000   
 Cadbury had ceased delivering raw ingredients to Bournville by canal barge in 
1961, and had transferred to a predominantly road-based distribution operation following 
the construction of a new depot in 1964, a decision which might have been was prompted 
by BR’s freight policy following the 1963 Reshaping report, which advocated a reduction 
in the duplication of railway facilities such as marshalling yards, which were essential in 
the dispatch of wagon load traffic.1001 In contrast, Rowntree’s development programme 
appears more measured, and implies that the confectioner was content to maintain its 
existing balance between rail and road.  The growth of its haulier subsidiary thus stopped 
short of a full modal shift to road haulage, although other factors ensured that Rowntree’s 
confectionery remained rail-borne beyond 1965.   
 Firstly, heavy goods vehicles were restricted to 30mph and were still evolving in 
terms of capacity and length.1002 With road vehicle regulations under continual review by 
the Ministry of Transport, the railways provided a level of consistency that appealed to 
firms such as Rowntree by offering a regular service with larger vehicle capacity and a 
higher speed than road haulage.  Secondly, although Rowntree’s Cocoa Works Magazine 
indicates that thought was being given to the eventual transfer of long-distance distribution 
to road haulage, government intervention in the guise of the Transport Act (1968) posed a 
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challenge.1003 On the one hand, the Act was beneficial, as it deregulated the quantitative 
controls over goods vehicle licensing; on the other, it imposed new controls based upon 
operator competency in an example of legislative governance setting the terms of 
participation in the haulage industry.1004  
 This was extended to the compulsory plating of vehicles with maximum load 
weights, which meant that traffic taken over 100 miles in vehicles weighing over 16 tons 
would be diverted to services provided by a new National Freight Corporation (NFC), thus 
‘[removing] freedom of choice from the user’ to ascertain the most economic and efficient 
mode of transport for the task at hand.1005 However, shorter-distance hauls could provide 
remunerative work for Rowntree’s road haulage subsidiary.  The most visible example is 
considered in a Cocoa Works Magazine article published in 1969, which records that 
Rowntree had undertaken to follow Cadbury’s example by transferring the 30,000 tons of 
raw ingredients conveyed by canal from Hull annually to road transport to provide 
something akin to a continuous ‘pipeline’ operation.1006 The use of rail also encompassed 
two of BR’s new freight services; for the export market, Rowntree used BR’s Freightliner 
service for dispatching containerised consignments to the ports.1007  
 Although Freightliner boasted improved productivity over the traditional wagon-
load freight train, the latter remained in use for domestic distribution, with BR’s 
‘Speedlink’ high-speed merchandise service used from 1973.1008 However, improvements 
in road infrastructure permitted increased lorry weight and length, whilst the development 
of regional distribution centres by Rowntree’s customers at strategic points on the 
expanding motorway network precipitated a reduction in rail traffic emerging from the 
Cocoa Works and the closure of York Dringhouses freight yard in 1973.1009 Similarly, the 
closure of yards in the Birmingham area and the inconvenient location of the remaining 
marshalling yard at Bescot for Cadbury’s Scottish traffic prompted a complete modal shift 
to road by 1977.1010 Whilst Rowntree’s rail operation lingered for another decade, the 
combination of changes implemented by its retail customers and improvements in the road 
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network unlocked the relationship between the confectioner and the railways in long-
distance distribution, creating the road-based logistical system described in section 5.2. 
 
5.12 Conclusion 
 
The case of Rowntree has provided an example of manufacturer-led logistics developed 
and organised according to the specific demands of a firm competing for market share.  
When considered against chapter 3, this analysis indicates that before the retail industry’s 
assertion of executive governance over the supply chain in the 1960s, manufacturing and 
processing industries such as chocolate and sugar confectioners had developed complex 
logistical networks.  Expanding consumer demand, the importance of branding and the 
concentration of the British market amongst a few, large manufacturers meant that speed, 
time and distance were crucial factors for consideration.  The historiographical implication 
is that the structure of one industry once again provides the framework in which another 
operates, with the confectioner’s search for a mode of transport with bulk capability and 
nationwide reach resulting in the adoption of rail as the principal means of distribution. 
 This account of Rowntree’s logistical operation indicates that the firm’s 
experience of logistics comprises of two key factors, the first being the role of the 1919 
railway strike in beginning a long-term modal shift to road haulage.  From a practical 
standpoint, the mode permitted a reduction in the ancillary packaging costs associated with 
dispatch by rail, as products could be packed loose in cheaper cardboard or purposely-
designed outer cases.  However, the second factor was the fact that the confectionery 
industry was ‘locked-in’ to rail transport by historic investment in related infrastructure, 
which was underpinned by the limitations of contemporary road transport such as range, 
urban congestion and an inability to convey bulk loads in volume.  In spite of this, road 
transport’s flexibility over shorter distances expanded once the requisite road infrastructure 
was in place, ensuring that it had already become indispensable by the Second World War. 
 Advances made by Cadbury in mass-producing low-cost chocolate of a consistent 
quality had laid a gauntlet for Rowntree to compete; the latter firm was forced to reduce 
costs through technological innovation.1011 This is the reason for the importance Rowntree 
accorded to packaging, which not only advertised the brand but also assured its retail 
customers that its confectionery products would arrive in both presentable and marketable 
condition; an important example of the confectionery industry exercising executive 
governance over distribution when the supply of transport was in the hands of a third party.  
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However, competition was also tempered by the close collaboration between Britain’s 
confectionery manufacturers between 1919 and 1923; the MCA asserted the collective will 
of the confectionery industry to influence railway rates, hold the railway companies to 
account, and provide a forum for discussing new developments in logistics. 
 The experiences of Rowntree and Cadbury in the field of rail and road distribution 
is recorded in publications such as The Commercial Motor, and suggest that Britain’s food 
manufacturers were important examples of private enterprise making market-based 
decisions on transport matters without the need for external intervention.  However, the 
Second World War imposed constraints upon the confectionery industry, initially due to 
the demands made upon increasingly scarce transport resources and subsequently points 
rationing, which is another example of the government attempting to implement legislative 
governance over the supply chain by removing normal market conditions and imposing a 
moratorium on competition within the confectionery industry.1012 This shift in governance 
was underpinned by a policy of factory concentration to prevent demand out-pacing supply 
and release labour, thus creating conditions for rationalising distribution and transport use 
via zoning by 1945. 
 As chapter 2 has already suggested, the immediate post-war period was 
characterised by increasing government intervention in transport matters; this had direct 
implications for Rowntree, as its long-term contract haulier, NMU, was nationalised in 
1949.  Nationalisation was accompanied by the delocalisation of long-distance haulier 
management, which removed Rowntree’s ability to freely negotiate charges and service 
alterations, a factor which may have informed the vertical integration of road transport into 
the firm’s portfolio after denationalisation in 1953.  In contrast, the relationship with the 
nationalised railway was one of continuity, although this may have been a legacy of the 
confectioner’s historic ties with the network. 
 One of the fundamental problems associated with railway operation was the time 
taken to adapt to changes in distribution because of the constraints of existing 
infrastructure, as the failure of the PALVAN, BR’s attempt to adapt to the rise in pallet-
based logistics, exemplifies.  Furthermore, the full decontrol of rationing in 1954 was not 
marked by a return to ‘business as usual’ for Britain’s food manufacturers; intense growth 
in the consumer demand for confectionery after 1954 accompanied a shift in supply chain 
governance towards large, national retail chains.  This was initially achieved by the 
undermining of the manufacturer’s ability to set prices through RPM, which in turn 
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affected the manufacturer’s ability to fund its existing distribution operations.1013 One 
response to the demand for cheaper transport was Cadbury’s and Rowntree’s transfer of 
raw materials from canal to road between 1960 and 1969.  However, the concurrent growth 
of the motorway network and improved lorry capacity permitted long-distance, door-to-
door road haulage.  Rowntree’s larger retail customers responded to this by constructing 
new regional road distribution centres, which permitted the direct governance of transport 
quality and quantity and forced the confectioner to adapt by gradually cutting its historic 
ties with rail distribution.  The detail of this seismic shift in the food supply chain’s 
character and its role in driving the development of food distribution will be examined the 
next chapter, which explores the British food retail sector’s use of transport. 
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Chapter 6 - Food retail transport, 1919-1975 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Food retailing is broadly defined as the vending of a variety of food products for final 
preparation and consumption off the store premises.  Consequently, this chapter will 
explore the transport operations associated with the final phase of distribution before food 
products are purchased for consumption.  It contrasts with the previous chapters as the 
industry was ‘scattered and ill-assorted [in] character’, with traders primarily focused upon 
the collection and delivery of small consignments from or to local destinations, thus 
rendering bulk, long-distance rail distribution services superfluous.1014 Consequently, the 
main example of modal shift was from horse to motor lorry, rather than from rail to 
road.1015 Between 1919 and the mid-1950s, the sector was broadly split between small, 
independent retailers, Co-operatives and the privately-owned retail multiple, and all were 
characterised by counter service, which necessitated the storage of stock either at store-
owned warehouses or at wholesalers.  Yet by 1975, food retailing had established itself as 
the dominant force within Britain’s supply chain, having laid the groundwork for the 
expansion of self-service supermarket chains connected by intricate distribution networks.  
However, the fragmentation of the industry between small and larger, commercially 
sensitive traders means that data relating to transport usage is equally fragmentary; this 
chapter consequently combines a supply chain analysis with surviving archival material 
and trade literature to examine the changing role of transport in a food retail context. 
 The existing historiography has yet to fully assess the role of transport in the 
evolution of British food retailing, particularly during the twentieth century.  With the 
exception of Roger Scola’s Feeding the Victorian City, the literature predominantly 
focuses upon the consumer-retailer relationship, or attempts to measure the development of 
European retail against the American experience.1016 Volumes edited by John Benson and 
Laura Ugolini analyse the cultural and social values of consumption in Britain, thus 
concentrating upon consumer perceptions and interactions rather than the mechanisms and 
structures supporting the sector.1017 Conversely, Gareth Shaw explores the historical 
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geography of retail development to explain the location of retailers in urban areas; 
however, the implications of shop location for collection and delivery remains unclear.1018 
 Looking at the twentieth century, Victoria de Grazia suggests that European 
consumerism was ‘Americanised’ during the mass retail revolution of the late 1950s; 
although the term is broad in scope, the author defines it as the transfer of American 
business, technological and cultural knowledge and working practices to non-American 
regions.1019 Although this narrative has become the historical assumption, it is also 
contentious, as Shaw and Louise Curth argue for the existence of a more nuanced process 
of retail development in Britain, a process which invariably relied upon the ability to move 
goods efficiently from supplier to store.1020 The sector has been well-served by popular 
histories; Bridget Williams’ account of Sainsbury’s takes a thematic approach, whilst 
business case-studies exemplified by John Wilson, Anthony Webster and Rachael 
Vorberg-Rugh’s overview of the Co-operative Group’s development since 1863, highlights 
the challenges and opportunities faced by the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS).1021 
The literature dealing specifically with the development of logistics within the food retail 
industry’s transport operations is sparse over the period 1919 to 1975, with publications 
such as Michael Bourlakis and Paul Weightman’s edited volume entitled Food Supply 
Chain Management concentrating upon developments made since the mid-1970s.1022   
 This chapter uses material from the Marks & Spencer (M&S) and Co-operative 
Wholesale Society archives, Sainsbury’s staff magazines and The Grocer and Oil Trader 
Review to analyse the evolution of retail transport before 1975.  It explores the use of road 
transport by small, independent retailers, the Co-operative movement and the privately-
owned retail multiple respectively, whilst supply chain analysis is employed to assesses 
how supply chain governance shifted over the period and determined the character of food 
retail transport.  The effects of wartime measures to control consumer demand and retail 
distribution are considered, whilst the chapter concludes by charting the extent to which 
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the development of road haulage was a crucial factor that underpinned the mass retail 
‘revolution’ that emerged in Britain after the mid-1950s. 
 
6.2 Food retail supply chain analysis 
 
As with the previous supply chain analyses, the operation of the food retail supply chain 
depended upon factors such as the range of goods, the size of the business and the demands 
of the customer base.1023 The previous chapters have shown that financial data concerning 
distribution arrangements further up the supply chain are widely dispersed; the issue is also 
consistent with data relating to smaller retailers, which presents a potential area of future 
academic research.  Surviving financial datasets consulted at the Co-operative archive in 
Manchester and in the retail trade press at the British Library are either incomplete, 
fragmentary, or present difficulties in interpreting the precise role of transport.  
Consequently, this section begins with an example of surviving transport cost data from 
Marks & Spencer (M&S), an example of a large chain retailer with a substantial archive in 
Leeds that sold consumer goods and diversified into luxury foods, before providing a 
general overview of the supply chain changes taking place between 1919 and 1975. 
 
Graph 22 
Cost of freight as a percentage of total sales: 
Marks & Spencer, 1936-1971
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 22 (p. 311). 
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Data detailing the overall cost of M&S’ recorded freight charges in proportion to sales 
since 1936 is provided above in Graph 22.  The lack of contextual information has 
prompted the author to assume that the series relates to the retailer’s warehouse-store 
distribution operations. Notwithstanding annual sales fluctuations, transport costs declined 
from a high-point in 1936-37, and reduced between 1940 and 1946 as a result of wartime 
rationalisation and a reduction in sales from £29.1 million to £19.6 million.1024 The 
subsequent increase to 1950 is consistent with rising road transport rates under the auspices 
of British Road Services, whilst the decrease between 1951 and 1960 encompasses rising 
sales following government decontrol.1025 Finally, the rise experienced between 1961 and 
1971 might be attributed to a reconfiguration towards a regional distribution centre-based 
system and rising contractor costs.1026 However, M&S’ surviving records do not 
distinguish food from consumer goods distribution, whilst the author has found no 
reference to tonnages dispatched.  Consequently, the remainder of this section will instead 
provide a general overview of the changes taking place within the food retail supply chain 
between 1919 and 1975 as a prelude to discussing their impact upon transport choices. 
 Figure 13 below illustrates the two principal routes for retailing food products to 
customers, and demonstrates what Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey and Tim Sturgeon 
consider market-linked supply chain governance, whereby business transactions are simple 
and can persist over time, yet the flexibility to switch customers and suppliers remains.1027 
With food retail a localised concern, inputs are amalgamated at strategic points throughout 
the supply chain.  These are denoted by wholesaler and retail multiple warehouses, which 
act as staging posts for providing product-specific distribution services or for collecting 
and combining commodities for onward dispatch.1028 As shown in the diagram, the flow of 
goods is complicated by the fact that large retailers maintained business relationships with 
wholesalers in products such as meat and fish, and it has already been seen that 
manufactured foods such as confectionery were delivered direct to the store by firms 
‘pushing’ their products into the market.1029 Consequently, the retailer’s reliance upon 
distributive efficiencies being achieved by organisations further up the supply chain 
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indicates that they lacked the status of ‘lead firms’ driving change between 1919 and 
1960.1030  
 
Figure 13 
The peacetime British food retail supply chain, 1919-c1960 
 
The situation is characteristic of an industry with little influence in the governance of the 
supply chain, which tended to be focused in the ‘intermediate’ stages of processing and 
wholesale.1031 The focus of supply chain governance is illustrated by the presence of resale 
price maintenance (RPM).  As the previous chapter indicates, the practice enabled food 
processors to add value to raw ingredients by converting them into complex and 
marketable products to set prices based upon production and distribution costs as well as 
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margin, thus creating a ‘producer-driven’ supply chain.1032 Consequently, processing firms 
could set the agenda for retail participation through contractual agreement, with little scope 
for retailers to engage in price competition on branded products, whilst wholesaler prices 
encompassed the distribution costs incurred as well as margin.1033 Consequently, one area 
in which retailers could exercise control over distribution between 1919 and 1960 was 
home delivery, in which road transport provided a means for market differentiation 
between small outlets and retail chains through service-based competition.1034 
 In common with the other case studies considered within this thesis, the retail 
sector was subjected to rationalisation during the Second World War.  Legislative 
governance over Britain’s retail sector was established by government to establish basic 
trading rules during the conflict to bolster the wartime economy, which was characterised 
by the implementation of food rationing.1035 Consequently, distribution was reconfigured 
by controlling consumer demand, with competition between retailers was held in 
abeyance.1036 As food supply was based upon a fixed notion of demand, it was possible to 
adjust distribution according to demand through the pooling of resources such as transport 
and cooperation between participants.  The changes resulting from government 
intervention are illustrated in Figure 14 below, whilst consideration of Graph 22 (p. 243) 
suggests that the combination of commodity control and transport rationalisation enabled 
M&S to achieve an overall decrease in freight charges between 1940 and 1946, thus 
reinforcing its decision to adopt road haulage as its principal means of distribution. 
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Figure 14 
The British food retail supply chain under government direction, 1939-1953 
 
The immediate post-war period was characterised by a slow recovery for the food retail 
sector, as food rationing continued until 1953; with supply chain governance remaining in 
the hands of government, the retail sector used the period to develop and trial new concepts 
such as self-service.1037 Whilst self-service brought about cost savings through the more 
efficient use of retail space, the de-specialisation of staff and the ability of the customer to 
view food products before buying, full advantage required retailer influence at key points 
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in the supply chain.1038 However, the process could only begin in earnest after the 
decontrol of food rationing in 1953, which removed restrictions on food consumption.  
Similarly, the continued existence of RPM meant that branded products could not be 
discounted as a result of the efficiencies obtained through self-service, as this carried the 
risk of manufacturers ceasing supply.1039 Moves to overcome the issue emerged in 1947 
when the government sought to improve food distribution by creating conditions for price 
competition for consumer benefit and the abolition of collective RPM in 1956.1040 
 
Figure 15 
The peacetime British food retail supply chain, 1960-1975 
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Further erosion of individual product RPM through buying power and sheer sales volume 
over a wide geographical area completed the shift in executive governance towards 
national chain retailers, with the resultant simplification in distribution highlighted above 
in Figure 15.1041 The development of the self-service supermarket brought far-reaching 
retailer-led legislative governance over market participation; retail chains seeking to reduce 
transaction costs encouraged investment in distributive technologies such as individual 
product packaging and road-based deliveries that underpinned the concept of self-service, 
consumer choice and low prices.1042 The result was a food supply chain managed 
according to the needs of the retailer with transport devolved to specialist firms, whilst one 
can speculate that the adoption of new distribution technologies including electronic stock 
control and temperature-controlled warehouses contributed to the rising cost of freight 
between 1966 and 1971 in Graph 22 (p.243).1043 These changes also assisted the small 
retailer, as their suppliers established a system of franchising and centralised warehousing 
to support the development of self-service convenience stores, thus emulating the active 
supply chain management implemented by retail multiples.1044 How changes in supply 
chain governance affected the role and character of retail transport operations between 
1919 and 1975 is detailed in the following sections. 
 
6.3 Independents, wholesalers, the Co-operative and multiples: 
food distributors and their use of rail and road transport 
 
The role of transport within the food retail sector was inextricably linked to growth of 
consumer demand as a result of the mass urbanisation of Britain’s towns and cities that 
accompanied industrialisation in the latter half of the nineteenth century.1045 The increased 
pressure upon local food supplies due to the geographical and population expansion of 
towns and cities stretched the ability of existing food traders to meet the demand for food 
in areas remote from established retail districts.  Shaw notes that by the 1880s, suburban 
growth precipitated the decentralisation of food distribution away from town and city 
centres, giving rise to a proliferation of specialist retailers in the periphery.1046 This process 
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of decentralisation meant that retailers, as opposed to suppliers of goods, would be 
predominantly ‘locked-in’ to road, rather than rail-based distribution. 
 This process is described as ‘proximity retailing’, in which outlets were 
established within areas of high consumer demand, meaning that retailers were not always 
located in areas with direct links to Britain’s railway network; yet stock had to be delivered 
to a scattered array of small shops.1047 The solution was the establishment of intermediaries 
between producer and retailer, giving rise to the food wholesale business.  In contrast to 
the retailer, the food wholesale industry was a consequence of the development of long-
distance transport links, and the railways provided economies of scale through the 
conveyance of food products in bulk from port and countryside, as well as providing 
warehouse space and cartage facilities for subsequent distribution to local retail customers 
in urban areas.1048 The wholesaler therefore also assumed responsibility for providing a 
convenient, collection and delivery service for the small shopkeeper.1049  
Wholesalers were thus clearing houses that specialised in the amalgamation and 
subsequent sale of supplies of specific food groups including meat, vegetables and dairy 
products to the retail trade.1050 Consequently, the wholesale industry paralleled the 
distribution arrangements established by food manufacturers in establishing a supplier-led 
operation, as evidenced by the diagrams in section 6.2 and the transport operations 
associated with the distribution of Rowntree’s confectionery described in the preceding 
chapter.1051 However, whilst supporting the small, independent food shops which 
dominated food retail in 1919, it is possible to hypothesise that the provision of these 
services added value to the products being dispatched, thereby increasing the final retail 
cost paid by the consumer.1052   
The independent retailer was therefore ‘locked-in’ to an arrangement requiring 
third-party input in the acquisition and delivery of stock; the sector’s primary role thus 
restricted to the selling of goods according to the ‘pull’ of consumer demand or the ‘push’ 
of travelling canvassers.1053 This raises the hypothesis that small retailers exercised little 
governance over its supply chain for combating growing competition from branch-based 
retail ‘multiple’ firm since the 1880s.  However, the multiple mode of retail possessed its 
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own logistical problems, as the regional and nationwide presence of some firms by 1919 
demanded closer control over the final stages of what remained a complex, supplier-based 
food distribution network.1054 Whether this was achieved depended upon whether the 
retailer operated as a private venture, or was affiliated to the Co-operative movement.  
Since its formation in Rochdale in 1844, the Co-operative movement had evolved 
into a federation of autonomous retail, wholesale and manufacturing societies in working-
class areas.1055 The movement had established ownership over various stages of the supply 
chain, giving it the capacity to directly negotiate with suppliers to obtain bulk food orders 
at prices favourable to suppliers and customers.1056 When coupled with the movement’s 
various transport interests, the structure resembled a fully-integrated supply chain from 
farm to fork; in practice the dominance of local retail societies created a fundamental 
disconnect between its key wholesaling and retailing functions.1057 This provided a 
stumbling-block for movement-wide adaption to changing external social and economic 
circumstances, including the establishment of a coherent transport policy, the latter 
resulting in a ‘wasteful duplication of effort’ in local transport management.1058  
Private multiples exemplified by firms such as Lipton’s, Sainsbury and latterly 
Marks & Spencer (M&S), achieved regional and national prominence.  The multiple 
principle comprised the full centralisation of purchasing strategy to reduce the 
administrative burden of store management and hence the risks associated with negotiating 
with wholesalers to produce a retail package that produced economies of scale that 
benefited the consumer.1059 Each adopted different growth strategies, with Lipton’s 
opening 600 outlets in heavily-industrialised areas between 1871 and 1920 on the basis of 
supplying a limited range of imported foodstuffs such as butter and bacon.1060 Despite this 
success, the focus upon such product ranges had rendered this generation of multiple 
vulnerable to the effects of the German U-boat campaign in the latter stages of the First 
World War, as well as post-war economic change.1061  
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In contrast, regional multiples such as Sainsbury expanded during the inter-war 
economic recession, having focused upon establishing food ranges with broad 
demographic appeal.1062 The approach placed the onus upon the retailer to meet consumer 
demand and sell a broad range of food at competitive prices; the price-inflationary 
influence of the wholesaler could be bypassed through the centralisation of purchases 
direct from the supplier, a process characterised by M&S’ expansion to 145 stores before 
the First World War.1063 However, whilst centralised purchasing concept presented 
multiples with an opportunity to establish greater supply chain accountability through 
direct negotiation with producers and the development of centrally-located warehouses, 
retail transport remained only partially integrated outside of the Co-operative movement. 
For the small, independent retailer, the wholesaler’s importance within the supply 
chain meant that transport organisation, and hence the negotiation of delivery rates to 
stores, was beyond their control; integration of store collection and delivery was only 
possible when own-account transport was available.1064 This contrasted with the multiples, 
which could assign clusters of shops to warehouses to facilitate regular dispatch, tight cost-
control and closer monitoring of stock condition and staff.1065 The warehouse system was 
also flexible, as multiples were free to accept goods from suppliers and adopt horse or 
motor transport on own account for store deliveries, with supplies dispatched by rail in the 
case of outlying stores.1066 However, it is possible to hypothesise that a combination of 
geography, the varying quantities of goods sold at branches, declining reliability, rate rises 
and the emergence of motorised lorries and vans confirmed that Britain’s railways were 
generally unsuitable for maintaining an efficient retail distribution operation by 1919. 
 Although food retail multiples with warehouses managed rising railway rates by 
employing staff to scrutinise charges and regularly acquiring stock in bulk from suppliers 
to obtain lower ‘tonnage’ charges, smaller retailers requiring less than a ton of goods 
reportedly accepted the rate as charged, exemplifying how businesses could be ‘locked-in’ 
to a mode of transport.1067 The government’s sanctioning of a general railway rates 
increase in 1920 had particular ramifications for retailers, as the merchandise charges for 
food products rose by 60 per cent.1068 This was further increased by an additional flat-rate 
‘terminal charge’ of one shilling per ton of merchandise to meet rising operational costs.  
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The addition of three shillings for railway collection and delivery services, which took the 
increase over the advertised 60 per cent, also prompted objections from the retail trade.1069 
However, this may be attributed to a new statutory obligation for the railway companies to 
disaggregate charges, thus allowing traders to refuse railway cartage and undertake their 
own collection and delivery to reduce costs.1070 
The publication of railway charges assisted the retailer’s application for freight 
rebates; however, this was a minor concession when economic recession and inflated food 
costs were already eroding the retailer’s ability to compete against rivals.  Furthermore, 
progress was slow; although the retail industry broadly welcomed the 1921 Railways Act’s 
proposal to revise the scale of goods charges and remove rate anomalies, this was finally 
implemented in 1928.1071 The inflexibility of the railway rates structure described in 
chapter 2 thus hampered the mode’s ability to seriously compete for retail business, with 
long-standing regulations preventing the negotiation of competitive rates on grounds of 
‘undue preference’; charges were thus fixed at basic ‘class’ or discounted ‘exceptional’ 
rates for merchandise.1072 Whilst the latter rate permitted the conveyance of goods in bulk 
at lower cost, the diversity of food retailing and the small quantities of goods required at 
store level negated this advantage.   
In consequence, the railways would face competition from any transport alternative 
offering greater flexibility in charges and operational radius, thus potentially providing 
savings that could be passed to consumers.1073Although cost control represents an 
important theme in food retail transport, the retailer’s inability to influence the activities 
taking place upstream within the supply chain during the inter-war period meant reliance 
upon transport efficiencies being made by suppliers.  However, the existence of resale 
price maintenance (RPM) in manufactured foods prevented the passing of savings, as the 
retailer retained a share of a retail price fixed by the manufacturers which also incorporated 
an amount required for distribution to retail customers.1074 This was a product of the 
concentration of production amongst large firms, which ensured that governance rested 
with the manufacturer; the retailer’s inability to individually negotiate or implement 
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competitive commodity pricing during the inter-war period therefore provided the 
enterprising retailer with an incentive to find alternative ways of generating custom.1075 
 
6.4 From railway strikes to road haulage: the Co-operative 
approach, 1919-1931 
  
The decline of food retail logistics by rail since the First World War paralleled the 
emergence of motor haulage as a viable competitor.  Chapter 2 has already touched upon 
the technological advances in range, capacity and reliability, whilst the sale of 
reconditioned lorries previously employed in military service provided opportunities for 
entrepreneurs to assemble vehicle fleets at low cost.  Thomas Gibson notes that the 1919 
railway strike had underlined the suitability of the motor lorry in serving the retail industry, 
which continued to experience dislocation because the clearing of the goods backlog 
congested the railways in the months following the strike.1076 This would suggest that a 
close relationship between the food retail sector and road haulage was almost guaranteed, 
particularly considering the latter’s rapid expansion throughout the 1920s.  However, a 
lack of quantitative data precludes full support for the hypothesis that retail traffic was 
more conducive to road haulage; an examination of the qualitative evidence suggests that 
whilst small and multiple food retailers were receptive to the possibilities offered by the 
new mode, its adoption from 1920 depended upon the requirements of individual 
businesses.1077   
 The Co-operative movement thus presents a unique case due to its ability to 
exercise governance over various aspects of its supply chain.  Despite struggling to 
develop a universal logistics policy because of the individual demands of local retail 
societies, the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) became an early proponent of 
standardised road motor haulage because of its vast scale and interest in increasing the 
exchange of goods in an uncertain economic environment.1078 However, the selection of 
the appropriate mode of transport depended upon three main priorities, namely ‘safe 
carriage, speed in transit and cheapness’.1079 Another priority was flexibility, as a 1921 Co-
operative Union pamphlet instructing retail societies on the importance of maintaining 
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adequate transport provision suggested that ‘the variations of the rail traffic afford scope 
for diversion to the roads’ where loads and distances allowed.1080  
 The pamphlet describes that it was essential to embrace new transport 
technologies to meet competition from private retailers and minimise the incidences of 
damage and delay; principles which could be applied throughout the food retail sector.  
However, the federal, democratic nature of the Co-operative movement’s retail societies 
meant that transport was coordinated locally, which prevented the development of a 
coherent national transport policy that capitalised upon the qualitative advantages of speed 
and general reliability provided by the lorry in service.1081 In consequence, a diverse range 
of approaches to the task of distribution were pursued, as the smaller retail societies lacked 
the financial and manpower resources enjoyed by their larger counterparts to invest in their 
respective operations. 
 
Table 16 
Approximate running costs of a Co-operative 2-3-ton petrol vehicle in 1921  
Miles per day 30 80 
Cost of vehicle £855 £855 
Driver and assistant wages (per week) £369.20 £369.20 
Petrol at 2s 1d per gallon £93.55 £250 
Tyres at 3/4d per mile (guaranteed 12,000 miles) £28.13 £75 
Lubrication oil £3.38 £9 
Repairs per annum £40 £80 
Insurance £51.30 £18 
Interest at 6% per annum on £855 £171 £171 
Motor tax £28 £28 
Total cost per annum £802.55 £1051.50 
Total cost per week (50) £16.06 £21.03 
Total cost per day (300) £2.68 £3.50 
Cost per mile 9p 4p 
Cost per ton-mile 3p 1p 
 
Source: R. W. Royle, Transport in the Cooperative Movement and the Organisation of a 
Cooperative Society’s Transport Department (Manchester: Cooperative Union Ltd., 1921), p. 3. 
 
Note: All monetary values have been decimalised to new pence. 
 
Where resources permitted, the pamphlet advocated comparisons with rail to employ the 
best characteristics of both modes when maintaining goods turnover and reducing 
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distribution costs.1082 Furthermore, it identified several disadvantages concerning motor 
transport technology, indicating a similar investigative approach to that undertaken by food 
manufacturers such as Rowntree between 1920 and 1923.  The principal concern was 
purchase and operational costs when compared to existing distribution methods; Table 16 
above details the annual running costs of a 2 to 3-ton petrol vehicle in 1921.  Whilst returns 
could be made from the operation of motor vehicles, they were their most efficient when 
conveying full loads at distances of up to 80 miles per day.1083 This produced a 166 per 
cent increase in mileage for only 23 per cent higher annual running costs, whilst the cost 
per mile of the lorry was reduced by over 50 per cent.  From these figures, cost-efficient 
short-distance delivery work would require fewer motor vehicles used more intensively.  
However, this also suggests that caution and forethought was needed in the employment of 
a lorry. 
The table also shows that road vehicles possessed several ‘fixed’ vehicle hire-
purchase, insurance and tax costs as well as variable fuel, oil, tyre and general maintenance 
costs.  To efficiently finance these costs, responsibility was divided between sales and 
transport functions within the organisation; the latter function employed engineers and 
transport managers to ensure that haulage operations were undertaken by competent 
personnel.  Retail fleets therefore had to be self-funding as the records originally kept by 
the Co-operative movement’s various departments might suggest, with individual transport 
accounts used to charge departments a fixed rate per vehicle, per hour.1084 The requirement 
to cover fixed costs incentivised the transport manager to minimise vehicle idle-time, with 
the pamphlet suggesting that lorries should be on the road for 75 per cent of the time.1085  
 Although the Co-operative movement encouraged an ethical approach towards all 
its employees, the government’s lack of legislative governance over the sector through the 
regulation of road haulage created conditions for transport managers and goods clearing-
houses to engage in sharp-practice.  This included driving-down rates when employing 
private hauliers during busy periods, or increasing a firm’s return on its investment in own-
account motor transport by giving drivers discretion to obtain return loads in company 
vehicles.1086 Furthermore, there was no ‘universal’ vehicle for meeting every logistical 
demand of retailers; specialist lorries and vans were required for perishable traffics such as 
milk and meat, which meant unremunerative empty return runs to the depots.  Despite 
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these disadvantages, the overall flexibility of the lorry in the retail trade was confirmed 
during the General Strike of May 1926.   
 Although railway reliability issues were highlighted by the 1919 and 1926 strikes, 
the fact that manufacturers had already sunk capital into infrastructure and the multiple 
retailer required bulk deliveries to maintain adequate warehouse stocks meant that they 
retained their position within the supply chain as long-distance bulk carriers.1087 This was 
partially due to regulatory and technological limitations such as the contemporary goods 
lorry’s low maximum speed, which prevented its economic use in trunk transport 
operations due to the length of time required to travel longer distances.1088 However, the 
strike had caused the retail industry to experience disruption and delay, which resulted in 
the running-down of available stock at wholesale and retail warehouses, a situation that 
continued during subsequent months. 
 Whilst private retailers freely adopted voluntary labour to maintain a basic 
service, the General Strike provided difficulties for the Co-operative movement as CWS 
and retail society employees were heavily unionised.1089 The effect of the strike at local 
level and upon the relationship with the trade unions has been researched by Nicole 
Robertson and Desmond Flanagan, who both indicate that warehouse and transport 
operatives at 126 societies ceased work, causing disruption nationwide.1090 Percy Redfern’s 
1938 account of the CWS indicates the failure of an agreement with warehouse staff for 
the continued distribution of essential foodstuffs, necessitating the assistance of employees 
from other departments to maintain the food supply.1091 The flexibility of the lorry was 
therefore an important attribute under these conditions, as exemplified by a supply 
operation administered by the CWS Transport Department in Manchester, which 
dispatched 18 lorries to collect 700 casks of imported butter and 230 bales of bacon from 
Grimsby, a journey of over 100 miles.1092 The motor fleet was thus considered ‘a valuable 
asset’ that could be successfully used on journeys normally worked by rail in an 
emergency, although the author has found no evidence of a permanent shift to road 
transport after the strike.1093 
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Table 17 
Comparison between Co-operative Horse and Motor Transport, 1931 
Lorry type Equivalent horse units at £1 per horse per day 
Lorry cost per day 
 
Under 1 ton 1.5 horses £1.70 
1 ton 2 horses £2.25 
2 tons 2.5 horses £2.75 
3 tons 3 horses £3.25 
4 tons 3.5 horses £3.75 
 
Source: J. S. Holloway, Road Transport Methods and Cost in Relation to Retail Cooperative 
Societies (Manchester: Cooperative Union Ltd., 1931), p. 11. 
 
Note: All monetary values have been decimalised. 
 
Despite the reliability displayed by road haulage during adverse circumstances, a pamphlet 
published by the Co-operative Union in 1931 raises the hypothesis that parts of the retail 
sector were yet to fully motorise, as the horse retained a significant presence on 
warehouse-to-shop deliveries in instances where branches were located within a short 
radius of the depot.1094 However, this apparent anachronism was based upon hard 
economics; the pamphlet records that the difference in daily operating costs between horse-
drawn transport and a one-ton lorry in Leeds was 25p, as highlighted in Table 17.1095 This 
indicates that whilst the fixed costs associated with lorry purchase was mitigated by the 
Co-operative movement’s vertical integration of construction at its own works at Trafford 
Park, Manchester, the advantages of speed and payload came at a premium when 
delivering in confined urban areas.1096 
 
6.5 The inter-war food retail multiple: regulation, expansion 
and the entry of Marks & Spencer, 1921-1935 
     
The retail price of food was a prominent issue in the ‘cost of living crisis’ between 1921 
and 1925, whilst price controls administered by manufacturers through RPM were applied 
to processed food products including confectionery, as detailed in the previous chapter.  
Consequently, the retail sector’s lack of governance over activities taking place upstream 
in the supply chain and their direct interface with the consumer meant that rising retail 
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prices were attributed to ‘profiteering’ shopkeepers accused of keeping prices artificially 
high whilst commodity prices were falling.1097 The disparity between retail prices and the 
prices received by producers was the focus of the Linlithgow Inquiry, although the sector’s 
comparatively light treatment within the report published in 1924 suggests that the 
government was hesitant to exercise legislative governance to regulate the terms under 
which the market operated as a whole.1098 Instead, blame was also apportioned to ‘third 
parties’ such as the wholesale and railway industries despite, as chapter 2 suggests, the 
latter being hamstrung by prices enforced by the bureaucratic regulatory structure imposed 
upon the industry by successive governments since the nineteenth century.1099 
 In contrast, the Geddes Report of 1925 advocated a more interventionist approach 
from the government in relation to the efficiency of Britain’s food supply chain.  It 
highlighted that greater market concentration and infrastructure rationalisation was 
desirable to mitigate against rising costs and economic uncertainties, as ‘the elimination of 
uneconomic businesses through amalgamation [can lead] …to the possibility of greater 
cheapness’.1100 The Report thus attributed high food retail prices to the complexity of 
Britain’s supply chain, and acknowledged that wholesalers, processors, manufacturers and 
transport all absorbed proportions of the price paid by the consumer.1101 Geddes also 
argued that the problem was related to fiscal policy, as the return to the gold standard in 
1925 had reduced the value of British currency, resulting in a higher proportion of 
household income being used to purchase food.1102 
 The global depression between 1929 and 1932 again highlighted the vulnerability 
of the sector to economic change, and emphasised the need for tight cost control.  
However, as the full force of economic decline was concentrated within Britain’s heavy 
industrial regions, steady growth in skilled manufacturing industries including motor 
vehicle construction and consumer electronics was experienced around London and the 
south-east.1103 The diversity of the manufacturing economy in south-eastern England thus 
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encouraged internal migration to new urban districts, prompting a building boom.1104 
Urban expansion in the south east throughout the 1930s presented new opportunities for 
growth within the food retail sector, and retail multiples such as Sainsbury took advantage 
of the situation to expand their store portfolios into new areas. 
 The shifting centres of consumer demand caused by suburbanisation thus began a 
large-scale shift from horse-drawn to motorised retail transport operations.  The 
establishment of shops at new, more distant locations in relation to existing warehouses 
and wholesalers had rendered the horse increasingly uneconomic; the spread of outlets into 
the suburbs thus presented an opportunity to use motor vehicles with heavier maximum 
payloads over longer cumulative distances to obtain greater economies of scale and door-
to-door service.1105 However, whilst it is possible to hypothesise that expanding food retail 
firms such as Sainsbury enjoyed levels of trade that supported a vertically-integrated lorry 
fleet for store deliveries, the wider adoption of motor transport again depended upon an 
individual retail firm’s circumstances.1106 
As motorised goods transport had experienced profound growth since 1919, 
Thomas Gibson has indicated that adverse economic cycles and motor taxation did little to 
deter smaller retailers from purchasing ‘runabout’ vans before 1932.1107 However, 
increased government regulation through the Road and Rail Traffic Act (1933) presented 
another factor that might have facilitated the retail sector’s increasing use of motor 
transport.  Peter Scott has shown that whilst the implementation of quantitative licensing 
for goods hauliers had effected a brake upon the number of vehicles registered by private 
hauliers between 1933 and 1938, the legislation stopped short of penalising the small 
trader.1108 This was because the quantity of ‘C’ licences issued for vehicles operated on 
‘own account’ were exempt from review and were issued without restriction.  
 Previous chapters have established that the key determinants of choosing a mode 
of transport were food product types and the cost of conveyance.  However, road transport 
possessed additional attributes which proved useful within a competitive retail 
environment where range, convenience and the desire to establish effective methods of 
generating sales attracted the retailer’s attention.1109 The approaches adopted by individual 
retail businesses to maintain competitiveness depended upon their target market, making it 
                                                 
1104
 N. K. Buxton, “The Role of ‘New’ Industries in Britain during the 1930s: A Reinterpretation,” The 
Business History Review, 49 (1975), p. 222; Broadberry, The British Economy Between the Wars, pp. 48-51. 
1105
 Williams, The Best Butter in the World, pp. 77-78 
1106
 “Delivered to your Door,” pp. 4-5. 
1107
 Gibson, Road Haulage by Motor in Britain, p. 162. 
1108
 This was due to the Act establishing a mechanism for objecting against a commercial haulier’s 
application for ‘A’ and ‘B’ licences.  See chapter 2; Scott, “The Growth of Road Haulage,” p. 138; Walker, 
Road and Rail, pp. 138-141; Road and Rail Traffic Act, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, 1933. 
1109
 Humphery, Shelf-Life, pp. 30-31. 
  
 261 
possible to observe profound differences between retail multiples choosing to focus upon 
specialising in particular food ranges, and small, independent retailers attempting to 
compete for local custom by expanding service provision. 
 One retailer wishing to obtain a share of Britain’s competitive food market during 
the 1930s was M&S, which had focused upon the sale of consumer goods since its 
establishment in Leeds in 1884.  The company was already well-established, it already 
possessed warehouses in Manchester, Birmingham and London, thus giving the company 
distributive coverage in key urban regions.1110 The retailer had experienced a period of 
profound growth following a stock market flotation in 1926, with investment directed 
towards the construction of new stores at locations far removed from its origins in northern 
England.1111 M&S was therefore in a strong position to weather the Depression between 
1930 and 1932, as the majority of its outlets were located in the prosperous south east.           
 M&S’ ability to weather the Depression is demonstrated by its decision to create a 
food department in 1931.  However, in establishing its market position, the retailer faced 
two challenges, the first being the government’s decision to impose import tariffs in 
1932.1112 Whilst this limited the scope to compete on product price because of the higher 
cost of importing produce, this policy enabled M&S to meet the second challenge, that of 
distinguishing itself from its competitors by selling British-grown fresh vegetables, fruit 
and canned foods on the basis of quality.1113 The success of this venture had ramifications 
for the firm’s distribution arrangements, as rising demand necessitated a permanent 
presence at Covent Garden from 1935, where produce could be purchased, consolidated 
and dispatched for sale at selected stores.1114 
 Another development in 1935 was a government scheme to encourage the 
consumption of fruit by reducing tariffs upon imported Jaffa oranges, a trade which 
resulted in the establishment of a specialist warehouse to sort, store and dispatch imported 
fruit at Stepney Green, East London.1115 However, the extent of M&S’ involvement in 
transport during the 1930s is difficult to ascertain beyond payments for ‘freight and 
shipping’ quoted in the revenue accounts; indeed, the sole transport-related memorandum 
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seen by the author at the company’s archive was published in 1954, which indicates that 
the firm used third-party hauliers on short-term contracts to administer its transport 
requirements, and the author hypothesises that this was a long-term policy.1116 It clearly 
had advantages in the pooling of engineering expertise and the delegation of the costs 
associated with purchasing new vehicles to a third party, as the analysis of Rowntree’s 
transport operation indicates in chapter 5.   
 
6.6 Mobile shops and home delivery: the independent retailer 
and service-based competition to 1939 
 
The experience of M&S contrasts with small, independent food retailers, which were less 
able to negotiate their position because of the comparatively smaller business they 
provided manufacturers and wholesalers.  With RPM fixed by the manufacturers for key 
product lines such as confectionery and branded goods, thereby preventing price-based 
competition, the independent food retailer was forced to compete through the provision of 
extra services designed to attract the customer.1117 Beyond the issuing of customer credit, 
the principle of ‘sales through service’ extended to the employment of mobile grocery 
shops and home delivery, both of which were prime examples of how the retailer engaged 
with road transport during the inter-war period.1118     
 Originally conceived in 1934 by an Ilkley grocer to serve outlying villages within 
a 20-mile radius of the town, the mobile grocery shop was a solution to the lack of shops 
located within newly-built suburban housing estates.1119 The concept provided customers 
with a convenient travelling ‘one-stop shop’ for a variety of food products, and provides 
evidence of a retailer’s ‘universal desire to please the public’.1120 The conversion of 
obsolete buses into mobile shops enabled food retailers to meet a changing social need, 
particularly when increasing female employment had reduced the amount of time available 
for shopping trips to acquire everyday groceries.1121 The mobile shop therefore provided 
access to markets otherwise restricted to shop-based retailers.     
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 Another example of service-based competition was home delivery.  The provision 
of the service gained heightened importance during the economic depression when 
independent grocers provided home delivery as a ‘loss-leader’ funded by the anticipated 
additional custom.1122 This facilitated direct competition with the multiples and Co-
operative retail societies, which kept costs low by promoting customer collection, or by 
adding a delivery surcharge based upon the weight of goods requested by the customer to 
offset the cost of service provision.1123 Independent retailers therefore resorted to using the  
service as leverage to increase consumer spend, although the risk of employing roundsmen 
during depressed economic circumstances meant that shops in densely-populated urban 
districts continued to focus upon providing counter service.1124 
 Delivery by manual, horse or motorised transport therefore depended upon local 
circumstances and the regularity of demand; for example, the employment of vans was 
contingent upon the distance from the shop, as the stop-start nature of delivery risked an 
increase in potentially costly vehicle idling-time.1125 Despite this shortcoming, retailers 
possessing small vans to collect stock from local wholesalers could improve the return on 
their investment by employing them on deliveries to expand their customer base 
geographically, which along with the use of horses, grocery trolleys and branch handcarts 
over shorter distances, promoted customer convenience and choice, albeit at the expense of 
transport efficiency.1126 The independent retailer’s application of transport thus blurred the 
boundaries between the districts they served, although this created a cycle of wasteful 
cross-haulage that left retailers with rising distribution costs.1127 Little was done to address 
this problem before the outbreak of the Second World War, when wartime controls and 
declining manpower resources finally checked the inefficiencies created by home delivery. 
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6.7 Food retail at war, 1939-1945 
 
Previous chapters have indicated that policy regarding road transport operations in wartime 
initially focused upon implementing Traffic Control Schemes that had been devised by the 
road haulage sector on a voluntary basis.1128 Whilst the government might therefore be 
accused of failing to grasp the nettle of road haulage coordination at the earliest 
opportunity after the outbreak of war in September 1939, its approach must be considered 
in relation to the complexity of the task. It is possible to hypothesise that the policy was 
adopted because of the numerous interests involved, and was intended to give the haulier a 
stake in the development of the organisation that would ultimately control it in wartime; 
equally, it reflected the government’s desire to establish governance through negotiation 
rather than coercion after the Road and Rail Transport Act (1933).1129 
 The voluntary schemes were a compromise between controlling road haulage in 
the interests of fuel economy and maintaining transport flexibility.  They were based upon 
the existing system of regional Licensing Authorities established under the Road Traffic 
Act (1930) and affected all grades of goods licence to afford the efficient and equitable 
distribution of Britain’s wartime fuel supply.1130 As ‘C’ licence holders, food retailers with 
vertically-integrated lorry fleets were expected to form their own groups with which 
independent retailers possessing smaller vans under 1 ton were encouraged to register their 
vehicles to guarantee fuel supplies.1131 However, full effectiveness could only be achieved 
after restrictions had been imposed upon the demands of transport users. 
 These included the imposition of restrictions placed upon service-based 
competition through home delivery, a task which was undertaken once food rationing and 
price controls were implemented in January 1940.  By tying customers to specific retailers, 
and retailers to specific suppliers, consumer demand for food could be monitored and 
controlled centrally by estimating the quantity of food required within a given locality, thus 
setting the terms of market participation through legislative governance by limiting the 
scope for retailers to enlarge their customer base and delivery radius.1132 However, whilst 
exercising control over consumer demand provided the Ministry of Food with a means for 
influencing rail and road distribution, rationing alone proved ineffectual in curbing home 
delivery.  
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 The problem rested with the fact that the food retailer’s position as an essential 
link in the wartime supply chain meant that guaranteeing the equitable distribution of 
Britain’s food supply was given priority over transport organisation.1133 However, part of 
the pre-war preparations was to give customers the opportunity to choose which retailers 
they wished to register with, a concession which posed a risk of registration at shops 
located some distance from their place of residence, which created demand for home 
delivery.1134 Consequently, whilst government control of Britain’s food supply imposed a 
moratorium upon the competition between independent and multiple retailers, it is possible 
to hypothesise that the rationing system perpetuated the wasteful cross-haulage of food.      
 Another source of confusion caused by the government’s policy for controlling 
road haulage during the initial stages of the Second World War was the difficulty in 
defining what constituted ‘non-essential’ transport.  The problem was partly caused by the 
government’s suspension of the goods vehicle licence classification system for the duration 
of the conflict to facilitate the employment of all general haulage lorries in an emergency, 
thus maximising the mode’s ability to support the railways in the event of serious wagon 
shortages when ports and routes were congested or were closed as a result of enemy 
action.1135 Despite providing a means of contingency in the case of the railways, the 
relaxation of the classification system also had the potential to disrupt a food retailer’s 
distribution operation as vehicles could be drafted into war service. 
 Although railway rolling stock owned privately by organisations such as the CWS 
were absorbed into a common-user pool to reduce cross-haulage and excessive shunting, 
the government stipulated that road vehicles could only be requisitioned by the military, 
whilst those used in food distribution were taken off the requisition list.1136 However, the 
relaxation of goods licensing put own-account food transport at risk, as the cessation of 
official differentiation meant they were considered fair game for requisition by civil 
defence personnel, despite defence regulations forbidding the commandeering of vehicles 
by Air Raid Precaution (ARP) staff.  This is evidenced by the CWS’ wartime circulars to 
its wholesale and retail society staff, and highlight the problems the movement faced in 
dealing with interference from over-zealous ARP personnel after the outbreak of war, 
resulting in time and resources being expended in resolving disputes.1137 
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 The rail distribution of food was inevitably disrupted by the Lüftwaffe’s aerial 
bombardment of Britain, although enemy action also affected the retail industry’s road 
haulage arrangements in two ways.  Firstly, the bombing of city centres had resulted in the 
destruction of numerous shops, which necessitated short-notice changes in existing 
distribution operations.  Large stores were particularly vulnerable, as exemplified by an 
M&S branch destroyed during the ‘Sheffield Blitz’ of 12-13 December 1940.1138 The 
aftermath of the air raid saw the dispersion of individual store departments to various 
unoccupied premises around the city for the duration, causing ‘a great inconvenience to the 
housewife’ because of the branch’s inability to stock the entire range at one location.1139 
 Although the war disrupted the ordinary channels of supply and demand within 
Britain’s grocery sector prompted the implementation of the changes to the distribution 
network described in section 6.2, it also presented an opportunity for innovation in store 
presentation and layout; innovations which would later influence the retail sector’s 
relationship with rail and road transport.  This is evidenced by a pioneering venture 
undertaken by the London Co-operative Retail Society at a store in Romford, Essex in 
1942, which was designed to offer part counter service and part ‘self-service’.1140 Self-
service was trialled to address the problem of declining staff levels caused by conscription 
and the re-allocation of labour to war production.  The war precluded the widespread 
adoption of the concept, yet its potential lay in both facilitating range expansion and 
efficient use of available space, reducing store overheads and catering for the discerning 
customer by allowing the shopper to inspect goods before purchase.1141 
 The concept of self-service thus represents an example of a retailer beginning to 
assert executive governance and change how it interfaced with the customer.  Its 
emergence coincided with a concerted attempt to make further improvements to transport 
efficiency, a task which was placed under the Ministry of War Transport’s remit.  From 
January 1942, the ministry began an initiative to rationalise the transport operations of the 
retail sector to obtain further savings in scarce resources.1142 It concentrated upon the 
restriction of home delivery, which had been virtually left alone since the implementation 
of food rationing.  Although customer registration at shops had suppressed competition, the 
practices associated with competition remained; The Commercial Motor commented that 
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home delivery was a luxury or convenience that had no place in wartime, and the 
government encouraged customers to carry their own shopping home.1143  
 The natural contraction of the retail sector caused by wartime attrition assisted in 
this regard, although the reality was that conflicting interests within the retail sector diluted 
the government’s attempts to establish legislative governance over transport operations, 
ensuring that the rationalisation of food retail distribution was only partially achieved by 
the end of the conflict.1144 A judgment on the success of wartime rationalisation might 
therefore concur with Hammond’s analysis of confectionery distribution during the Second 
World War, which concludes that the Ministry of Food’s policy merely attempted to 
maintain the appearance of economy and control.1145 By March 1945, road haulage was 
released from wartime control through the reinstatement of quantitative goods haulage 
licensing; however, the election of the Labour government in July 1945 and subsequent 
regulatory and legislative changes prevented any immediate return to the pre-war status-
quo of unchecked retail competition. 
 
6.8 Post-war challenges, 1946-1948 
   
The first post-war challenge facing the food retail sector was the passing of legislation 
devised to limit drivers’ hours in February 1946, which had implications for retailers 
requiring long-distance transport of food products.  The legislation imposed a statutory 5.5 
hours of continuous driving, with drivers working eleven hours in any 24 granted a ten-
hour rest period between shifts, which necessitated the employment of more drivers to 
maintain existing service levels, as well as creating demand for higher-capacity 
vehicles.1146 Secondly, discussions surrounding the nationalisation of transport during 1946 
caused concern amongst food retailers, as the Ministry of Transport proposed to rein-in the 
‘C’ licence holder by restricting their range to a maximum of 40 miles from the depot, with 
merchandise traffic requiring long-distance haulage directed onto the railways.1147   
 Whilst the clause represented a clear desire to continue the work of transport 
rationalisation and coordination based upon the strengths of rail and road transport, the 
distance restriction demonstrated the government’s failure to recognise that merchandise 
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traffic was not necessarily in direct competition with the railways because of the lower 
distances involved.1148 Food distribution between warehouse and retailer was characterised 
by smaller loadings and multiple deliveries over short distances; practices more conducive 
to the lorry than rail transport, whilst use of the latter had the attendant risk of pilferage or 
spoilage.  Although consultation with trade and industry produced a range increase to 60 
miles in August 1946, further intensive lobbying resulted in the complete removal of the 
clause from the Transport Bill by March 1947, thus removing the uncertainty facing 
retailers that possessed vertically-integrated distribution operations.1149 
 The Bill was but one challenge facing the food retail sector’s distribution 
operations between 1946 and 1950.  The period was also dominated by balance of 
payments crises and global shortages in food and raw materials, which prompted the 
Labour government to maintain food rationing in the interests of controlling consumer 
spending and their demand for imported foods.1150 Despite the opening of Britain’s first 
fully self-service supermarket by the London Co-operative Society at Manor Park in 1948, 
an effective self-service operation required the pre-packing of perishable food to preserve 
the product’s integrity during transit.  This required assistance from food processors when 
investment to reduce the resource-intensiveness of portioning and packaging was 
unavailable.1151 Consequently, while the growth of self-service concept was hindered by a 
lack of financial resources throughout the supply chain, the post-war period was 
characterised by a continuation of ‘inefficient’ independent and multiple food retailing. 
 
6.9 Tentative steps towards self-service retailing and its impact 
upon distribution, 1950-1955  
 
Another reason for the gradual adoption of self-service was physical and institutional path-
dependency, as exemplified by the Co-operative movement’s difficulties in establishing a 
coherent plan for its future retailing needs.1152 This was because its existing stores were ill-
suited to conversion, many having been fitted-out for counter-service.1153 Despite the 
movement pioneering self-service and supermarkets in 1942 and 1948 respectively, both 
were products of a single London-based retail society adapting to local needs.  Whilst 600 
other stores were converted to self-service by 1950, Wilson, Webster and Vorberg-Rugh 
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suggest that standardisation was again hindered by the federal structure of the Co-operative 
movement, which preserved the autonomy of the local retail society in decision-
making.1154 In contrast, multiples with centralised management and planning such as 
Sainsbury’s could more readily adopt a self-service policy across its branch portfolio. 
 However, the continuation of food rationing created an interim period for detailed 
research into self-service management and stock control techniques between 1948 and 
1952, which was undertaken with the support of the Anglo-American Council on 
Productivity.1155 The Council encouraged a number of representatives from British firms to 
visit their counterparts in the United States to take advantage of free knowledge transfer 
and hence increase productivity within British food retailing, which ostensibly supports de 
Grazia’s thesis of an ‘Americanising’ European retail sector.1156 In contrast, Gareth Shaw 
and Louise Curth highlight that far from being universally accepted, American retail 
practices were treated with scepticism amongst British shoppers.1157 Equally, it is also 
possible to hypothesise that the slower pace of adoption was dictated by structural factors, 
which include the gradual pace of technological, regulatory and commercial developments 
in distribution, which meant that retailers remained ‘locked-in’ to existing transport 
operations beyond 1950.             
 The product of research into self-service undertaken by Sainsbury’s was the 
opening of a large store in West Croydon in 1950, which demonstrated that food ranges 
appealing to the broadest possible customer base provided a formula for success.1158 It also 
confirmed the prescient observation made by Professor of economics Hermann Levy in 
1947 that the sale of a variety of foods was not necessarily dependant upon the existence of 
an equal variety of specialist shops.1159 The widespread adoption of self-service thus had 
the potential to alter the traditional British pattern of regular, ‘themed’ shopping trips and 
reduce the time spent shopping.  However, full exploitation was contingent upon the 
decontrol of Britain’s food supply; improvements in customer mobility and the 
reconfiguration of the supply chain to reduce lead times and adapt to new food ranges.  In 
short, it required the retail sector to assert executive governance over its supply chain. 
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 The period 1950-1955 was therefore crucial in the development of British food 
retail distribution.  Although the Anglo-American Council of Productivity published a 
report on the future development of retail in 1952 that recommended the adoption of self-
service retail, the implementation of the idea was slow to take place, initially because of 
continuing regulatory constraints.1160 Firstly, the Conservative government’s Transport Bill 
of 1952 indicated that the denationalisation of long-distance transport under the Transport 
Act (1953) would be accompanied by a road transport levy to compensate for any resultant 
transfer of traffic from British Railways (BR).1161 Secondly, the longevity of food rationing 
hindered progress; the full decontrol of Britain’s food supply in 1954 therefore created an 
environment more conducive to the large-scale adoption of self-service.1162 The ideal of 
service through minimising costs and maximising product range became fundamental in 
the battle for customer loyalty and increasing market share.1163 
 
Table 18 
Index of basic weekly wage rates, 1950-1965 
 
 Index (January 1956 = 100) 
1950 70.9 
1951 71.9 
1952 83.2 
1953 87.1 
1954 90.8 
1955 97 
1956 104.7 
1957 110 
1958 113.9 
1959 117 
1960 120.1 
1961 125 
1962 129.6 
1963 134.3 
1964 140.6 
1965 146.7 
 
Source: B. R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 151. 
 
Table 18 indicates that decontrol coincided with rising real consumer income, which rose 
sharply between 1954-1957 and 1960-1965 respectively; increasing disposable income was 
accompanied by a desire for food variety and cheapness, which meant that the floor-space 
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released by self-service could be used to full advantage.1164 With a resultant increase in the 
pace of stockroom turnover as product ranges expanded at the expense of the volume of 
goods stored at branches, the capabilities of the transport operation became an obvious area 
for analysis and improvement as inefficient logistics had the potential to choke the 
transition to self-service.1165 However, a means to achieve the timely delivery of a 
broadening food range cheaply had been developed during the war, as regional warehouses 
constructed by the Ministry of Food were turned over to private enterprise to provide the 
basis for the peacetime road distribution network. 
 
6.10 Improving the mobility of food: warehousing, transport 
technologies and the influence of consumer demand, 1955-1959 
 
Private warehouse and distribution networks were established by food manufacturers and 
retail consortia to reduce the requirement for vertically integrating transport fleets into the 
main business, as exemplified by Unilever’s subsidiary SPD Ltd. - ‘Speedy Prompt 
Delivery’- which possessed 52 depots nationwide.1166 Large retail chains also expanded 
their use of third-party hauliers on short-term contracts, particularly when British Road 
Services (BRS) was in the process of being denationalised under the terms of the Transport 
Act (1953).  In 1954, M&S recorded that BRS operated 32 vehicles on its behalf, with 
contracts terminable via three-month notice by either side.  It also revealed that the ‘full 
and planned use of contract vehicles [offers] a saving of 25-30% compared with [fixed] 
tonnage rates’ quoted by BRS.1167 Denationalisation also saw a proportion of the BRS fleet 
sold back to private enterprise; this presented an opportunity for retailers to exercise 
governance over the supply chain as competition returned to the retail market following 
decontrol, with M&S protecting its reputation for quality by approving new owners before 
awarding contracts.1168  
 Equally, M&S’ policy was to ‘...increase the use of contract vehicles as far as it is 
economic,’ thus highlighting the firm’s emphasis upon minimising internal transport 
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overheads.1169 Store deliveries were thus delegated to experienced, regionally-based road 
hauliers, whilst the firm’s stated policy on rail transport was that its continued use 
depended upon the effect of rates increases upon the firm’s traffic.1170 With M&S seeking 
to maintain its reputation as a retailer of high quality, a resilient and reliable mode of 
distribution that assisted with protecting the supply chain in adverse circumstances was 
crucial.  In this regard, a modal shift to road-based distribution proved beneficial during the 
railway strike of 1955; in the case of M&S, deliveries of food to stores were met with little 
disruption beyond road congestion in urban areas.1171  
 The year also saw a sea-change in activities associated with customer service, as 
Sainsbury’s discontinued home delivery on the basis that its cost outweighed the benefit to 
the customer, a trend that accelerated with increasing personal mobility offered by the 
mass-produced car.1172 The combination of events means that it is possible to hypothesise 
that 1955 was the year in which ‘modern’ British mass consuming culture emerged, with 
rising consumer spending power the driver for further retail development.1173 The period 
1955-1965 also encompassed the development of modern packaging and preservation 
techniques, which assisted the road haulage of perishable food products such as meat, fruit 
and vegetables by preventing spoilage in transit.1174   
 These developments accompanied the increasing involvement of third-party firms, 
such as East Kent Packers Ltd. (EKP), which collaborated with M&S in 1959 to procure 
and supply fresh fruit and vegetables to 133 stores.1175 Aside from receiving perishable 
imports from the continent by rail, the firm also operated a lorry fleet to collect fresh fruit 
from local farms and wholesalers, with personnel employed to check product condition 
before packing.  The removal of wartime restrictions on materials had allowed businesses 
such as EKP to research and invest in new packaging types such as fruit netting, which 
reduced the risk of damage and minimised the gross weight and bulk of loosely-packed 
fruit and vegetables without resorting to heavy and expensive wooden crates.1176     
 The pre-packaging of perishable foods was a major step towards realising the self-
service concept; it increased product shelf-life, allowed the pre-measurement of staple 
foods for low-cost batches on the shop floor, and permitted customer inspection before 
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purchase.1177 Finally, the employment of third-party specialists in the packaging of food 
thus allowed the retailer to reduce its involvement in labour-intensive product selection.  
This had the benefit of reducing company overheads through the closure of warehouses, 
such as M&S’ fruit warehouse at Stepney Green, and focused management attention upon 
anticipating consumer demand and meeting competition from rival firms.1178 The process 
of de-specialising company warehouses was assisted by palletisation, which enabled stock 
to be assembled on a branch-by-branch basis; an important development that increased the 
speed and efficiency of stock turnover at self-service stores.1179 
 Transport improvements also reflected shifts in consumption, particularly in 
relation to consumer demand for products with ease of preparation.  Rising female 
employment favoured products with longer shelf-life and hence reduce the regularity of 
shopping trips.1180 These attributes are characteristic of frozen produce, although progress 
was initially slow; whilst market leader Birdseye established a quick-freezing plant in East 
Anglia in 1945, consumer demand was initially constrained by the lack of affordable 
household refrigeration equipment.1181 The ‘affluent society’ of the 1950s saw the mass 
production of home refrigerators and freezers, with ownership observed to increase from 
six to 16 per cent between 1956 and 1959 amongst Britain’s working class population 
alone.1182 Rising demand also drove technological change in low-temperature distribution, 
as bulky vehicle insulation was replaced with lightweight construction materials such as 
aluminium, thus allowing hauliers to compete for a traffic associated with rail-hauled 
‘company trains’ from factory to distribution depot.1183  
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6.11 Shifting supply chain governance and its effect upon food 
retail transport operations, 1959-1975 
 
The growth of self-service retail also required a reconfiguration of the distribution process, 
and the gradual expansion of Britain’s motorway network after the opening of the M1 in 
1959 presented opportunities for change, as it had the potential to reduce delays caused by 
urban road congestion.1184 Consequently, the motorway network prompted retailers to 
establish new warehouses at key road intersections, creating an asset that reduced 
dependence upon supplier-led deliveries direct to stores, thus lowering supplier overheads 
and the retail cost of food products; this development is described in section 6.2.1185 
Although a limited and unscientific survey of store chains published in The Grocer in 1963 
suggested that 83.9 per cent of centrally-bought goods received by stores originated from 
the retailer’s own warehouses and was conveyed by own-account transport, a retailer’s 
ability to exercise executive governance over the supply chain was contingent upon the 
size of company turnover and its customer base.1186  
 
Table 19 
Estimated number of supermarkets, 1958-1967 
 
 
Sources: Self Service and Supermarket Annual Survey and Directory, 1963 (London: Self 
Service and Supermarket, 1963), p. 13; G. Shaw, A. Bailey, A. Alexander, D. Nell and J. 
Hamlett, “The Coming of the Supermarket: The Processes and Consequences of 
Transplanting American Know-how into Britain,” in Transformations of Retailing in Europe 
after 1945, ed. R. Jessen and L. Langer (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), p. 42. 
 
The issue of supply chain governance also explains the sluggish growth of the British 
supermarket after its emergence in 1948, which was caused by the constraints of rationing 
and manufacturer-controlled RPM.  The latter was an important factor, as fixed prices 
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Number of supermarkets 
1958 175 
1959 286 
1960 367 
1961 572 
1962 996 
1967 3,000 
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initially limited the possibility for retail multiples to pass the benefits of economies of scale 
through the bulk-purchasing of stock and competitive pricing to the customer.1187 
However, a desire amongst the larger retail chains to capitalise upon a combination of 
rising consumer affluence and government interest in restricting and ultimately abolishing 
RPM created conditions which would support the rapid growth of the format throughout 
the 1960s, as Table 19 demonstrates above.  In this regard, the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act (1956) commenced the outlawing of collective RPM amongst a cartel of 
manufacturers, permitting an intensification of price competition in a wider range of 
products.1188 
 
Graph 23 
New vehicle licence registrations for private cars in 
Great Britain, 1950-1969
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Source: See Appendix 2, Table 23 (p. 312). 
 
It is possible to hypothesise that the British supermarket was as much a product of growing 
price competition as the spreading of American influence, as multiple retailers such as 
Tesco recognised that the cost-efficiencies provided by self-service supported ‘special 
offers’ and ‘loss-leaders’ to entice custom, which undermined RPM.1189 The increasing 
size of food retail chains allowed the circumvention of any terms and conditions set by 
suppliers, as retailers engaged in price-based competition without recourse to obtaining 
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support from the latter, a key example of how supply chain governance was shifting 
towards the retailer even before RPM was finally abolished in 1964.  Equally, restrictive 
town centre planning regulations failed to constrain the long-term growth of the 
supermarket format; improved personal mobility and the rise in private car ownership 
highlighted above in Graph 23 prompted the emergence of ‘edge of town’ stores between 
1960 and 1969.1190 
The pressure to drive-down costs and focus upon core operations resulted in 
greater delegation of logistics to haulage specialists through vertical disintegration.  
Although this approach had already been adopted by firms including M&S, others such as 
Sainsbury had continued to operate transport on own-account, which distracted from the 
day-to-day management of the retail business.1191 The practice of contracting-out 
distribution to third-parties also provided a means to avoid the cost implications of 
transport policy shifts following the election of the Labour government in 1964.1192 
Although legal restrictions were imposed upon vehicle construction and maximum 
payloads, the main source of concern for vertically-integrated transport operators was the 
alteration of the regulatory structure governing the use of goods transport.                
On the one hand, the 1967 Transport Bill deregulated road haulage by removing 
the quantitative licensing of vehicles, which allowed the demands of the market to 
determine the maximum number of hauliers and lorries.1193 This was accompanied by two 
other initiatives.  Firstly, the Bill proposed the creation of a National Freight Corporation 
(NFC), which would combine long-distance road and rail haulage to stem the decline of 
rail-borne freight by controlling the bulk transport of goods by road at distances of over 
100 miles, thus effecting a modal shift in favour of the railways.1194 However, the 
inconvenience facing food retailers as a result of the allocation of traffic to specific modes 
of transport was mitigated by the fact that British Railways was gradually extricating itself 
from wagonload traffic in favour of trainload operations, therefore making it increasingly 
unsuited to retail traffic bound for destinations below a 200-mile radius from rail-
connected distribution depots.1195 
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 Secondly, the imposition of qualitative licensing necessitated the employment of 
accredited transport managers and the compulsory training and retraining of drivers, which 
were expensive propositions for retail multiples already experiencing numerous other 
demands upon revenue.1196 Incentives to adopt electronic stock control, ‘just-in-time’ 
deliveries to stores and multi-temperature warehousing between 1970 and 1975 might 
therefore have been lost had the flexibility and adaptability encapsulated within road 
transport been restricted by the government setting the terms of participation within the 
road haulage sector.  Instead, it is possible to hypothesise that the legislation created 
favourable conditions for a shift towards the use of third-party hauliers, with 
administration, cost and risk transferred to the transport specialist, thus leaving retail 
management to concentrate on policy and establish executive governance over the supply 
chain through direct negotiation with suppliers.1197 Consequently, it may be argued that the 
Transport Act (1968) secured the British retail sector’s relationship with road haulage, and 
created the conditions for an expansion of road-based distribution networks.  
 
6.12 Conclusion 
 
The previous chapters have referred to a gradual modal shift from rail to road haulage in 
food distribution between 1919 and 1975.  In contrast, the railways were of limited use in 
meeting the distribution requirements of the food retailer, as geographical constraints 
determined the stop-start, short-distance nature of collection and delivery and ensured that 
the sector already relied upon road haulage by 1919; indeed, the question of modal shift 
might be considered simply as one from horse to the motor lorry.  Contact with the 
railways was thus at arm’s length, and confined to the movement of stock from suppliers to 
wholesalers. However, the road transport requirements of food retailers broadly reflected 
the changing consumer landscape of the mid-twentieth century, which in turn determined 
the focus of supply chain governance. 
 The use of transport depended upon the size of the retailer in question, as the Co-
operative movement and privately-owned retail multiples could justify expenditure upon 
the vertical integration of transport or the use of haulage contractors to distribute goods 
between warehouses and stores.  In contrast, small, independent grocers were wholly 
reliant upon supplier-led distribution throughout the inter-war period.  This was 
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emblematic of overall supply chain governance resting outside the retail sector, as food 
processors and manufacturers could exert influence by setting retail prices through RPM.  
Price competition was thus constrained, and retailers turned to service-based competition 
to increase custom through home delivery, providing an example of how Britain’s food 
retailers attempted to use the flexibility of road transport to their advantage.        
 The provision of home delivery for customer convenience was restricted during 
the Second World War, although the conflict also initiated a sea-change in the introduction 
of self-service.  Whilst it might be said that food retailing experienced a self-service 
‘revolution’ during the 1950s, it was initially a revolution of ideas, rather than visible 
change.  The ideal of self-service was initially constrained by the continuation of rationing 
until decontrol in 1954 and the gradual development of distributive infrastructure such as 
the motorway network; however, the author has identified 1955 as the watershed year for 
British retail, as subsequent years witnessed steps towards mass food retailing and a 
profound shift in supply chain governance away from suppliers. 
 The shift was achieved through a combination of government intervention in 1956 
and the ability of large chain retailers to use their size to circumvent price controls 
enforced by suppliers and engage in price competition.  This combined with rising 
consumer affluence to ensure that Britain’s food retail sector, particularly chain retailers, 
could take the initiative in asserting supply chain governance in their pursuit of self-
service.  This was also supported by the development of new forms of lightweight 
packaging, which not only prevented spoilage in transit, but also permitted a broadening of 
the range of food suitable for display.  The remaining pieces of the self-service puzzle 
included the expansion of the motorway network after 1959, which presented opportunities 
for retail chains to establish regional warehouses at locations away from the congested 
urban environment, whilst the emergence of personal transport underpinned the growth of 
the supermarket format.   
 Finally, changing government transport policy cemented the association between 
road haulage and the retail sector for the long term, as the 1968 Transport Act marked the 
deregulation of road transport through the abolition of quantitative vehicle licensing and 
the imposition of qualitative licensing based upon training and accreditation.  Far from 
stifling the relationship with road haulage, the policy encouraged a transfer of 
responsibility to transport specialists, with retail management free to directly negotiate 
with suppliers to improve efficiency and cut costs within the supply chain; later technical 
innovations such as electronic stock control had increased the pace of distribution by the 
early 1980s.1198 Consequently, the transfer of governance from supplier to retailer provides 
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a concise reason for the post-war ascendancy of road haulage, and underpins the modal 
shift from rail to road experienced elsewhere in Britain’s food supply chain by 1975.1199   
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
 
7.1 Overview 
 
‘The organisation of industry is generally marked by constant change, and, although many 
of these changes are gradual, the continuous absorption ...of ideas and new methods 
...affect in one way or another the demands of industry upon transport’.1200 Thus wrote T. 
F. Cameron, Acting Divisional General Manager of the London and North Eastern 
Railway’s Scottish Area in his 1946 publication detailing the intricacies of railway traffic 
operation.  Cameron succinctly highlights this thesis’ core argument that analysing the 
supply of transport only partially explains Britain’s transition from rail to road haulage; his 
statement reflects upon the fact that structural changes in industry influenced the demand 
for transport and was of equal importance in determining the character of food distribution.  
Cameron also comments that the railways, and by extension transport in general, presented 
a ‘series of diverse, although related problems’, and these are prevalent within each of the 
cases studied.1201 To conclude the thesis, the main findings will be reviewed before further 
avenues of research are proposed and their place within wider debates considered.         
 Two key research questions were posed in the introduction.  The first was 
concerned with the impact of supply chain governance upon food distribution; the second 
the impact of labour relations and government regulation upon the food sector’s 
relationship with transport.  In answering these questions, each chapter has demonstrated 
that success in distribution between 1919 and 1975 depended, at least in part, upon the 
food trader’s capacity to drive change and overcome any reticence to invest on the part of 
the transport provider.  Although such direct action depended upon overall trading 
conditions and the extent of the market influence exerted by the enterprise under analysis, 
it indicates that transport was under continuous review by the food trade, a process which 
generated service improvements and flexibility. 
 In addressing these questions, this thesis has responded to Colin Divall’s call for 
further investigation into the demise of rail distribution, albeit from the perspective of 
food.1202 Despite the importance of food to human existence, knowledge of food 
distribution beyond the key stages of the supply chain is notable by its absence within the 
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literature.  However, studying the needs and idiosyncrasies of the transport customer has 
added a new dimension to traditional accounts focusing upon the impact of regulation and 
transport management upon Britain’s modal shift from rail to road haulage.  The overview 
of the transport sector in chapter 2 indicates that free competition and government 
regulation had failed to produce the coordination of rail and road haulage, and had instead 
exposed structural and organisational deficiencies in the former.  The ‘Square Deal’ 
campaign of 1938 and ‘Modernisation Plan’ of 1955 were thus symptoms of an industry 
wrestling with the fact that it was not necessarily master of its own destiny.   
 Bearing this in mind, the author has identified an opportunity to place transport 
within the context of the food supply chain, thus responding to Elaine Hartwick’s call for 
the analysis of individual commodities.1203 The supply chain analyses undertaken at the 
beginning of each chapter have produced the hypothesis that shifting governance, which 
has been defined as the focus of management and control, amongst the key stakeholders 
within a supply chain has played a significant role in driving modal shift between rail and 
road distribution of food in Britain.  Furthermore, the thesis has argued that the conditions 
which permitted modal shift in some commodities had emerged within a common and 
identifiable timeframe.  The key points supporting this hypothesis are therefore detailed in 
the following section. 
 
7.2 Key factors 
 
Supply chain governance 
 
The overarching influence of shifting governance within Britain’s food supply chains is 
present in all cases studied, as each stage between producer and retailer has exercised 
influence over the organisation of transport between 1919 and 1975.  The thesis has 
therefore argued that the profound changes experienced in the structure of food 
distribution, as demonstrated by the supply chain analyses, drove innovation in the form 
and practice of conveying products between supplier and customer for a variety of reasons.  
These include responses to influences such as the cost of living, inter-firm competition and 
the demands of the final consumer which heightened the need for cheap, flexible and 
reliable distribution.  The resultant power plays between the stakeholders described within 
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each of the food supply chain analyses thus created a dynamic environment for developing 
transport networks according to the logistical requirements of the trader.1204  
 Another motivation was inter-firm competition amongst the commodity-based 
oligopolies such as United and Express Dairies, Rowntree and Cadbury’s, as well as the 
leading players within the more fragmented meat and retail sectors.  Consequently, 
producer, manufacturer, processor and retailer had the ability to exercise control over their 
respective markets at various times throughout the period studied, and hence influence the 
development of distribution.  In the case of the producer, chapter 3 has shown that dairy 
farmers were initially at the mercy of the wholesaler to organise cheap and efficient 
transport.  However, the wholesaler influence, whilst not entirely benign, reflected a shared 
interest in reducing costs and achieving economies of scale by driving the development of 
transport technology to the benefit of all parties concerned.  This placed pressure upon 
Britain’s railways, which were physically and organisationally path-dependent and 
consequently reluctant to adopt and invest in innovative technology, to change.  This is 
demonstrated by the LNER’s lacklustre response to the emergence of the bulk milk tank, 
which contrasted with the willingness of road hauliers and the owners of vertically-
integrated lorry fleets to speculate by pioneering new transport concepts.1205 
 Consequently, the thesis has argued that any change required of the railway 
industry depended upon a trader’s ability to make a financial commitment.  This required 
stable market conditions, a challenging proposition within a volatile food industry that 
outpaced rail transport’s capacity to adapt and adopt to favour the flexibility provided by 
road transport, as the livestock and meat case study in chapter 4 has highlighted.  This is 
supported by the post-war transfer of supply chain governance from the manufacturer and 
wholesaler to the retailer.  Chapter 5 has indicated that Rowntree’s marketing strategy 
focused upon ‘pushing’ products into retail; consequently, the growth of consumer demand 
for confectionery and a desire to establish a positive reputation amongst retail customers 
necessitated the closer monitoring of distribution to ensure reliability, cost-efficiency and 
the maintenance of its share of a competitive market.1206 However, multi-modal 
distribution networks developed by manufacturers such as Rowntree were under pressure 
to obtain cost efficiencies and standardisation to lower retail prices.1207 
 The pressure had emerged from a profound shift in supply chain governance 
towards the retailer.  Chapter 6 has indicated that Britain’s inter-war retail sector depended 
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upon the manufacturer to organise the supply network from supplier to store, a practice 
which provides one reason for the prevalence of resale price maintenance (RPM) 
throughout the period.  Consequently, Britain’s broadly fragmentary retail sector initially 
used road transport as a tool for engaging in non-price competition through services such 
as home delivery, thus providing a means for maintaining market share.  However, the 
growing influence of retail multiples, the decontrol of food rationing in 1954, the 
development and demands of self-service and increasing product ranges gave retailers 
greater leverage over the supply chain.  This favoured the adoption of a standard form of 
transport capable of resupplying enlarged retail spaces from a broad range of suppliers on a 
regular, door-to-door basis; indeed, the gradual growth of the motorway network was 
instrumental in consolidating a long-term modal shift to road haulage.1208 
 
Service quality 
 
The second research question focused upon trader perceptions of service quality and the 
influence of regulatory processes upon food distribution, which touches upon a diverse 
range of issues including labour relations and the impact of government intervention.  The 
trader’s quest for service reliability is important lens for understanding the modal shift to 
road, and it is necessary to reiterate that the immediate post-First World War period was 
crucial in establishing the viability of road haulage in participating in food distribution.  In 
this regard, railway maintenance deficits, traffic embargoes and strikes disrupting routine 
food distribution carved the future shape of food logistics in Britain. 
 Complaints about the quality of service provided by Britain’s railways were a 
perennial issue in all commodities studied, with each presenting examples of cases where 
suppliers had struggled to meet consigner expectations and service obligations because of 
the railway industry’s shortcomings.  With railway companies struggling to operate goods 
services because of wagon shortages, a cause of the traffic embargoes experienced at 
various times, any loss of traffic to road hauliers would appear self-inflicted.1209 
Dissatisfaction is particularly evident in milk and confectionery distribution, as railway 
reliability issues combined with high charges to prompt United Dairies and Rowntree to 
experiment with different transport solutions; in contrast, the retail sector’s long-term 
association with road distribution ensured only indirect inconvenience during strikes.     
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 The Second World War has demonstrated that the railway industry struggled to 
meet the demands of the food industry because of network congestion and damage.  This, 
coupled with the railway strike of 1955, had sown the seeds for a change in the 
organisation of food distribution in Britain.  However, the fact that several technological 
innovations relating to road haulage had yet to reach their apogee, such as temperature-
controlled road haulage, which required the construction of similarly-equipped 
warehousing, ensured that the process was ongoing in 1975.  Further development was also 
required in the management of mass transit operations to meet the needs of self-service 
food retail necessitated the universal adoption of electronic stock control systems which 
directly linked the point of sale to suppliers. 
 
Regulation 
 
Regulatory intervention was an issue that affected both food and transport industries; 
indeed, it determined the terms of participation in each market in ways which were well-
intentioned, yet sometimes disruptive.  In chapters 3 and 4, initial laissez-faire from 
successive governments between 1919 and 1932 gave way to legislation offering greater 
support to the milk and meat trades.  The establishment of the Milk Marketing Board 
(MMB) in 1934 gave the producer protection from domestic competition through fixed 
milk prices that stabilised the industry by shifting the centre of control away from the 
wholesaler, as the supply chain analysis has shown.  Conversely, it was the government’s 
imposition of trade tariffs that assisted the domestic livestock industry by restricting the 
flow of imported animals and meat.1210 Distribution was thus affected because the MMB 
eventually pursued a policy of reducing long-distance milk haulage, whilst declining 
livestock imports eroded the viability of a once-regular source of railway traffic. 
 The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries’ animal welfare regulations also made 
the process of transporting livestock, whether from port or cattle market, difficult when rail 
and road industries were experiencing their own regulatory challenges.  The passing of the 
Road and Rail Traffic Act (1933) added an extra layer of bureaucracy for traders through 
its implementation of quantity licensing, yet it failed to address the fundamental 
disadvantage faced by the railways caused by nineteenth-century anti-monopolist 
regulation.  In contrast, the Agriculture Act (1947) paved the way for investment in 
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Britain’s agricultural economy to improve self-sufficiency in food, a consequence of which 
was the ability of farmers to purchase tractors and lorries.1211  
 Other instances of government intervention had implications for all cases because 
of their widespread effect.  Firstly, the imposition of rationing during the Second World 
War restricted the influence of the market in the interests of preserving Britain’s fragile 
wartime economy.  Whilst petrol rationing favoured rail distribution, it was combined with 
commodity controls to precipitate the rationalisation of road haulage to prevent wasteful 
practices such as cross-haulage and service-based competition to demonstrate the mode’s 
adaptability.  Although the Labour government’s nationalisation programme threatened 
long-standing transport arrangements, as evidenced by the absorption of Rowntree’s main 
haulage contractor into British Road Services and the problems faced by the MMB, its 
abolition of quantitative licensing in favour of qualitative, competency-based licensing in 
1968 encouraged the use of third-party contractors, and paved the way for a fully 
deregulated, flexible haulage market.1212   
 
The point of transition 
 
The foregoing has already given some idea of when a general ‘point of no return’ in the 
transition from rail to road transport took place in British food distribution.  The inter-war 
years were a period of reputation-building for road hauliers, and although the Second 
World War ostensibly slowed the process of transition in the interests of preventing waste, 
it had also proved that rationalised road distribution could successfully operate within 
constraints set down by government in terms of market control and petrol rationing.1213 
Consequently, one must turn to the developments experienced in transport and food retail 
during the 1950s to pinpoint when conditions favoured the widespread adoption of road 
distribution by traders.   
 Firstly, the gradual loosening of restrictions imposed upon long-distance road 
transport after the 1953 Transport Act provided the basis for a general reconfiguration of 
distribution.1214 However, it took until 1955 before the combination of the decontrol of 
transport and rationing, the adoption of self-service retail, the emergence of mass 
consumption and the transfer of supply chain governance to the retail industry permitted 
such reconfiguration.  Furthermore, British Railways’ (BR) Modernisation Plan offered 
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little from the perspective of the food industry, whilst the Associated Society of 
Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) strike of 1955 once again confirmed a key 
disadvantage of rail distribution: the lack of consistent reliability.  This setback was faced 
by BR at a critical point in the narrative of transport in Britain, as the growing influence of 
the retailer within the supply chain ensured that a tipping point had been reached. 
 In the case of food distribution, this tipping point is linked to the emergence of 
self-service retailing since 1945; retail chains had developed a vision of the future, and in 
doing so established a groundswell which would ultimately change the face of supply 
chain management within the sector.  However, whilst a course towards road-based food 
distribution was set after 1955, progress depended upon the resolution of remaining 
physical constraints, which initially comprised the lack of a road network capable of 
accommodating intensive long-distance trunk haulage.1215 Despite this, the retail sector 
was making progress in establishing a clear system of supply chain management by 1975.  
    
7.3 New directions 
 
The thesis introduction has already highlighted that this thesis contributes to histories of 
transport, consumption, agriculture, food manufacturing and retail.  Furthermore, by 
adopting the supply-chain approach, this thesis has worked around the fragmentary nature 
of statistics by using empirical evidence comprising correspondence and official 
documentation to build a picture of the organisation and practice of food distribution, as 
well as considering the place of transport in the development of the food supply chain in 
Britain.  However, the research has also produced some tantalising, detailed glimpses of 
transport operations which offered only limited scope in the analysis of long-term national 
trends forming the focus of this thesis, as exemplified by ledgers found by the author 
pertaining to daily meat arrivals at Smithfield Market between 1937 and 1939.   
 The researcher’s challenge in this regard is the extent to which national trends can 
be extrapolated from such material when the available data series is limited, and a 
comparative dataset remains to be seen by the author.  The existence of more than one 
repository of data is also of use in supplementing the material found in business archives; 
indeed, the author’s research at the Rowntree-Mackintosh archive initially produced a 
conclusion that the confectioner had developed a near-exclusive relationship with Northern 
Motor Utilities (NMU) for its transport requirements.  However, documents at the NRM 
and TNA disproved this conclusion, as engineering drawings found amongst the Great 
Western Railway’s (GWR) Swindon Works collection and a depot agreement found by the 
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author amongst that railway’s plans and deeds suggests the contrary.  This raises the 
possibility that as principal contractor, NMU might have sub-contracted this work to the 
railway company, allowing speculation that there was more collaboration between rail and 
road transport operators than at first sight; an alternative conclusion might be that 
Rowntree sub-contracted to more transport providers than the archive suggests. 
 The breadth and scope of available sources has also meant that some aspects of 
food distribution have either eluded the author, or space constraints have prevented their 
inclusion.  A prime example is the ability to ascertain the extent to which investment in 
motorway construction since 1959 has subsidised users of road transport; although Peter 
Scott has highlighted that Britain’s road network had experienced underinvestment in 
comparison with other European nations, the growth of private road haulage by nearly 
500,000 vehicles between 1949 and 1959 implies that a modal shift was taking place in 
spite of minimal expenditure on road improvements.1216 However, a more in-depth, 
international comparison would provide a useful future contribution to the historiography.  
There is more work to be done on the impact of food hygiene legislation upon transport.  
This might take the form of ascertaining whether hygienic processes in transport were 
adopted out of genuine concern for public health, or were considered as marketing tools.  
Finally, the approach adopted within this thesis might be used to investigate further 
commodities, thus providing a broader perspective on distribution in Britain.   
 The introduction of this thesis has already established that food forms only part of 
the freight equation; much more research is desirable in non-food freight and the transport 
of consumer goods to ascertain whether the concerns and demands of the numerous 
stakeholders that participated within Britain’s food supply chain reflected a wider pattern 
of modal shift from rail to road haulage.  Secondly, much more has been written about the 
regulation of British transport than the effect of deregulation, which has been touched upon 
in several chapters when discussing the consequences of the Transport Act (1968).  
Qualitative licensing was introduced to replace quantitative licensing, which opened the 
sector to regulation by the demands of the market; whilst the government retained an 
interest in road haulage until 1981 through its National Freight Corporation (NFC), the 
effect of deregulation upon the growth of the private haulage contractor and its relationship 
with business presents an important point for future analysis, particularly as the contractor 
retains a visible presence on the road network at the time of writing. 
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 The thesis has demonstrated that the course of transport development was driven 
by the demands of British trade, which reflected various shifts in supply chain governance, 
whether from an executive or legislative perspective; indeed, this may have informed 
political lobbying concerning its use, and might also explain the government’s support of 
the haulage sector since the Transport Act (1962).  This in turn suggests that Britain able to 
broadly parallel the consumer-led deregulatory path pursued by the United States 
throughout the late 1970s.1217 There are also wider ramifications for European transport 
regulation, as Britain was the first European nation to fully deregulate road transport by 
1982, thus permitting the haulage industry to achieve equilibrium through private 
enterprise.  Patterns of transport demand and consumption thus contribute to wider debates 
concerning the growth of Britain’s service-based economy. 
 Although the provision of transport is arguably Britain’s original service industry, 
having emerged to support economic growth, the author subscribes to the view that the 
transition from rail to road during the twentieth century broadly reflected the inability of 
Britain’s existing industrial resources to support a demand-driven mass consumerist 
society alone.  Its ramifications for the supply chain was a shift towards globalisation, 
which has provided business opportunities for transport specialists possessing a strong 
customer focus and a service outlook.  The emergence of the car as a means of personal 
transport in Britain is emblematic of this; it opened avenues of consumer demand by 
presenting new freedoms of choice, which consequently drove changes within business to 
reflect the ever-evolving need to compete for a customer’s time and money. 
 This shift is by no means exclusive to road haulage, which has inevitably 
experienced a burgeoning in scale and scope- BR’s sectorisation programme of 1982 also 
reflected a need to compete for custom, as it entailed dividing the nationalised railway 
operation into individual, specialist business units that could focus upon specific traffic 
flows.  However, the thesis has shown that the metamorphosis which took place in rail and 
road food logistics between 1919 and 1975 was achieved partly through the transformative 
effect of the changes in supply chain governance.  The result has been a continuous search 
for flexibility, efficiency and service; the consequence for failure in this quest is concisely 
summarised by Rudyard Kipling’s observation that: ‘Everything in life ...turns on the 
speed and cost at which men, things and thoughts can be shifted from one place to another.  
If you tie up a Nation’s transport, you can take her off your books’.1218 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
Histories of selected organisations 
 
Anglo-American Council of Productivity - The Council was assembled by Sir Stafford 
Cripps, President of the Board of Trade and Chancellor of the Exchequer, in late 1948.  It 
was composed of management and workforce representatives from key British industries 
including the Federation of British Industries (FBI).  The Council’s remit was to facilitate 
the free flow of knowledge and best practice in industrial organisation by examining 
American methods.  Following the publication of a series of reports on subjects including 
retail and manufacturing, the Council was disbanded in 1952. 
 
Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) - A ‘craft’ trade 
union established in 1880 to represent railway locomotive crews.  Participated in the 
September 1919 national railway strike over pay which resulted in the introduction of the 
eight hour working day.  The union also called railway strikes in 1923 and 1955. 
 
Board of Trade - A government department with wide-ranging responsibilities for trade 
and industry.  It advised on domestic and Empire economic matters, and was responsible 
for formulating legislation on a broad range of issues including trade marks, company 
regulations, employment and transport.   
 
British Transport Commission (BTC) - Created under the Transport Act (1947), the 
Commission was tasked with providing strategic oversight for all transport interests 
nationalised under the Act.  The Commission was disbanded upon the creation of the 
British Railways Board (BRB) in 1962. 
 
British Road Services (BRS) - The trading name for long-distance haulage firms 
nationalised under the Transport Act (1947).  A proportion of BRS’ assets were sold after 
the dissolution of the Road Haulage Executive (RHE) in 1953.  Sales were halted in 1956, 
and the remainder of the organisation was left to compete with the commercial haulage 
sector.  It was subsequently amalgamated with BR’s Freightliner services following the 
Transport Act (1968) to form the National Freight Corporation (NFC).  
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Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) - Founded in 1863, the CWS provided a means 
of bulk-buying and supplying produce and consumer goods to Co-operative retail societies.  
The CWS was wholly owned by the societies it traded with, and integrated the means of 
production and distribution to drive down costs. 
 
Co-operative Union - A national organisation created in 1869 to provide a central forum 
for the co-operative movement in Britain and disseminate advice on issues of common 
interest.  It was also a lobbying organisation for the movement which campaigned on 
matters of regulation and market discrimination against the movement.   
 
Departmental Committee on Distribution and Prices of Agricultural Produce - Also 
known as the Linlithgow Inquiry after its chairman, Lord Linlithgow.  The Committee was 
convened in 1922 to consider how supply chain inefficiencies impacted upon the 
marketing of domestic agricultural produce. 
 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) - The DSIR was established 
in 1915 to fund and encourage a wide range of developments in scientific and industrial 
research to assist the war effort and reduce Britain’s reliance upon imported goods.  After 
the First World War, the Department turned to applying scientific research to everyday 
tasks such as food production and distribution.  The DSIR was disbanded in 1965.  
 
East Kent Packers Ltd. (EKP) - A fruit grower’s co-operative established in Faversham 
in 1944 to collect, grade, pack, market and distribute locally produced fruit such as apples 
and pears to local and national retail and wholesale customers. 
   
Federation of British Industries (FBI) - A unitary association of manufacturing firms 
and trade associations founded by Dudley Docker in 1916 in response to the government’s 
implementation of wartime controls.  Its remit was to establish policy positions on behalf 
of its membership when dealing with government regulation, and also provided a means 
for firms to collectively lodge objections to railway rates at the Railway Rates Tribunal.      
 
Licensing Authorities - Regional Authorities was created under the Road Traffic Act 
(1930) to regulate public service and private motor vehicles.  Their remit was expanded 
after the passing of the Road and Rail Traffic Act (1933) when they were also tasked with 
implementing quantitative goods vehicle licensing.  The Licensing Authorities were a 
means of controlling motorised road transport during the Second World War. 
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Mansion House Association on Transport (MHA) - Originally called the Mansion 
House Association on Railway Rates when created in 1889, the MHA was a trader’s 
association which provided an organisation for objecting to high rates and, after 1931, 
railway demands for the removal of anti-monopoly regulations.  In doing so, it became a 
key advocate for road haulage.  The MHA became part of the Freight Transport 
Association in 1969. 
 
Manufacturing Confectioner’s Alliance (MCA) - Established by key firms involved in 
the production of confectionery including Cadbury and Rowntree, the Alliance was 
responsible for representing the industry.  In doing so, it influenced the development of 
food regulations and pursued legal disputes with external bodies such as Britain’s railway 
companies.  It was renamed the Cocoa, Chocolate and Confectionery Alliance in 1945.    
 
Meat Transport Organisation, Ltd. (MTOL); United Carriers Ltd. - A company 
established in 1946 to coordinate the activities of all Meat Transport Operators in London 
and the Home Counties.  It also assumed responsibility for long-distance insulated road 
haulage.  It became a co-operative haulage organisation that incorporated former MTOL 
members in July 1954. 
 
Milk Marketing Board (MMB) - The MMB was a producer-controlled marketing 
organisation established in 1933 under the Agricultural Marketing Act.  It was tasked with 
stabilising the milk market at a time of dire economic performance in other agricultural 
commodities by providing a steady and regular income for all farmers selling milk to 
wholesalers and other purchasers.  It also developed transport interests to reduce transit 
costs for the farmer, and was instrumental in the motorisation of country milk collection 
after the Second World War.  The MMB was dissolved in 1994.  
 
Meat Importer’s National Defence Association Limited (MINDAL) - An agency 
established by the Ministry of Food in 1940.  It facilitated liaison with the Wholesale Meat 
Transport Association (WMTA) and the Railway Executive Committee (REC) in respect 
to imported frozen meat, and to allocate tonnages for onward transport from the ports by 
rail or road. 
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Reorganisation Commission for Milk - Appointed in 1935 to review the Milk Marketing 
Board’s (MMB) activities and consider improvements.  Chaired by Arthur Cutforth, the 
Commission’s Report was published in November 1936, and also reflected upon the 
efficiency of the retail distribution of milk in urban areas. 
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries - 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was created in 1919 to oversee the transition of 
domestic agriculture to peacetime conditions after the First World War.  Price controls for 
farm produce introduced under the Agricultural Act (1920) were abolished following the 
Act’s repeal in 1921, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries subsequently focused 
upon issues including disease control and research.  
 Between 1925 and 1933, the Ministry was responsible for introducing the 
Agricultural Marketing Acts, which led to the formation of the Milk, Hops, Potato and 
Bacon Marketing Boards.  The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was also responsible 
for the allocation and cultivation of agricultural land during the Second World War.  The 
Ministry was renamed Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries following a merger 
with the Ministry of Food in 1955. 
 
Ministry of Food; Food (Defence Plans) Department - The first incarnation of the 
Ministry of Food emerged during the First World War and was tasked with maintaining a 
stable food supply in wartime conditions.  To prevent shortage and inflationary pressures 
upon the wartime economy, the Ministry devised and administered rationing schemes to 
ensure the equitable distribution of food amongst the population.  The Ministry of Food 
was disbanded in 1921, and its functions absorbed by the Board of Trade.   
 The Food (Defence Plans) Department was created in 1936 to develop plans in 
anticipation of the Second World War.  The Ministry of Food was consequently re-formed 
in 1939 to implement rationing and, in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries (MAF) and Ministry of War Transport, ensure the efficient distribution of food.  
The Ministry of Food was merged with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries following 
the repeal of food rationing in 1955. 
 
Ministry of Health - The Ministry of Health was created in 1919, and absorbed the 
powers of the Local Government Board.  Although responsibility for housing was 
transferred away from the Ministry, it subsequently focused on public health matters 
including food hygiene. 
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Ministry of Labour - Created in 1916, the Ministry of Labour absorbed the Board of 
Trade’s employment remit, and directed labour resources to essential industries.  In 
peacetime, the Ministry was tasked with the re-employment of demobilising soldiers, 
established labour exchanges and the administration of unemployment insurance.  From 
1939, the Ministry allocated personnel to military, civil defence and industrial posts, and 
retained responsibility for labour exchanges after the Second World War.              
 
Ministry of Transport; Ministry of War Transport - The Ministry of Transport was 
established by the Ministry of Transport Act (1919).  It was created to amalgamate the 
powers and responsibilities held by diverse agencies such as the Board of Trade over 
transport matters into one government organisation.  Initially tasked with the 
administration of a transition to peacetime operations, the Ministry of Transport was 
responsible for legislation amalgamating the majority of Britain’s railway companies into 
four major concerns.   
 The Ministry also exercised regulatory jurisdiction over road transport, and 
oversaw the organisation of transport in wartime as the Ministry of War Transport.  
Between 1945 and 1948, the Ministry of Transport oversaw the Labour government’s 
transport nationalisation programme, and later administered the contraction of the British 
railway network following the publication of the Beeching Reports in 1963.    
 
National Farmers’ Union (NFU) - Established in 1908 as a professional association 
representing the interests of the British farming industry.  As a lobbying organisation, the 
NFU worked to protect the interests of farming in England and Wales, as evidenced by its 
call for trade quotas during the 1932 Ottawa Conference. 
 
National Freight Corporation (NFC) - Created under the Transport Act (1968) to 
improve coordination between nationalised long-distance rail and road transport 
operations.  The Corporation was denationalised in 1982.  
 
National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) - The NUR was an industrial union which 
emerged from the amalgamation of three smaller unions in 1913.  Consequently, the union 
represented a diverse range of railway occupations including signallers, works staff and 
some footplate crews.  The union took part in the September 1919 railway strike to 
improve pay and establish the eight-hour day, but refrained from joining the ASLEF-
supported strikes that took place in 1923 and 1955.   
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Northern Motor Utilities (NMU) - A York-based haulage contractor with close links to 
Rowntree.  The firm was established soon after the First World War and was nationalised 
under the Transport Act (1947).  Following denationalisation, the firm’s assets were 
purchased by Rowntree, and became a transport subsidiary of the confectioner, NMU 
(1953) Ltd.        
 
Railway and Canal Commission - The Commission was the predecessor of the Railway 
Rates Tribunal, and was created under the terms of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act 
(1873).  It was a permanent court of record tasked with enforcing the Railway and Canal 
Traffic Act (1854) by supervising the issuing of railway rates and investigating trader 
grievances in relation to unfair charges and abuses of monopoly.     
 
Railway Clearing House (RCH) - The RCH was formed in 1842 to administer the 
allocation of revenue where passenger and goods journeys traversed more than one railway 
company’s network, as well as maintaining a standard classification of goods for charging 
purposes.  The RCH was also an important conduit for standardising railway technology 
such as wagons and equipment, with the resultant designs capable of being easily 
maintained throughout the network.  The nationalisation of the railways resulted in a 
much-reduced workload, and the RCH’s activities were absorbed by the British Transport 
Commission (BTC) in 1955.     
 
Railway Companies Association (RCA) - Founded in 1867, the RCA was a lobbying 
organisation that provided a coordinated approach towards protecting the commercial 
interests of Britain’s private railway companies before nationalisation in 1948.  Examples 
of RCA lobbying include propaganda published during the Salter Conference of 1932 and 
the ‘Square Deal’ campaign of 1938.  The Association was dissolved as a result of 
nationalisation in 1948.  
 
Railway Executive (RE); Railway Executive Committee (REC) - Created under the 
terms of the Transport Act (1947), the RE was a successor organisation to the wartime 
Railway Executive Committee (REC) established in 1914.  It was disbanded in 1921 and 
reconvened in 1938 to provide centralised, coordinated management of Britain’s railway 
network in wartime.  The 1947 creation was responsible for the daily management of 
British Railways (BR).  It was disbanded under the Transport Act (1953) and its functions 
were absorbed by the BTC.  
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Railway Rates Tribunal - The Tribunal was a product of the Railways Act (1921), which 
proposed the revision of railway rates.  It was a court of record set up to hear the opinions 
and objections of traders regarding the ‘standard’ schedule of charges published in advance 
of 1 January 1928; the ‘appointed day’ when these charges would become effective.  The 
Tribunal was also responsible for compiling and revising conditions of carriage.      
 
Road Haulage Association - A trade association founded in December 1944 following the 
amalgamation of several local road haulage associations.  It continues to support and 
represent the interests of the road haulage industry during negotiations with government 
and the trading community. 
 
Road Haulage Executive (RHE); Road Transport Executive (RTE) - Originally named 
the RTE, the RHE was created as a result of the Transport Act (1947).  The RHE was 
responsible for the daily management of the nationalised haulage services, which traded as 
British Road Services (BRS).  It was disbanded under the Transport Act (1953). 
 
Royal Commission on Food Prices - Chaired by Sir Auckland Geddes, the Commission 
was appointed in 1924 to ascertain how conditions within the food supply chain influenced 
the differences between prices paid by the retailer and received by the producer.  The 
Geddes Report was published in 1925, and recommended the creation of a Food Council to 
oversee Britain’s food trade.   
 
Salter Conference on Road and Rail - Set up in 1932, the Conference was chaired by Sir 
Arthur Salter.  It comprised rail and road industry experts, and its remit was to discuss 
matters of policy and regulation concerning Britain’s rail and road industries.  A broad 
principle of rail and road transport coordination was established, and the subsequent 
Report of 1933 recommended the reduction of ‘wasteful competition’ by regulating road 
haulage through goods licensing.  The Salter Report’s findings were adopted by the 
government, and formed the basis of the Road and Rail Traffic Act (1933). 
 
Transport and General Workers’ Union - Established in 1922 following an 
amalgamation of several dock-worker, clerical and road transport union groups, the 
Transport and General Workers’ Union was to become the largest British trade union.   
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Wholesale Meat & Provisions Transport (Defence) Association (WMPTA); Wholesale 
Meat Transport Association (WMTA) - Set up in 1939, the WMPTA provided the basic 
organisational structure for wartime meat transport.  The Association exercised central 
control over operations and administered haulier remuneration during the first two years of 
the Second World War.  The WMPTA was renamed the WMTA in 1940, and was 
disbanded when responsibilities were absorbed by the Ministry of War Transport in 1941. 
 
Wholesale Meat Supply Associations (WMSA) - Established in 1939 when a series of 
eight Associations were appointed as agents for the government with responsibility for 
administering the equitable distribution of meat allocations to retailers and retail butchers.  
The WMSA issued permits to buying consortia based upon an aggregate of customer ration 
book registrations.  
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Appendix 2 
Graph data tables 
 
Table 1  Compensation for damage and loss of goods and property, 1919-1938 (all 
railways) 
 
 
Compensation for damage 
and loss of goods and 
property (£ thousands) 
Goods 
traffic 
(1,000 
tons) 
Compensation per 
1000 tons of traffic (£ 
Sterling) 
1920 2,039 332,164 6.1 
1921 1,353 230,786 5.8 
1922 592 319,934 1.8 
1923 617 366,606 1.6 
1924 658 359,873 1.8 
1925 701 339,818 2 
1926 698 233,850 2.9 
1927 660 345,229 1.9 
1928 570 328,098 1.7 
1929 607 351,144 1.7 
1930 555 325,812 1.7 
1931 472 288,865 1.6 
1932 408 268,519 1.5 
1933 407 269,249 1.5 
1934 421 289,008 1.4 
1935 451 289,914 1.5 
1936 463 300,580 1.5 
1937 521 317,707 1.6 
1938 479 284,834 1.6 
 
Source: Ministry of Transport, Railway Returns (London: HMSO, 1920-1947). 
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Table 2  LNER cartage service motorisation, 1932-1935 
 
 
LNER Road 
Motor Service Horses 
1932 1,615 No data 
1933 2,267 3,244 
1934 2,791 2,901 
1935 3,033 2,483 
 
Sources: TNA: RAIL 390/917, 26 April 1933 Memorandum to the Suburban and 
Road Traffic Committees, p. 1, TNA: RAIL 390/1011, 1 May 1935 Memorandum to 
the Suburban and Road Traffic Committees, p. 1 and TNA: RAIL 390/1055, 22 
April 1936 Memorandum to the Suburban and Road Traffic Committees, p. 1. 
 
Note: There is no data for the number of horses employed in cartage in 1932. 
 
 
Table 3  Estimated British Railways male adults weekly wage bill, 1949-1958 
 
 
Male adults annual 
wage bill (£000s) 
1949 200,689 
1950 198,084 
1951 213,408 
1952 228,899 
1953 240,053 
1954 250,271 
1955 266,282 
1956 288,002 
1957 294,466 
1958 313,820 
 
Source: Calculated from British Transport Commission- Annual Report and 
Accounts (London: HMSO, 1949-1958). 
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Table 4  Non-nationalised lorries in Britain, 1945-1959 
 
 
Total number of 
licensed lorries 
(thousands) 
1945 446.9 
1946 532.8 
1947 649.4 
1948 746.6 
1949 801.8 
1950 852.4 
1951 912.3 
1952 950.2 
1953 981.8 
1954 1,025.9 
1955 1,085.1 
1956 1,147.4 
1957 1,224.3 
1958 1,258.1 
1959 1,299.3 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, Annual Abstract of Statistics (London: HMSO, 
1946-1960). 
 
 
Table 5  British Railways total merchandise freight traffic, 1948-1959 
 
 
Total merchandise freight 
tonnage (thousand tons) 
1948 54,727 
1949 53,978 
1950 52,995 
1951 53,290 
1952 50,275 
1953 48,708 
1954 46,641 
1955 43,400 
1956 42,503 
1957 41,596 
1958 36,290 
1959 37,125 
 
Source: British Transport Commission, Transport Statistics (London: HMSO, 1948-
1959). 
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Table 6  Liquid milk for consumption in the UK, 1901-1937 
 
 
Liquid milk for 
consumption (million 
gallons, including Eire) 
Liquid milk for consumption 
(million gallons, excluding 
Eire) 
1901 1,605  
1919 1,892  
1920 1,807  
1921 1,894  
1922 1,907  
1923 1,928  
1924 1,965  
1925 
 1,152 
1926 
 1,186 
1927 
 1,212 
1928 
 1,224 
1929 
 1,235 
1930 
 1,255 
1931 
 1,249 
1932 
 1,248 
1933 
 1,255 
1934 
 1,255 
1935 
 1,277 
1936 
 1,331 
1937 
 1,336 
 
Source: B. R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 211-212. 
 
 
Table 7  Cost of United Dairies' milk transport as a percentage of total sales, 1927-
1938 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WSA: 1531/130/1, Wilts United Dairies, Annual Accounts and Balances, 1917-1938. 
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Table 8  Milk Marketing Board transport deductions as a proportion of total 
producer contract income, 1935-1975 
 
 
Transport 
Deductions 
(£ sterling) 
Total Value of Milk 
Sold 
(£ sterling) 
Transport deductions 
as a proportion of total 
producer contract 
income 
 3,337,339 36,698,931 9.09 
	 4,163,411 56,454,591 7.37 
	 3,921,943 96,022,215 4.08 
 4,893,753 177,040,306 2.76 

 6,678,027 235,484,500 2.83 

 7,385,601 259,573,429 2.84 

 8,350,198 397,952,743 2.09 
 9,502,076 345,606,969 2.74 
 28,071,864 670,765,834 4.18 
 
Source: Milk Marketing Board, Reports and Accounts, 1935-1975. 
 
 
Table 9  Value of gross output of selected agricultural holdings in England and Wales 
and the economic Depression, 1927-1939 
 
 
Milk and 
products 
(£ millions) 
Grain crops 
(£ millions) 
Potatoes and 
sugar beet 
(£ millions) 
1927-28 55 22.6 17.1 
1933-34 52.1 9.2 14.2 
1934-35 52.9 10.1 18.8 
1935-36 54.1 10 19.5 
1936-37 55.8 12.4 20.4 
1937-38 59.3 12.4 16.6 
1938-39 64.6 10 15.8 
 
Source: E. H. Whetham, The Agrarian History of England and Wales, Vol. VIII 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 260. 
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Table 10  Annual average liquid milk prices in England and Wales, 1922-1938 
 
 
Annual average liquid milk prices 
in England and Wales, 1922-1938 
(data converted to new pence) 
1922-23 6.7 
1923-24 6.4 
1924-25 6.4 
1925-26 6.4 
1927-28 5.9 
1929-30 6.2 
1930-31 5.8 
1931-32 5.6 
1932-33 5.9 
1933-34 4.9 
1934-35 5 
1935-36 4.8 
1936-37 5 
1937-38 5.4 
 
Source: E. H. Whetham, The Agrarian History of England and Wales, Vol. VIII 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 147; pp. 251-252. 
 
 
Table 11  Total wartime milk production (June-May year), 1939-1945 
 
 Milk (million gallons) 
Pre-war 
average 1,781 
1939-40 1,771 
1940-41 1,608 
1941-42 1,564 
1942-43 1,657 
1943-44 1,712 
1944-45 1,727 
1945-46 1,789 
 
Source: K. A. H. Murray, History of the Second World War- Agriculture (London: 
HMSO, 1955), p. 262. 
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Table 12  Production and consumption of liquid milk in the UK, 1945-1964 
 
 
Liquid milk 
for 
consumption 
(million 
gallons) 
Population: 
mid-year 
estimates 
(thousands) 
Estimated 
average milk 
consumption 
per capita in the 
UK, 1945-1964 
(gallons per 
annum) 
Estimated 
average milk 
consumption 
per capita in the 
UK, 1945-1964 
(pints per week) 
1945 1,243 48,668 25.5 3.9 
1946 1,304 48,987 26.6 4 
1947 1,305 49,538 26.3 4 
1948 1,417 50,033 28.3 4.4 
1949 1,514 50,331 30 4.6 
1950 1,557 50,381 30.6 4.7 
1951 1,567 50,286 31.1 4.7 
1952 1,545 50,429 30.6 4.7 
1953 1,518 50,592 30 4.6 
1954 1,515 50,764 29.8 4.5 
1955 1,516 50,946 29.7 4.5 
1956 1,521 51,183 29.7 4.5 
1957 1,504 51,430 29.2 4.4 
1958 1,518 51,652 29.3 4.5 
1959 1,537 51,956 29.5 4.5 
1960 1,559 52,372 29.7 4.5 
1961 1,583 52,807 29.9 4.6 
1962 1,606 53,291 30.1 4.6 
1963 1,621 53,624 30.2 4.6 
1964 1,641 53,990 30.3 4.6 
 
Sources: B. R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 211-212; “UK Population Estimates 1851-
2014,” Office for National Statistics, 6 July 2015, accessed January 3, 2017, 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/people 
populationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/adhocs/0
04356ukpopulationestimates1851to2014. 
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Table 13  Comparison between total British cattle population and imported Irish 
cattle, 1901-1926 
 
 
Total British cattle population 
(to nearest 1,000) 
Total Irish imports 
(to nearest 1,000) 
1901 6,764 343 
1902 6,556 959 
1903 6,705 898 
1904 6,858 772 
1905 6,987 749 
1906 7,011 775 
1907 6,912 842 
1908 6,905 862 
1909 7,021 837 
1910 7,037 868 
1911 7,114 695 
1912 7,026 555 
1913 6,964 1,108 
1914 7,093 945 
1915 7,288 841 
1916 7,442 889 
1917 7,437 889 
1918 7,410 720 
1919 7,424 764 
1920 6,713 926 
1921 6,660 767 
1922 6,869 978 
1923 7,017 813 
1924 7,059 1,078 
1925 7,368 781 
1926 7,451 720 
 
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food & Department of 
Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland, A Century of Agricultural Statistics: Great 
Britain, 1866-1966 (London: HMSO, 1968); A. Chadwick et al., The Meat Trade, 
Vol. I, (London: Gresham Publishing Co., 1935), p. 248. 
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Table 14  RPI price comparison between British and imported beef ribs, 1914-1947 
 
Year Beef Ribs, British (new pence) 
Beef Ribs, imported 
(new pence) 
1914 9.7 7.4 
1915 11.6 9.1 
1916 13.9 11.3 
1917 16.8 13.9 
1918 17.3 16.3 
1919 17.2 15.8 
1920 20.4 14.5 
1921 21.3 13.1 
1922 16.8 9.6 
1923 16.3 9.4 
1924 16.3 9.4 
1925 16.3 9.6 
1926 16.1 9.4 
1927 15.4 8.9 
1928 15.4 9.4 
1929 15.4 9.6 
1930 15.1 9.6 
1931 14.5 8.9 
1932 13.5 8.5 
1933 12.9 8.3 
1934 12.9 8.3 
1935 12.4 8 
1936 12.2 8 
1937 12.9 8.5 
1938 13.3 8.9 
1939 13.2 8.9 
1940 14.4 11.5 
1941 14.5 11.7 
1942 14.5 11.9 
1943 14.5 11.9 
1944 14.5 11.9 
1945 14.5 11.9 
1946 14.5 11.9 
1947 14.5 11.9 
 
Source: “RPI Average Prices 1914 to 2004,” Office for National Statistics, c2005, 
accessed April 5, 2016, https://www.ons.gov.uk/file?uri=/economy/inflationand 
priceindices/methodologies/consumerpricesindexcpiandretailpricesindexrpibasket
ofgoodsandservices/rpiaverageprices19142004tcm77168515tcm77420253.xls. 
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Table 15  Total British cattle, sheep and pig population and livestock conveyed by 
rail, 1920-1937 
 
 
Total 
livestock 
population 
(thousands) 
Total 
livestock 
conveyed by 
rail 
(thousands) 
1920 28,393 17,086 
1921 29,272 16,773 
1922 29,642 16,706 
1923 30,088 17,266 
1924 31,586 17,846 
1925 33,889 18,663 
1926 34,312 18,158 
1927 34,439 19,728 
1928 34,106 19,121 
1929 34,019 17,701 
1930 33,560 16,117 
1931 35,308 13,721 
1932 36,948 12,328 
1933 37,165 11,149 
1934 35,392 10,615 
1935 35,629 10,410 
1936 36,132 10,645 
1937 36,661 9,238 
 
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food & Department of 
Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland, A Century of Agricultural Statistics: Great 
Britain, 1866-1966 (London: HMSO, 1968); D. L. Munby and A. H. Watson, 
Inland Transport Statistics: Great Britain, 1900-1970, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978); Ministry of Transport, Railway Returns (London: HMSO, 
1920-1938). 
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Table 16  Total British cattle, sheep and pig population and livestock conveyed by 
rail, 1920-1937 
 
 
Million cattle carried 
by rail (to nearest 
100,000) 
1920 17.1 
1921 16.8 
1922 16.8 
1923 17.3 
1924 17.8 
1925 18.7 
1926 18.2 
1927 19.7 
1928 19.1 
1929 17.7 
1930 16.1 
1931 13.7 
1932 12.3 
1933 11.1 
1934 10.6 
1935 10.4 
1936 10.6 
1937 9.2 
1938 8.4 
 
Source: Ministry of Transport, Railway Returns (London: HMSO, 1920-1938). 
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Table 17  Total Irish cattle exports, 1930-1938 
 
 
Irish exports 
(nearest thousand) 
1930 858 
1931 766 
1932 645 
1933 590 
1934 511 
1935 668 
1936 728 
1937 711 
1938 702 
 
Source: "TSA04: Exports of Cattle and Beef by State, Year and 
Statistic," Central Statistics Office, Ireland, March 15, 2016, accessed April 7, 
2016, http://www.cso.ie/px/pxeirestat/Statire/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable 
=TSA04&TabStrip=Select&PLanguage=0&FF=1. 
 
Note: It has not been possible to adjust the export data from the Central Statistics 
Office (Ireland) to accurately represent the exact head of cattle exported to Britain 
between 1930 and 1938.  The figures represented within the graph therefore include 
the numbers of cattle exported to Europe.  However, a rough indicator of the numbers 
arriving may be ascertained from Walworth, who cites figures which indicate that 87 
per cent of total cattle exported from Ireland in 1930 went to the British market.  See: 
Walworth, Feeding the Nation in Peace and War, p. 460. 
 
 
Table 18  Total confectionery output in Britain: Five-year averages, 1919-1959 
 
 
Five-year average total 
output (thousand tonnes) 
1919-1923 28,020 
1924-1928 36,020 
1929-1933 38,800 
1934-1938 46,210 
1939-1943 31,620 
1944-1948 27,000 
1949-1953 44,420 
1954-1959 65,640 
 
Source: R. Fitzgerald, Rowntree and the Marketing Revolution, 2nd Edition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 625-626. 
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Table 19  Cost of Rowntree’s (York) outward goods transport as a percentage of 
gross sales, 1920-1952 
 
 
Gross Sales 
(£ sterling) 
York-Depots 
Carriage Outwards 
(£ sterling) 
Cost of freight 
as a percentage 
of gross sales 
1920 5,126,217 105,220 2.05 
1923 3,152,721 127,073 4.03 
1935 3,078,537 106,470 3.45 
1936 4,371,941 139,256 3.18 
1947 7,431,529 174,089 2.34 
1952 16,117,356 306,177 1.89 
1957 24,171,794 527,531 2.18 
 
Sources: The Borthwick Institute: Rowntree-Mackintosh Archive (RMA): 
Rowntree (R)/DD/T/2 Transport Manager’s Budget Files, 1935-1944; R/DF/A/2-4, 
Annual Accounts, 1916-1960; R/DD/T/2 Transport Manager’s Budget Files, 1935-
1944; R/HIR/4A/9 General Account/Analysis Book, 1870-1953. 
 
 
Table 20  Rowntree's confectionery output at five-year intervals, 1919-1939 
 
 
Rowntree total 
output (tonnes) 
1919 17,845 
1924 17,821 
1929 19,829 
1934 22,499 
1939 52,433 
 
Source: R. Fitzgerald, Rowntree and the Marketing Revolution, 2nd Edition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 611-614. 
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Table 21  Rowntree sales, 1950-1965 
 
 
Rowntree & Co. Sales 
(£ sterling) 
Rowntree Group 
Sales (£ sterling) 
1950 11,982,611  
1951 15,262,130  
1952 16,117,356  
1953 18,760,393  
1954 22,927,735  
1955 23,923,912  
1956 23,927,735 42,504,000 
1957 
 43,726,000 
1958 
 46,163,000 
1959 
 48,856,000 
1960 
 51,955,000 
1961 
 51,538,000 
1962 
 51,598,000 
1963 
 51,678,000 
1964 
 56,647,000 
1965 
 62,075,000 
 
Source: Fitzgerald, Rowntree and the Marketing Revolution, pp. 614-615. 
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Table 22  Cost of freight as a percentage of total sales: Marks & Spencer, 1936-1971  
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Source: Marks & Spencer Nominal Ledgers, 1937-1971. 
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Table 23  New vehicle licence registrations for private cars in Great Britain, 1950-
1969 
 
 
New vehicle licence 
registrations for private cars 
1950 132,273 
1951 136,188 
1951 187,616 
1953 295,073 
1954 386,386 
1955 500,857 
1956 399,675 
1957 425,355 
1958 555,297 
1959 645,617 
1960 805,017 
1961 742,803 
1962 784,734 
1963 1,008,608 
1964 1,190,569 
1965 1,122,477 
1966 1,065,423 
1967 1,116,702 
1968 1,116,894 
1969 987,441 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, Annual Abstract of Statistics (London: 
HMSO, 1951-1969) 
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